Amanda M. Ross

The defendant, Daniel Costa, was charged with perjury for making a false statement under oath to homicide detectives.

The Crown conceded that Costa could not be convicted of perjury due to the application of s. 131(3) of the Criminal Code, as he was not legally required, permitted, or authorized to make the statement.

The Crown then sought to continue the prosecution on the basis that attempt to obstruct justice was an included offence of perjury as described in the indictment.

The court denied the Crown's request, finding that attempt to obstruct justice was not necessarily included in the perjury charge as worded, and that the accused did not have fair notice of this potential charge.

The appellant was convicted of possession of controlled substances and possession for the purpose of trafficking based on evidence seized from his residence and vehicle pursuant to search warrants.

The central fact in the Information to Obtain (ITO) supporting the warrants was false: the police believed the appellant had sent a text message setting up a drug transaction, but it was actually sent by an employee.

The trial judge dismissed the appellant's Charter s. 8 application.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the search warrants invalid, as the false information was the central basis for the residence search, and the remaining evidence was insufficient.

The court also found the warrant overbroad and the execution improper.

Applying s. 24(2) of the Charter, the court excluded the evidence and set aside the convictions.

The Applicants sought judicial review of a decision by the Regional Municipality of Niagara Police Services Board, which declined to extend the time for service of a Notice of Disciplinary Hearing on two police officers beyond the six-month period under s. 83(17) of the Police Services Act.

The Divisional Court found that the Board breached procedural fairness by not providing the Applicants with the officers' submissions or an opportunity to respond.

The Court also found the Board's decision unreasonable for failing to consider the causes of delay holistically.

The Board's decision was quashed and remitted for reconsideration.

The moving party, a dental surgeon, sought a stay of the revocation of his licence pending his appeal of a Discipline Committee decision finding him guilty of professional misconduct and sexual abuse of a patient.

The court applied the three-part test for a stay.

The court found that while there were weak but arguable grounds regarding the existence of a doctor-patient relationship at the time of one incident, the overwhelming evidence of subsequent sexual abuse made a finding of misconduct and a period of suspension inevitable.

As the moving party would not suffer irreparable harm by beginning to serve an inevitable suspension, the motion for a stay was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a conviction for failing to comply with a bail condition requiring him to remain at his residence except for limited specified purposes.

He argued the trial judge shifted the burden of proof contrary to the principles in R. v. W.(D.), improperly relied on his failure to provide a detailed explanation to police, misapprehended the evidence, and improperly took judicial notice regarding evening traffic conditions.

The court held that the trial judge properly applied the presumption of innocence and the W.(D.) framework, permissibly assessed the credibility of competing testimony, and did not infringe the appellant’s right to silence.

The court also found no material misapprehension of evidence and concluded that the limited judicial notice regarding reduced evening traffic congestion was permissible.

The conviction was upheld.

The accused pleaded guilty to assault causing bodily harm and raised a constitutional challenge during sentencing concerning the denial of enhanced credit for pre‑sentence custody where bail had been cancelled under s. 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code.

The court considered whether the statutory limitation violated s. 7 of the Charter by infringing the principle of proportionality in sentencing.

Relying on appellate authority recognizing proportionality as a principle of fundamental justice, the court found that the provision could produce disparate custodial outcomes unrelated to the gravity of the offence or the offender’s responsibility, particularly where detention depended on the ability to obtain bail.

The court held that the deprivation of liberty was not in accordance with fundamental justice and that the provision was arbitrary and not minimally impairing.

The infringement could not be justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Property Standards Committee confirming a municipal Order to Comply issued under the Toronto Municipal Code in relation to a residential property.

The order required remediation of unsanitary and hazardous conditions including accumulation of waste, structural disrepair, and obstruction of passageways associated with hoarding and animal contamination.

After a trial de novo with viva voce evidence, the court accepted the evidence of municipal officials regarding the property's unsafe and unsanitary condition and rejected the appellant’s allegations of municipal conspiracy and improper inspection.

The court held that the amended order sufficiently particularized the required remedial work and was justified under property standards enforcement.

The decision confirming the order was upheld, though the City was directed not to commence remedial work until after December 1, 2015 to allow the appellant time to preserve items he claimed were evidentiary for potential litigation.

The appellant, facing charges under the Provincial Offences Act for failing to comply with property standards orders under the Building Code Act, sought advanced funding to mount a constitutional challenge against the Building Code Act.

He argued the Act violated his section 7 Charter rights by threatening his shelter.

The application judge dismissed the request.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal, finding the constitutional challenge lacked merit because section 7 does not protect property rights and the Building Code Act itself does not authorize the seizure of property.

The appellants were convicted in absentia of Highway Traffic Act offences after failing to appear for trial.

The certificates of offence contained discrepancies between the short-form description of the offence and the section number.

The appeal judge upheld the convictions, finding the certificates complete and regular on their face.

On appeal to the Court of Appeal, the Crown conceded that the certificates were not regular on their face as required by ss. 9(2) and 9.1(2) of the Provincial Offences Act.

The Court of Appeal agreed, allowed the appeals, and quashed the certificates of offence.

The offender pleaded guilty to an unprovoked assault causing bodily harm against a stranger while on parole for manslaughter.

