Court File and Parties

COURT FILE NO.: CR-846-10 Perth, Ontario

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN Applicant

– and –

P. E. M. Respondent

Counsel: Kimberley E. M. Moore, for the Crown J. Michael Spratt, for the Respondent

HEARD: January 28, March 18, 19, 20, and 21, 2014

REASONS FOR SENTENCING

McLean J.

[1] P. E. M. was convicted of one count of sexual assault contrary to s. 271 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46, and the remaining counts of sexual touching contrary to s. 151(a) of the Criminal Code, and sexual exploitation contrary to s. 153(b) of the Criminal Code were stayed.

[2] Mr. M. was found guilty of this count by Mr. Justice McMunagle on September 28, 2012. I have heard the sentencing arguments and I am making this determination pursuant to s. 669.2 of the Criminal Code.

[3] A summary of the findings of McMunagle J. are as follows:

[4] J. W. was 18 years at the time of the trial, and was attending high school. She was between the ages 12 and 15 during the time period of the indictment. Namely, November of 2006 to June 2010. Apparently the accused, Mr. M., was her mother’s (M. W.’s) boyfriend. After dating for a while Mr. M. moved into M. W.’s home in November of 2006. Apparently Mr. M. inveigled his way into becoming the primary parent. He placed a number of rules on J. to restrict her movements and would punish her if she broke these rules. Sometime around June 4, 2010, she made an admission to her girlfriend. Her girlfriend then took the admission to the local high school guidance counsellor who in turn contacted the local Children`s Aid Society. This in turn led to police involvement. Apparently the sexual abuse of J. began within months of Mr. M. moving into her mother’s house and lasted some three and half years. Various sexual assaults occurred culminating in sexual intercourse which occurred for a two to five month period and essentially every day. J. was 15 at the time. Over time the abuse increased. Her mother was not present as she was working essentially seven days a week. As part of the grooming that took place, Mr. M. moved he and J.’s mother’s bedroom into the basement and moved J. upstairs. This is apparently so that he could have access to J. after the mother went to bed. Over this period of time, if J. did not comply she would be punished. It was clear to the trial judge that Jessica’s testimony that all types of sexual activities were involved from vaginal intercourse to fellatio on Mr. M. This is just to indicate a few of the types of sexual activity that took place.

[5] There is no doubt that the basis for the convictions indicates a lengthy period of abuse of an escalating nature on a young girl. This Court also has before it a presentence report which is not positive as it indicates that the offender has previous convictions for sexual offences and also indicating that the offender is not remorseful.

[6] The offender has been convicted in the past of several like offences. These past convictions will deal with these in due course. The Crown has made an application to have Mr. M. declared a dangerous offender in the meaning of s. 753 of the Criminal Code. The issue has been narrowed by agreement of counsel. To quote from a recent written submission:

The narrow issue, in our submission before the Court, is whether the sentence should be determinate or indeterminate (s. 753(4) and s. 753(4.1) – is the court satisfied that there is a reasonable expectation that a lesser measure (the fixed sentence followed by long-term supervision of 10 years) will adequately protect the public against the commission of a murder or a serious personal injury offence.

Both Crown and Defence agree that Mr. M. meets the requirement to be found a Dangerous Offender as set out in s. 753 of the Criminal Code.

[7] It is therefore against this background that the Court must determine the sole issue of whether there is a reasonable expectation that a lesser measure will adequately protect the public.

Facts and Opinions

[8] The evidence called on the sentencing hearings came from various officials from the National Parole Board of Canada, Mr. M.’s previous probation officer, and two psychiatrists, Dr. Booth and Dr. Klassen. Most of the evidence had to do with various schemes of supervision available that would be able to control Mr. M.’s behavior.

Predicate Offence

[9] As set forth above, the predicate offences involve progressive sexual violations of a young child. The findings of the trial judge indicate that there was grooming, that he placed himself in a position of trust, and that the violations of the young child became increasingly invasive and increasingly frequent. The sexual offences occurred over a long period of time. The accused has been convicted in the past of similar offences.

Background of the Offender

[10] In Dr. Booth’s report dated March 4, 2014 at page 4 of 16 the offender’s background information is set out as follows:

Mr. M. said that he was born and raised in Smith Falls. He has eight siblings from his father’s first marriage. He has two biological brothers. He noted that his mother left his father when the patient was 2½ years old. Mr. M. maintains contact with his father and has a good relationship with him.

