Mark Edward Ertel

The Crown sought an adjournment of a criminal trial continuation due to the unavailability of a key witness.

The defendant opposed the application, arguing the Crown failed to meet the "laches or neglect" prong of the R. v. Darville test.

The court found that the Crown's office was negligent in failing to notify the police of the continuation date until six days prior, attributing this to a systemic resourcing issue where one person was responsible for all subpoenas.

Despite acknowledging resource constraints, the court held that such deficiencies cannot imperil a defendant's rights.

The application for adjournment was dismissed.

The appellant, Abigail Morris, appealed her conviction for sexual interference (sexual assault conviction stayed under Kienapple principle) involving a 15-year-old complainant.

The appeal challenged whether voluntariness requires subjective consent of the accused, the admissibility of prior sexual communications (Seaboyer application), reliance on myths and stereotypes, and the use of context evidence to infer voluntariness.

The court dismissed the appeal, rejecting the appellant's premise that voluntariness equates to subjective consent of the accused.

It found no error in admitting the prior sexual communications, nor in the trial judge's determination of voluntariness, which was based on the complainant's testimony and the appellant's own statements, not on myths or stereotypes.

The appellant, Kensky Dautruche, appealed two convictions for possession of cocaine and crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The appeal challenged the validity of a vehicle search incident to arrest for flight from police under s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and the trial judge's inference regarding the appellant's possession of cocaine found outside the vehicle.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the search was a valid search incident to arrest, as the officer had a reasonable subjective belief that the search might uncover evidence explaining the flight.

The court also determined that even if a Charter breach occurred, the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2).

Furthermore, the Court affirmed the trial judge's inference of possession of the second bag of cocaine, finding it to be the only rational inference from the circumstantial evidence.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and leave to appeal sentence was denied.

The appellant, J.Y.L., appealed his conviction for historical sexual offenses involving a complainant, D.H., arguing that the trial judge erred by not determining the physical possibility of the assault as described and by focusing solely on credibility over reliability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that it was open to the trial judge to accept the complainant's evidence despite minor inconsistencies, especially given the significant passage of time since the incident.

The court addressed a constitutional challenge to section 14 of the Security of Information Act, which criminalizes the unauthorized communication of special operational information by persons permanently bound to secrecy.

The challenge argued that the term "without authority" was unconstitutionally vague, violating section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court dismissed the application, holding that the term was not vague when interpreted in its statutory context, particularly for the specific class of individuals to whom it applies.

It clarified that "without authority" pertains to the actus reus of the offence, meaning the power or right to act, derived from one's official position or a superior's grant of authority.

The offender, a high-ranking civilian member of the RCMP, was convicted of communicating special operational information to targets of international investigations, breach of trust, and unauthorized use of a computer.

The Crown sought 22 to 25 years' imprisonment, while the defence sought a sentence of time served (seven years).

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, noting the offender's extreme breach of trust and the potential risk to undercover operations, but also considered his historically good character and harsh pre-trial custody conditions.

The court imposed a total sentence of 14 years' imprisonment, reduced by 2400 days of pre-trial custody credit, leaving 7 years and 155 days to serve.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for impaired driving, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence regarding the arresting officer's grounds for arrest and observations of the appellant's driving.

The Superior Court of Justice reviewed the trial judge's assessment of the evidence, including the officer's testimony about tire tracks, the appellant's belligerent behaviour, and information from civilian callers.

The court found that the trial judge did not misapprehend the evidence and properly resolved inconsistencies in the testimony.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused, Akram Elmuradi, was charged with sexual assault.

The defence conceded sexual activity but argued consent, explicitly not relying on mistaken belief in consent.

The case hinged on the credibility of the complainant and the accused.

The court found the accused engaged in deceitful conduct to create an opportunity for sexual activity, exploiting the complainant's trust and vulnerability as a client seeking therapeutic massage.

The complainant's testimony regarding lack of consent was accepted, and the accused's account was deemed implausible and incredible.

The court found the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant did not consent and that the accused knew the sexual contact was unwanted.

The accused was found guilty of sexual assault.

The applicant sought to appeal a penalty decision imposing a two-year demotion for discreditable conduct.

The Notice of Appeal was filed more than 30 days after the applicant received the decision.

The applicant brought a motion to extend the time to file the appeal.

The Commission dismissed the motion, finding that the appeal was filed outside the strict 30-day limitation period prescribed by section 87(1) of the Police Services Act, and that the Commission has no statutory jurisdiction to extend this timeline.

The Crown brought an application under s. 486(1) of the Criminal Code to exclude the public and media from the courtroom during the testimony of the accused and three other witnesses due to national security concerns.

The accused, a former civilian member of the RCMP, was charged under the Security of Information Act.

Applying the Sherman Estate test for discretionary limits on court openness, the court found a serious risk that classified information could be inadvertently disclosed during cross-examination.