The Crown sought a sentence of 3 years and a long-term offender designation.

The court sentenced the offender to 3.5 years (reduced to 6 months with enhanced pre-sentence credit) and 3 years of probation.

The court dismissed the long-term offender application, finding that while the offender posed a risk, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a substantial risk of violent reoffending as required by the legislation.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Property Standards Committee confirming an Order to Comply issued by the City.

The court found the Order to Comply was vague and lacked necessary particulars to inform the appellant of the required remedial steps.

The court stayed the enforcement of the decision and ordered the City to provide a revised Order to Comply containing additional particulars before proceeding with the balance of the appeal.

The appellant appealed convictions arising from historical sexual offences against a teenage complainant who was a close family friend.

He argued that the mixed verdicts were inconsistent and that the jury charge was deficient on count-by-count reasoning, witness credibility, delay in disclosure, corroboration, and limiting use of bad character evidence.

The court held that the acquittals and conviction were rationally reconcilable on the evidence and that the jury instructions, read functionally and as a whole, adequately conveyed the governing principles.

Although a limiting instruction on alleged mistreatment of children would have been preferable, its absence caused no reversible error.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a licensed motorized ice cream vendor, was convicted and fined $2,000 for selling ice cream from his truck parked inside a school parking lot, contrary to a municipal by-law prohibiting sales within 30 metres of a school entrance.

On appeal, he argued the by-law only applied to the area outside the entrance and did not apply on private property.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, applying the modern approach to statutory interpretation to find that 'within' creates a boundary that includes the area inside the entrance, and noting that the by-law regulates the vendor's licence conditions rather than the property itself.

The appellant, a self-represented litigant, appealed his conviction for failing to stop at a red light under the Provincial Offences Act.

He argued his right to make full answer and defence was violated because the prosecutor did not advise him of his right to disclosure, and the Justice of the Peace failed to assist him.

The City conceded that the appellant was not adequately informed of his right to disclosure and that significant video evidence had been lost.

Based on these concessions, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and entered an acquittal.

The Court declined to rule on the broader constitutional and procedural issues regarding disclosure for unrepresented litigants, finding them moot.

The appellant pleaded guilty to mischief and criminal harassment after distributing degrading emails and a naked photograph of his former intimate partner and a former co-worker.

He appealed his sentence of 90 days intermittent imprisonment and a suspended sentence, seeking a conditional discharge and introducing fresh evidence of rehabilitation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that despite the appellant's positive prospects and time served, a conditional discharge would be contrary to the public interest given the serious nature of the offences and the need for denunciation.

The Crown applied under s. 752.1 of the Criminal Code for an order directing an assessment to determine whether the offender should be designated a dangerous offender or long‑term offender following a guilty plea to assault causing bodily harm.

The offender previously pleaded guilty to manslaughter arising from an earlier violent assault and committed the new offence while on parole and under the influence of drugs and alcohol.

The court considered the low threshold applicable to ordering an assessment and whether there were reasonable grounds to believe the offender might meet the criteria under s. 753 or s. 753.1.

Finding evidence of a pattern of unprovoked violent behaviour associated with substance abuse and a failure to restrain conduct, the court concluded the statutory threshold was met.

An assessment order was therefore granted.

The applicant, a self-represented taxi driver, was convicted of failing to stop at a red light and fined $350.

His appeal to the Ontario Court of Justice was dismissed.

He sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal on three grounds: an unsworn interpreter, lack of disclosure, and the justice of the peace's failure to assist him as an unrepresented defendant.

The Court of Appeal refused leave on the interpreter issue but granted leave on the disclosure and duty to assist issues, finding conflicting authority on the obligations owed to self-represented defendants in provincial offences trials.

The appellant was convicted of two provincial offences after failing to appear at his trial dates.

Under s. 9.1(1) of the Provincial Offences Act, he was deemed not to dispute the charges.

He appealed, arguing that s. 9.1 violates s. 11(d) of the Charter by denying him a fair hearing.

The Court of Appeal held that s. 9.1 does not violate the Charter, as the notices provided clear warnings of the consequences of failing to appear, allowing the court to infer a valid waiver of s. 11(d) rights.

However, the appeal was allowed and new trials ordered because the City of Toronto conceded the appellant did not receive a fair hearing on his initial appeals.

The appellant appealed convictions for a 'no permit' offence and a 'failure to stop' offence.

At the provincial offences appeal, the prosecutor conceded the appellant had a valid permit and invited an acquittal, and also conceded the fine for failure to stop should be reduced.

The appeal judge peremptorily dismissed the appeal without giving effect to the concessions.

The Court of Appeal found this resulted in a miscarriage of justice, allowed the appeal, entered an acquittal on the 'no permit' charge, and reduced the penalty on the 'failure to stop' charge to a suspended sentence.

The respondent was charged with driving while holding a hand-held wireless communication device after a police officer observed her holding a cellphone while stopped at a red light.

The respondent claimed she had only momentarily picked it up after it fell to the floor.

The trial court convicted her, but the appeal judge allowed her appeal, finding that 'holding' required sustained physical contact.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the ordinary meaning of 'holding' and the road safety objectives of the Highway Traffic Act dictate a complete prohibition on having a cellphone in one's hand while driving, regardless of the duration.