[11] Both psychiatrists are of the view that Mr. M. has borderline intelligence, mild mental retardation or intellectual disability. The debate between the psychiatrists seems to be as to the level of intellectual disability. Dr. Klassen feels that Mr. M. is higher functioning than does Dr. Booth. It seems that in Dr. Klassen’s point of view, which is accepted by the Court, the outlook for the offender is more positive in that he an individual with a relatively more minor intellectual disability and thus he is more amenable to treatment as he would have more insight into his difficulties.

[12] The diagnoses of both psychiatrists differ more in detail than in the actual conclusions reached. The substantive details and conclusions of both reports will be dealt with later in these reasons.

Prior Offences

[13] The details of the prior offences are taken from the criminal record and the report of Dr. Klassen dated September 15, 2013. The Court notes that there appears to be some controversy with regard to the details surrounding the prior offences themselves. This can be seen from the interviews that were conducted by Dr. Klassen with Mr. M. Mr. M. seems to in most cases indicate that he was convicted by reason of incompetence of counsel, or that he was victimized into committing these offences in one way or another. Generally, Mr. M. takes no responsibility for the offences that he has committed. The only exception that the Court could find is that Mr. M. admitted to the mother of the victim that he committed the sexual assaults involved in the predicate offence.

[14] Mr. M.’s prior offences started in 1996 when he received a suspended sentence and eighteen months’ probation. The offence involved an assault upon his then common-law spouse, Ms. N., and their eleven month old son K. He apparently grabbed Ms. N. by the throat and attempted to take the child out and he pushed her again and threatened her when she once again blocked his exit.

[15] Again in 1996, Mr. M. was convicted of assault, failing to comply with probation, mischief, and failure to comply with recognizance (two charges). Mr. M. was sentenced to ninety days imprisonment and two years’ probation. Because of the prior charge Mr. M. was not to have any contact with Ms. N. and thus could not live with Ms. N. Despite this court order, Mr. M. he moved in with Ms. N. anyway. Apparently while living with Ms. N., he assaulted Ms. N.’s six year old son and also apparently damaged her barbecue and air conditioner.

[16] In 1997, he was convicted of sexual assault and assault simpliciter and failing to comply with probation. The sexual assault involved a L. G. who was thirteen years of age and in grade eight. Mr. M. was twenty-two years of age. Apparently Mr. M. befriended Ms. G. at a house party. He asked her for a date but she declined. On December 1, 1996, when at the house party the partygoers fell asleep on the floor and Mr. M. apparently penetrated Ms. G. sexually over her objection stating that he was neutered. Mr. M. stated to the police that he had been quite intoxicated. Also, Mr. M. met another person in September of 1996 who was sixteen years old but developmentally challenged. In March of 1997, he apparently approached her at school and tickled and grabbed her around the waist. In response she kicked him and fled and reported the same to police.

[17] In 1998, Mr. M. was charged with sexual assault, assault and failing to comply with probation. Mr. M. received a twelve month concurrent sentence, a twelve month community service order, and also a three month community service order and six months’ probation. Mr. M. apparently dated the victim, J. C., who was twenty two years of age, for approximately one month. In April or May of 1998, Mr. M. forced intercourse with Ms. C. straddling her on more than one occasion. Further, Ms. C. indicated that Mr. M. would fight with her to provoke a struggle when she refused sex. In May of 1998, Mr. M. while in the presence Ms. C. and her friend, blamed them for not being able to get his government support cheque. He grabbed Ms. C. by the arm and assaulted her.

[18] In 1999, Mr. M. was charged with assault and failing to comply with probation. Apparently, Mr. M. befriended a girl who indicated that sexual relations did not begin until she was actually fourteen years of age. Mr. M. received a sentence of imprisonment of three hundred and forty two days concurrently and three years’ probation. The victim was thirteen years of age when they met and Mr. M. was twenty four years of age. The assault mentioned was apparently related to an incident at the Guelph Reformatory.

