Marilyn Denise Dolby

The accused, R.H., was found guilty of sexual interference with his four-year-old step-granddaughter.

The Crown sought a two-year jail sentence, while the defence argued for a conditional sentence.

Despite initially denying guilt, R.H. accepted responsibility at the sentencing hearing.

The court applied the principles from R. v. Friesen, emphasizing the need for increased sentences for child sexual offences, the profound psychological and emotional harm caused, and the aggravating factors of a position of trust and the victim's young age.

Mitigating factors included no prior criminal record, employment, and family support, though the belated acknowledgment of guilt was attenuated.

The court rejected a conditional sentence, imposing a sentence of two years less a day in jail, followed by three years probation, and various ancillary orders, finding the case slightly more aggravating than R. v. J.T. due to the family relationship.

The accused, R.H., was charged with sexual interference, sexual assault, and invitation to sexual touching involving his step-granddaughter, M.C. The core allegation was that R.H. made M.C. touch his penis over his clothes.

The Crown presented evidence including M.C.'s spontaneous utterances, a 715 statement, and R.H.'s out-of-court admissions via text message.

R.H. testified, denying the allegations and explaining his admissions as panic-induced.

The court rejected R.H.'s in-court testimony, finding it inconsistent with the evidence, particularly M.C.'s unprompted utterances and R.H.'s own inculpatory text.

The court accepted M.C.'s statements and R.H.'s admissions as reliable.

Consequently, the court found R.H. guilty on all three charges.

The defendant, Darren Robert Lingard, pleaded guilty to careless driving causing bodily harm under the Highway Traffic Act, S.130(3), following a collision caused by failing to stop at a stop sign, which resulted in significant injuries to a passenger in the other vehicle.

The court accepted a joint submission from the Crown and defence, imposing a $2000 fine and a 12-month probation order with specific conditions, including a 30-day driving prohibition and completion of a 'Back on Track' program.

The judge emphasized the importance of specific and general deterrence, noting the defendant's extensive driving record.

This decision addresses a Crown application to admit hearsay statements of a child complainant (M.C.) in a criminal trial where the accused, R.H., is charged with sexual interference, sexual assault, and invitation to sexual touching.

The complainant, aged 6 at the time of the application and 4 at the time of the alleged incidents, had no recollection of the events and would not testify.

The court applied the twin criteria of necessity and reliability for hearsay admissibility.

It found necessity met due to the complainant's young age and inability to recall.

For reliability, the court assessed both procedural and substantive aspects, including corroborative evidence from the accused's admissions.

The court admitted two spontaneous utterances and a video-recorded statement, finding them sufficiently reliable and distinct, but dismissed a third utterance as redundant.

The defendant brought applications for a stay of proceedings based on violations of Charter rights.

The primary application was under Section 11(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging denial of the right to trial within a reasonable time.

The defendant also brought applications under Section 7 of the Charter and Section 35 of the Provincial Offences Act regarding disclosure.

The court found that the applicable delay was 21 months and 21 days, exceeding the 18-month ceiling for Ontario Court of Justice proceedings.

The court determined the case was not particularly complex and that the Crown failed to remedy disclosure issues.

A stay of proceedings was granted.

The defendant sought an adjournment of his preliminary hearing and requested scheduling of a further date to hear from witness M.P. solely for discovery purposes.

The court denied the adjournment application.

The defendant was charged with attempted murder, aggravated assault, possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose, and possession of a prohibited weapon.

By the fourth day of the preliminary hearing, committal was evident on the record, with the defence conceding committal on three of the four charges.

The court found that the proposed witness had no bearing on committal and that discovery is not a constitutional right at a preliminary hearing.

The court emphasized the importance of judicial efficiency, particularly given COVID-19 constraints and the need to ensure the defendant's right to a timely trial.

The appellant was convicted of wilfully causing unnecessary pain to his dog by spraying it with bear spray and assaulting it, contrary to s. 445(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting hearsay statements from his mother for their truth.

The appeal court reviewed the trial judge's application of the principled exception to the hearsay rule, specifically regarding substantive reliability as per R. v. Bradshaw.

The court found that while the trial judge made some errors in identifying corroborative evidence, the overall analysis correctly concluded that the hearsay statements were admissible due to compelling circumstantial evidence negating untruthfulness or mistake.

The appeal was dismissed.

A young person was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over 80 milligrams per 100 milliliters of blood and with having a blood alcohol concentration above zero as a novice and young driver.

The defendant challenged whether his right to counsel was breached, alleging he was funneled to duty counsel.

The court found no breach of section 10(b) of the Charter.

The defendant was properly informed of his right to counsel through the standard caution, understood that right, and was appropriately offered duty counsel when he indicated he did not have a lawyer.

The court rejected arguments that non-compliance with section 146 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act regarding statements rendered the breath samples inadmissible, as breath samples are not statements and section 146 compliance is not a Charter requirement.

The defendant was convicted on all three counts, with one charge stayed pursuant to the Kienapple principle.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while her blood alcohol level exceeded 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood.

The defence raised two arguments: first, that the arresting officer failed to copy his scratch notes, resulting in lost evidence that should trigger a stay or exclusion of evidence; and second, that the absence of scratch notes rendered the officer's testimony unreliable regarding grounds for arrest.

The court found that while the failure to copy scratch notes constituted a breach of section 7 of the Charter, the officer's testimony was sufficiently detailed and reliable to establish that the notes were transcribed accurately.

The court found no remedy was warranted in a judge-alone trial and convicted the accused.

