Amanda M. Ross

The appellant appealed convictions for a 'no permit' offence and a 'failure to stop' offence.

At the provincial offences appeal, the prosecutor conceded the appellant had a valid permit and invited an acquittal, and also conceded the fine for failure to stop should be reduced.

The appeal judge peremptorily dismissed the appeal without giving effect to the concessions.

The Court of Appeal found this resulted in a miscarriage of justice, allowed the appeal, entered an acquittal on the 'no permit' charge, and reduced the penalty on the 'failure to stop' charge to a suspended sentence.

The respondent was charged with driving while holding a hand-held wireless communication device after a police officer observed her holding a cellphone while stopped at a red light.

The respondent claimed she had only momentarily picked it up after it fell to the floor.

The trial court convicted her, but the appeal judge allowed her appeal, finding that 'holding' required sustained physical contact.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the ordinary meaning of 'holding' and the road safety objectives of the Highway Traffic Act dictate a complete prohibition on having a cellphone in one's hand while driving, regardless of the duration.

The applicant sought an extension of time and leave to appeal from a provincial offences appeal decision upholding a conviction for failing to stop at a red light.

The proposed appeal raised issues concerning an apparent discrepancy between the offence description and statutory section on the certificate of offence, and whether a subsequent change to the ticket constituted an improper out-of-court amendment made without the accused's knowledge.

The chambers judge held that the additional issue met the threshold under s. 139 of the Provincial Offences Act because both the public interest and the due administration of justice would be served by having it settled.

The extension of time and leave to appeal were granted.

The applicant moved for an extension of time to seek leave to appeal, and for leave to appeal, from a provincial offences appeal decision upholding a careless driving conviction entered in absentia.

The proposed appeal raised a statutory interpretation issue under s. 9.1 of the Provincial Offences Act concerning whether a certificate of offence is complete and regular on its face where the handwritten offence description conflicts with the cited section number.

The court held that this issue raised a question of law alone of public importance, particularly given conflicting lower-court authority and the limited guidance provided by prior appellate authority on analogous but distinct defects.

Both the extension of time and leave to appeal were granted.

A property owner brought a motion to dismiss a municipal appeal concerning a property standards order requiring stairwell guard and handrail modifications.

The moving party argued the matter had already been adjudicated in earlier litigation involving the same property and substantially identical compliance issues.

The court held that strict issue estoppel did not apply because the municipality had amended the relevant by-law after the earlier judgment, creating a technically new legislative framework.

However, the court found that allowing the appeal to proceed would constitute an abuse of process because the factual and evidentiary issues were identical to those previously tried and would result in duplicative litigation and wasted judicial resources.

The motion was granted and the municipality’s appeal was dismissed.

The moving party sought leave to appeal his conviction for disobeying a traffic sign, arguing he should have been charged under a more specific provision and that the unilingual English sign was invalid under the French Language Services Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding the prosecutor was entitled to proceed under the general provision and that the City of Toronto is not required to have bilingual traffic signs because it has not passed a by-law under section 14 of the French Language Services Act.

The appellant was convicted of selling professional lacrosse tickets without a licence under s. 2(20) of By-Law 20-85.

On appeal, he argued that tickets are not 'goods' within the meaning of the by-law and that the municipality lacked the authority to enact the provision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that tickets fall within the ordinary meaning of 'goods' as movable personal property, and that the municipality had the necessary authority under the Municipal Act to enact the licensing by-law.