[19] In 2002, Mr. M. was charged with sexual assault, break and enter and theft (two charges), failing to comply with an undertaking, possession of a weapon, break and enter, theft (three charges), failing to comply with a probation order. Mr. M. was living with his girlfriend, D. M. and his friend R. G. He was on Judicial Interim Release at the time of the break and enters. Mr. G. and Mr. M. broke into CordMaster International a business, a cottage, and other locations. They also stole a van after they had been released from the CordMaster incident and caused approximately $20,000 worth of damage to the van. They returned to the cottage property and stole from there approximately one hundred and fifty items, including a sawed off shotgun. Also on or about September 1, 1996, Mr. M. near Smith Falls pushed C. B. down and penetrated her vaginally during which he threatened to kill her while placing a sharp object against her neck. She became pregnant as a result of this violation but miscarried.

[20] In 2003, Mr. M. was involved with D. M. and had moved in with her. The parties argued a lot so she left with her son. When she returned in a taxi to get some of her personal items from the home, Mr. M. blocked her way and broke the door at the rental premises. In 2004, he was also charged with failed to comply with probation. Once again in 2004, he was charged with possession of a weapon while prohibited, careless use and failing to comply. Mr. M. received a ninety day concurrent sentence. Also in an around this time period, Mr. M. and his father shot a decoy deer in their truck while on a hunting excursion and as a result Mr. M. was charged as he was not to have a weapon in his possession.

[21] In 2005, Mr. M. was charged with assault causing bodily harm and failure to comply with probation (two charges). Mr. M. received a six month sentence along with two years’ probation. He argued with his common-law partner, D. M., he flipped over a table punching her in the head eight times and pushed her down. As a result, she required six staples to close the wound in her head. Ms. M. also alleged numerous sexual assaults and that he punched her, straddled her and entered her vaginally without her consent. The sexual offences however were dismissed.

[22] Then in 2010, Mr. M. was charged with sexual assault (five charges), sexual interference. These are the current predicate offences before the Court. The above is the prior background of the accused before the criminal courts.

[23] When we consider these matters, it is clear that Mr. M. has not done well on community supervision. Indeed, it appears from the number of convictions and the number of times he has been on community supervision, that he has not really amenable to any kind of control outside an institution. It is true, however, notwithstanding his lengthy and serious criminal record that he has never has been subject to controls of Corrections Canada in that he has never been sentenced to a penitentiary incarceration. The evidence provided by his prior Provincial Social Worker confirms this.

Psychiatric Assessments

[24] Fortunately, the Court has the benefit of the evidence of two eminently qualified psychiatrists, Dr. Booth who is qualified as a forensic psychiatrist and is currently the treating psychiatrist for Mr. M. The Court also has the opinion requested under this section of Dr. Klassen, a psychiatrist in the same field, at the University of Toronto. Notwithstanding Mr. M.’s previous offending history, it seems that in-depth psychiatric assessment and treatment had not occurred until he was incarcerated on these current charges. Prior to and since his trial, Mr. M. has been at the St. Lawrence Valley site of the Royal Ottawa Hospital and has been a patient of Dr. Booth. Dr. Booth’s diagnosis is multi-faceted and he is of the view that Mr. M. suffers from a major depressive disorder and dysthymic disorder. According to Dr. Booth, Mr. M. has had a lifelong history of emotional problems which has been worsened by his current legal difficulties. Treatment has ameliorated these depressive symptoms. Mr. M. also suffers from panic disorder and anxiety disorder. Mr. M. was put on the medication Nitrospray as the attacks were mistaken for being cardiac in origin. He had some occasional panic attacks in the hospital but these have improved significantly by use of appropriate medications.

Dr. Booth’s Opinion

[25] Apparently Mr. M. reported sexual and physical abuse as a child and therefore there may be some symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder. The main concern here, however, is the diagnosis of “paraphilia none otherwise specified as hebephilia, non-exclusive heterosexual type”. Dr. Booth states at para. 3 (page 12) of his report dated March 4, 2014:

A diagnosis of paraphilia is given to individuals with recurrent arousal or behaviours that cause dysfunction. The DSM-5 includes a number of named paraphilias, such as pedophilia (arousal to pre-pubescent children). There are many paraphilias that are identified though not listed in the DSM; instead they are classified under the grab-bag name of “Paraphilia not otherwise specified.” Many of these paraphilias have been named in other literature.