A corporate defendant charged with animal cruelty offences brought a motion for a stay of proceedings based on alleged abuse of process due to the Crown's refusal to provide first-party disclosure.

The defendant sought investigative files and internal correspondence from the OSPCA relating to the key witness and the investigation.

The court held that while the defendant, as a corporation, could not invoke section 7 of the Charter, it retained jurisdiction to address disclosure obligations under common law and the Provincial Offence Act.

The court distinguished between first-party disclosure (fruits of the investigation and obviously relevant material) and third-party disclosure, finding that most of the requested materials fell outside the Crown's disclosure obligations.

The court declined to grant a stay of proceedings but ordered the OSPCA to disclose investigative files and agent notes related to the specific investigation within 30 days prior to trial.

The accused pleaded guilty to aggravated assault for stabbing his former girlfriend multiple times with a three-inch blade on November 12, 2018.

The victim, the mother of their child, sustained multiple small cuts requiring stitches.

The sentencing involved complex balancing of psychiatric factors, Gladue factors concerning the accused's Aboriginal heritage, his status as a youthful offender, and the serious nature of the violent domestic offense.

The court imposed an eighteen-month custodial sentence with three years of probation.

The accused pleaded guilty to impaired driving.

A Gardiner Hearing was conducted because the accused sought to plead guilty to a materially different set of facts than those alleged by the Crown.

The Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was impaired while driving with his 16-month-old daughter in the vehicle.

The accused's blood alcohol level was 248 milligrams per 100 milliliters of blood, three times the legal limit.

The court rejected the accused's testimony that he had consumed alcohol only after returning home, finding it inconsistent with the toxicological evidence and the observations of the former partner.

The accused was sentenced to 75 days incarceration, 12 months probation, and a 3-year driving prohibition.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown's case relied on breath test results obtained at the detachment following an approved screening device failure at a RIDE program.

The defence challenged the admissibility of evidence on grounds of breaches of sections 8 and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the approved screening device used by the officer had not been subjected to the required accuracy testing within the timeframe mandated by Ontario Provincial Police policy, rendering the officer's grounds for arrest objectively unreasonable.

Additionally, the court found breaches of the accused's right to counsel, including inadequate opportunity to contact counsel of choice, interruption of the duty counsel call, and lack of privacy during the consultation.

The breath test evidence was excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter, and the charge was dismissed.

Michael Canavan was sentenced after being found guilty of impaired driving causing death, two counts of impaired driving causing bodily harm, and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over 80mg.

The court considered aggravating factors including the loss of life, severe injuries to two passengers, significant intoxication, and a problematic driving record with a prior impaired driving conviction and numerous speeding convictions.

Mitigating factors included a positive pre-sentencing report, 56 positive reference letters, and a sincere apology to the victims' family.

The court imposed a sentence of five and a half years in penitentiary, concurrent on each count, a 10-year driving prohibition in addition to the jail sentence, and a DNA sample order, recommending counselling.

The defendant was charged with multiple offences including possession of stolen property, failing to comply with recognizance, breach of probation, using a stolen credit card, and simple possession of morphine.

Following a blended voir dire and trial, the court found that the defendant's Charter rights under sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) were violated during a police stop and search.

The Crown conceded a section 8 breach.

The court found additional violations of sections 9, 10(a), and 10(b), and excluded all evidence obtained as a result of these breaches under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The defendant was acquitted on all counts.

The Crown applied under section 117.05 of the Criminal Code to have the respondent forfeit his firearms and be prohibited from possessing weapons for up to five years.

The application arose after police seized the respondent's weapons collection during a welfare check following the respondent's self-harm incident.

The respondent had made a minor cut to his arm while in a depressed state after learning of his girlfriend's infidelity.

The court found that the respondent did not improperly store his firearms, that mental health assessments indicated no significant concerns, and that there was no basis to conclude the respondent lacked the responsibility required of gun owners.

The application was dismissed.

A seventeen-year-old defendant pleaded guilty to operating a motor vehicle with an improper means of attachment and operating an unsafe motor vehicle under the Highway Traffic Act.

The defendant's improperly attached homemade trailer became detached and struck a cyclist, resulting in the cyclist's death.

The court imposed fines and probation, balancing the defendant's youth, remorse, and lack of prior record against the severe and tragic consequences of the offences and the need for general deterrence.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with more than 80 milligrams of alcohol in his system.

The trial judge acquitted on the impaired charge but reserved judgment on the over 80 charge due to a defence argument regarding the failure of the breath technician to perform a self-test on the Intoxilyzer 8000C machine.

The court examined whether deviation from the Centre of Forensic Science training manual recommendations regarding self-tests created reasonable doubt about the machine's proper operation.

The court found that the machine's internal self-diagnostic tests were sufficient to establish proper working order and that the failure to perform a manual self-test did not raise a reasonable doubt.

The accused was convicted on the over 80 charge.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood on June 19, 2010.

The defence challenged the validity of the approved screening device demand under section 8 of the Charter and sought exclusion of the breath test results under section 24(2).

The defence also argued that evidence of late consumption of alcohol (bolus drinking) immediately before the RIDE stop raised a reasonable doubt regarding the accused's blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving.

The court found the officer had reasonable suspicion to make the demand and dismissed the Charter application.

On the trial issue, the court accepted the accused's evidence regarding his consumption pattern but found that "straddle evidence" (evidence showing blood alcohol concentration could have been either above or below the legal limit) was insufficient to rebut the statutory presumption of identity under section 258(1)(d.1) of the Criminal Code.

The accused was convicted.