Stephanie Turner

The appellant appealed his sentence for assault causing bodily harm, seeking an absolute or conditional discharge instead of the 12-month conditional sentence imposed at trial.

The appellant had joined a group assault on an unconscious victim but did not cause the bodily harm.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court considered the appellant's lack of prior record, his mental health struggles, his successful completion of a university degree while on bail, and the potential impact of a conviction on his career prospects.

The court found that a conditional discharge was in the appellant's best interests and not contrary to the public interest.

The appeal was allowed, and a conditional discharge with 15 months' probation was imposed.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle in a manner dangerous to the public contrary to section 249(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and breach of recognizance for contact with the complainant contrary to section 145(3) of the Criminal Code.

The charges arose from an incident on July 9, 2017, involving an acrimonious interaction between the defendant and his ex-wife during a child custody exchange.

The defendant pleaded guilty to the breach of recognizance but not guilty to dangerous driving.

The court found the defendant's credibility unreliable due to his agitated state of mind and inconsistencies in his testimony.

However, the court determined that the Crown failed to prove the mens rea of dangerous driving beyond a reasonable doubt, as the evidence did not establish that the defendant operated his vehicle at a high rate of speed or deliberately swerved toward the complainant.

The court found the defendant guilty of breach of recognizance but acquitted him of dangerous driving.

The defendants brought a Charter application under section 11(b) alleging that their right to a trial within a reasonable time had been breached.

The delay from arrest to the anticipated end of trial was approximately 20.5 months.

The Crown acknowledged the delay was presumptively unreasonable and sought to justify it based on case complexity and transitional exceptional circumstances.

The court found neither complexity nor transitional circumstances applied.

The case involved straightforward factual issues regarding consent and age verification, with only three principal Crown witnesses and a five-day trial schedule.

The court granted the application and stayed all charges against the defendants.

The appellant, Gordon Machen Jr., appealed his conviction for sexual assault, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel, reasonable apprehension of bias by the trial judge, and misapprehension of evidence.

The appeal court reviewed numerous allegations against trial counsel, including failure to obtain full disclosure, inadequate cross-examination on inconsistencies and omissions in complainant testimony, and an overly narrow "one-pronged" GPS defence.

While acknowledging some deficiencies in counsel's preparation and strategy, the court found that these did not individually or collectively establish a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different or that the trial was unfair.

The court also dismissed the claim of judicial bias due to lack of independent evidence and found no material misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge.

The sentence appeal was deemed moot as the jail sentence and probation period had been completed.

The appeal was dismissed.

During the preparation of reasons for judgment on a summary conviction appeal for sexual assault, the court identified an issue regarding an alleged omission by trial counsel.

The appellant raised in written submissions that trial counsel failed to cross-examine the complainant on an inconsistency between her police statement and her testimony regarding touching.

The court adjourned the matter to allow trial counsel an opportunity to give evidence on this issue.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault arising from an incident at a house party.

The complainant testified she was asleep when the sexual activity began, while the appellant testified she was awake and actively participated.

The trial judge convicted the appellant, finding the complainant was asleep and therefore could not consent.

On appeal, the Superior Court of Justice found the trial judge erred by failing to consider the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent, which had an air of reality given the conflicting testimony and evidence of the complainant's intoxication, sleep-walking, and sleep-talking.

The trial judge also erred by failing to conduct a proper reliability analysis of the complainant's evidence in light of her alcohol consumption.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a conviction for dangerous driving arising from a rear-end collision allegedly caused by deliberate braking after an aggressive pass.

He argued the verdict was unreasonable, the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to defence and Crown evidence, and the reasons disclosed bias.

The court held there was evidence on which the trial judge could reasonably convict, including accepted evidence that the appellant passed too closely and deliberately braked in anger.

The court further held the credibility analysis disclosed no reversible uneven scrutiny and no reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appellant appealed convictions for two counts of assault and one count of unlawful confinement arising from incidents involving his spouse.

He argued that the trial judge failed to analyze each count separately and misapplied the W.(D.) credibility framework.

The appeal court held that the trial judge properly articulated the governing legal principles, including the burden of proof and the W.(D.) analysis, and that the reasons, when read as a whole, adequately explained the credibility findings and verdicts.

The court also found no error in the trial judge’s comments regarding the defence’s failure to cross‑examine the complainant on certain allegations.

The convictions were supported by the evidence and no miscarriage of justice occurred.