From my understanding, Dr. Klassen performed phallometric testing which confirms significant preferential arousal to teenagers. Similarly, Mr. M. has previous and concurrent offences involving teenagers. However, it is controversial whether or not to give a diagnosis of hebephilia in this population as physical arousal to adolescence is biologically “normal” occurring in a large percentage of “normal” men. Because of this controversy, the diagnosis was not included in the DSM-5. I agree with Dr. Klassen’s giving this diagnosis as this arousal likely was a factor in the index offences. Mr. M. denies this arousal, although some individuals may not be aware of this being a particular vulnerability for them (i.e. it is unconscious). It is also possible that he is attempting in a concrete way to act in his own “best interest” by minimizing problems that he believes would be viewed negatively by the court.

[26] According to Dr. Booth, apparently Mr. M. had some alcohol use problems in the past but has been able to overcome these difficulties. Dr. Booth also mentions in his report that Mr. M. has made significant gains from a psychiatric perspective. His behaviour in the Institution has improved. Mr. M. is no longer adversarial and angry. His depressive symptoms have improved and he has shown significant improvement also with interpersonal relations with co-residents and staff.

[27] From February 25 to July 13, 2013, Mr. M. started sexual offender treatment being three hour sessions twice weekly but with variable performance. He would miss group sessions or shut down while in group therapy. Mr. M. reached a therapeutic impasse in July when he was specifically asked to do an empathy exercise but felt that this was a trick to get him to admit to the offences.

[28] According to Dr. Booth, on November 30, 2013 Mr. M. started taking Lupron which is a drug that causes “chemical castration.” Mr. M. indicated his willingness to continue this medication if released into the community. In addition, Mr. M. was taking the antidepressant medication Pristiq. According to the doctor, this medication increases serotonin which decreases sexual drive.

[29] In his testimony Dr. Booth indicated that continuing treatment would lead to improvement of Mr. M.’s conditions. However, this would be a lengthy process. The Court also notes that Mr. M. has had difficulty with regard to the sexual offender treatment groups. It seems a common theme from both psychiatrists that Mr. M. has not taken direct responsibility for any of his sexual offences. This in itself is not a contraindicating factor with regard treatment of sexual offenders, notwithstanding the offender’s particular stance on this issue, progress in treatment still can be made.

Dr. Klassen’s Opinion

[30] Dr. Klassen’s report and testimony by a large extent has been echoed by the testimony of Dr. Booth. Their diagnoses seemed to be essentially confirmatory one of the other. The Court notes that there may have been some difference with respect to the exact nature of the paraphilia disorder. However, generally it seems that both views were significantly similar. Indeed, the basis for Dr. Booth’s opinion seems to be to a large extent based on the phallometric testing and other psychiatric risk instruments used by Dr. Klassen. The main difference between the doctors’ opinions is the issue of hebephilia, and the nature of Mr. M.’s attraction to pre-pubescent age females. Obviously, there is an overlap with respect to the hebephilia being a specific part of paraphilia. However, generally speaking, both psychiatrists are of the view that clearly from the testing and the background of Mr. M., he has a preference for this particular type of individual.

[31] In regard to the testimony and opinion of Dr. Klassen, he undertook a series of psychological and psychiatric testing to assess Mr. M.’s risk of sex offender recidivism. To summarize the opinion of Dr. Klassen on the basis of these various risk assessment instruments, the VARG and HCR20 to name but a few, Dr. Klassen was of the view that:

…this gentlemen is at high risk of sexual or violent recidivism. He is at a moderately high risk of violent recidivism alone.

[32] Dr. Klassen was of the view that this statistical risk assessment was born out by Mr. M.’s pattern of offending, namely that there is a continuous pattern of sexual abuse that he inflicted on others. Dr. Booth was substantially in agreement with this conclusion and differed only as to the possibility of rehabilitation.

[33] In cross-examination, and in his evidence generally, Dr. Klassen stated that an offender’s age reduces rates of hormonal generation to some extent which therefore reduces the offender’s risk of reoffending. However, he was of the view that to significantly reduce the risk of reoffending, it would be necessary that Mr. M., if released, continued to take the medication Lupron. In light of this conclusion, the Court notes that there is no order that can be made by a court, even in this situation, whereby a person is forced to take Lupron or a similar chemical castration drugs. Indeed, there was a discussion about problems with Lupron and its effect on Mr. M.’s ability to achieve a healthy sexual relationship. The medication also has other quite severe side effects.

[34] The debate between the psychiatrists essentially comes down to the fact that control must be exercised over this particular individual. Obviously, Mr. M. has difficulty with obeying court orders and the Court notes that he indeed has had difficulty with sexual offender treatment.

Analysis

[35] Counsel agree that Mr. M. meets the criteria for a dangerous offender under s. 753 of the Criminal Code. It is also counsel’s joint submission that the narrow issue before the Court is whether there should be a determinate or indeterminate sentence of s. 753(4) and s. 753(4.1.). Indeed, is the Court satisfied that there is a reasonable expectation that a lesser measure that an indeterminate sentence to adequately protect the public against the commission of serious personal injury offences? Sections 753(4) and s.753(4.1.) read as follows:

(4) If the court finds an offender to be a dangerous offender, it shall

(a) impose a sentence of detention in a penitentiary for an indeterminate period;

(b) impose a sentence for the offence for which the offender has been convicted — which must be a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of two years — and order that the offender be subject to long-term supervision for a period that does not exceed 10 years; or

(c) impose a sentence for the offence for which the offender has been convicted.

(4.1) The court shall impose a sentence of detention in a penitentiary for an indeterminate period unless it is satisfied by the evidence adduced during the hearing of the application that there is a reasonable expectation that a lesser measure under paragraph (4)(b) or (c) will adequately protect the public against the commission by the offender of murder or a serious personal injury offence.

The main issue as set forth by counsel is: “is there a reasonable expectation that a lesser measure will adequately protect the public against the commission of …. a serious personal injury offence.” There is no issue that Mr. M. has been convicted of a serious personal injury offence within the meaning of s. 752 of the Criminal Code. The issue is whether a reasonable expectation exists that a lesser measure will adequately protect the public and that the crown has convinced the court no such expectation exists beyond a reasonable doubt.

[36] The dangerous offender provision has been considered in R. v. Szostak 2014 ONCA 15, 118 O.R. (3d) 401 at paras. 53, 54 and 55:

Thus, the legislation contemplates that a person could be declared a dangerous offender because they meet the definition but nevertheless be given a disposition including a long-term supervision order or a conventional sentence. However, these two options are only available if an indeterminate sentence is not required to protect the public from the commission of murder or a serious personal injury offence. If a person, to be declared a dangerous offender, had to not only meet the statutory definition but display a pattern of conduct that was pathologically intractable, that person could, it seems to me, rarely, if ever, be eligible for a long-term supervision order or a conventional sentence.

Further, while I agree that the legislation must be interpreted in the spirit of Lyons and bearing in mind the sentencing principles and objectives in ss. 718, 718.1 and 718.2, it is apparent that Parliament intended a broader group of offenders be declared dangerous offenders than was envisaged in Lyons where the court spoke of “a very small group of offenders”. While the legislation is still narrowly targeted to a small group of offenders, that Parliament intended to broaden the group of persons to be labelled as dangerous offenders is apparent from the legislative reversal of the principle in Johnson referred to earlier that no sentencing objective is advanced by declaring an offender dangerous and imposing a determinate sentence. I point out that there has been no constitutional challenge to the 2008 regime in this case.

Accordingly, it is of no assistance in interpreting the legislation to go beyond the words of the definition in s. 753(1) and introduce principles of intractability or attempt to predict the number of offenders that Parliament intended to bring within the legislative scheme.

[37] Reasonable expectation in this section has considered the following cases:

R. v. Moonias, 2013 ONCJ 126, [2013] O.J. No. 1160 at para 56:

The term “reasonable expectation” is not defined in the Criminal Code. Reasonable possibility may be viewed as too low of a bar to set to protect the public. More certainty would be required to persuade a sentencing judge that the public would be adequately protected without an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment. On the other hand, reasonable probability may be too onerous a standard to meet given the vagaries of prognostication and the difficulty in predicting future behaviour. However, when I consider the legislative objectives of the Dangerous Offender provisions, the protection of the public is the overarching objective, and a degree of certainty is necessary when conducting this assessment. A hope or a possibility that the public could be protected without an indeterminate jail sentence is insufficient.

R. v. Taylor, 2012 ONSC 1025, [2012] O.J. No. 1564 at paras. 344-346:

Meaning of “a reasonable expectation”

344 Madam Justice Arnold-Bailey considered the meaning to be given to the words “a reasonable expectation” in s. 753(4.1) in R. v. Walsh, Chilliwack Reg. No. 55701, May 24, 2011 (B.C.S.C.). Madam Justice Arnold-Bailey reviewed authorities in which that expression was used in other contexts and concluded: What I draw from the above authorities as to the meaning of the phrase “reasonable expectation” that a lesser measure will adequately protect the public in s. 753(4.1) is that it amounts to “a confident belief for good and sufficient reasons” to be derived from the quality and cogency of the evidence heard on the application.

[Emphasis added]

345 In R. v. B.A.R. 2011 BCSC 1313, Mr. Justice Joyce stated at para. 46, “I am satisfied that the change of language in the dangerous offender provisions was intentional and that it imposes a different and higher standard than was previously the case.” [Emphasis added]. At paragraph 48, Mr. Justice Joyce concurred with and applied Madam Justice Arnold-Bailey's interpretation of s. 753(4.1).

346 I accept the definition of Justice Arnold-Bailey adopted by Mr. Justice Joyce in R. v. B.A.R.. A “reasonable expectation” that a lesser measure will adequately protect the public in s. 753(4.1) should be interpreted to mean a confident belief for good and sufficient reason based upon the quality and cogency of the evidence heard on the application. [Emphasis in the original.]

[38] Indeed, in the new shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed., s.v. “reasonable” is defined as: “within the limits of reason; or appropriate, moderate. Of fair, average or considerable amount, size etc.”. “Expectation” is defined as: “the state or mental attitude of expecting something to happen; the degree of probability that something will occur expressed numerically.” It seems that the meaning here is that there must be a reasonable chance, approaching probability that a lesser measure will adequately protect the public. Clearly this indicated, as set forth in R v. Tayler, supra, “a confident belief for good and sufficient reason based upon the quality and cogency of the evidence heard on the application.”

[39] Here the argument made by defence counsel is simply that a six to eight year sentence followed by ten years of long-term offender supervision, would meet the threshold that there is an expectation that the public would be protected against Mr. M. The basis for that argument is that according to Dr. Booth, Mr. M. is making progress with regard to his various psychological and psychiatric difficulties, and that due to his age the likelihood of reoffending in this manner will be reduced to a reasonable level. This is particularly so according to defence counsel given the fact that Mr. M. is already taking Lupron to reduce his sexual desires. The Court, however, has concerns about this submission and notes that Dr. Klassen testified that there were concerns about Mr. M. not being able to continue with the sexual offender treatment program. Further, in a Federal institutional setting there is a possibility that because of Mr. M.’s potential inability to successfully continue with that program, the federal authorities would simply not offer the treatment program to him.

[40] There is also the concern that in order to ameliorate Mr. M.’s situation, he should continue on Lupron when he is out of incarceration. As mentioned above, the Court can make no order compelling Mr. M. to continue to take this particular or other medication. The Court simply does not have that ability. Moreover, the Court is not satisfied that the National Parole Board could make such orders either that would be enforceable. In addition, there is the issue as described particularly by Dr. Booth, that it might be clinically important for Mr. M. from a treatment point of view to enter into a relationship with an adult female which of course could not occur while he was taking Lupron.

[41] When the Court considers the background of the offences, it seems that Mr. M. seeks out people who are vulnerable and victimizes them. This is a continuing pattern. Clearly, from the psychiatric evidence, this pattern of offending is based on Mr. M.’s psychiatric problems. The Court here is simply not satisfied that there is a reasonable expectation that a lesser sentence would adequately protect the public from Mr. M. committing another serious personal injury offence. It is particularly concerning that Mr. M. has not been able to complete the sexual offender treatment program, notwithstanding that he has successfully completed other treatment programs, a factor that Dr. Booth considers hopeful. It is the Court’s view that these treatment programs are hopeful only to the extent that may lead to Mr. M. to successfully completing a sexual offender treatment program. The latter has not happened.

[42] Simply put, when the Court considers all the evidence that was provided, the Court has no confident belief that any sentence other than an indeterminate sentence of detention in the penitentiary would adequately protect the public. Accordingly, Mr. M. will be so sentenced on count 1 as a dangerous offender to detention in a penitentiary for an indeterminate period.

McLean J.

Released: May 26, 2014

COURT FILE NO.: CR-846-10 Perth, Ontario

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

B E T W E E N:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN Applicant

– and –

P. E. M. Respondent

REASONS FOR SENTENCING

McLean J.

Released: May 26, 2014