The court granted the order, directing that the public be excluded during the specified testimony, but required that vetted transcripts be released as soon as possible to balance the open court principle with national security interests.

The offender was sentenced for hacking into his ex-girlfriend's Snapchat account, changing her passwords, and posting her private nude images and videos publicly, while simultaneously sending her harassing messages.

The court emphasized the severe psychological harm caused by the targeted and vengeful distribution of intimate images.

The offender, a first-time offender who lacked insight and remorse, was sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment followed by 3 years of probation.

The accused, the former mayor and acting CAO of a municipality, was charged with sexually assaulting a municipal employee on multiple occasions.

The complainant, who was experiencing workplace harassment, sought the accused's help.

The accused used his position of power and authority to induce the complainant into sexual acts.

The court found the complainant's evidence credible despite some inconsistencies, noting the accused's abuse of power vitiated any perceived consent.

The accused was found guilty of sexual assault.

The accused, Cameron Ortis, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under section 38.14 of the Canada Evidence Act, arguing that non-disclosure of highly classified information by the Crown compromised his right to a fair trial and full answer and defence.

The court dismissed counts 5 to 8 of the indictment, finding that the prohibited classified information was of immense importance to Ortis's defence regarding the mens rea element of those charges, making the national security interests and fair trial rights irreconcilable.

However, the court denied the stay for counts 1 to 4, 9, and 10, determining that the non-disclosure did not sufficiently impact Ortis's ability to present his defence for those charges.

This is an appeal from a summary conviction appeal judge's decision that overturned an acquittal in a sexual assault case and ordered a new trial.

The trial judge had acquitted the appellant, finding reasonable doubt regarding consent and the alleged initial assault, partly due to an inconsistency in the complainant's evidence and the public nature of the alleged act.

The summary conviction appeal judge (SCAJ) allowed the Crown's appeal, concluding the trial judge engaged in "myth-based reasoning" and erred in finding consent.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appellant's appeal, restoring the acquittal.

The Court found the SCAJ erred by substituting its own factual conclusions, mischaracterizing the trial judge's reasoning as "myth-based" and failing to distinguish between a finding of lack of consent and a finding of reasonable doubt about consent.

The Court also noted the SCAJ's failure to apply the material error test required for Crown appeals from acquittal.

The applicant, a former high-ranking civilian member of the RCMP charged with serious national security offences under the Security of Information Act, sought a bail review after spending over three years in pre-trial custody.

Following the dismissal of four of the ten charges against him, the court found a material change in circumstances.

The court concluded that the applicant met his onus on the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds, noting that the passage of time and strict proposed conditions mitigated the risks of flight, reoffending, and loss of public confidence.

The application was granted, and the applicant was released on strict conditions including house arrest and GPS monitoring.

Sentencing for possession of child pornography following a guilty plea.

The offender possessed 276 unique images depicting very young children, including infants and toddlers, in highly intrusive and violent sexualized abuse, and had sent one image to an adult companion with a message expressing a desire to replicate the conduct.

The court held that it was unnecessary and potentially revictimizing for the sentencing judge to view a sample of the images where the facts were undisputed and a detailed police categorization report had been filed.

Applying the governing sentencing principles for child pornography offences and the conditional sentence framework, the court found that denunciation and deterrence predominated and that the offender's lack of insight made a community sentence inappropriate.

A sentence of 400 days' custody, followed by 24 months' probation and ancillary orders, was imposed.

The person sought in an extradition proceeding brought an application for disclosure of records from the Requesting State (United States), including police interviews and polygraph test results, to support a potential abuse of process claim.

He alleged that he had cooperated with US authorities and passed a polygraph test, which was not mentioned in the Record of the Case.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the person sought failed to meet the first stage of the Larosa test because his affidavit did not provide an evidentiary foundation for an agreement or deal with US authorities that would support a stay for abuse of process.

The court addressed whether it lost jurisdiction over a trial when the accused was disconnected from a virtual hearing for 15 minutes during evidence.

The accused was charged with impaired driving.

The court considered the right to be present at trial, the less formal nature of summary conviction proceedings, and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on court operations.

The judge ruled against declaring a mistrial, finding that alternative remedies, such as providing the accused with a transcript and recording of the missed evidence and resuming the trial in person, could cure any prejudice and ensure a fair trial.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80mg.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding the breath samples were taken 'as soon as practicable' and improperly took judicial notice of police procedures regarding meetings between arresting officers and breathalyzer technicians.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied the law, properly took tacit judicial notice based on common experience, and reasonably concluded the police acted with reasonable promptness.

The appellant, H.K., appealed convictions for various sexual assault offences, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing conflicting evidence on consent and that the global sentence of three years was excessive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the sentence appeal at the outset.

Regarding the conviction appeal, the appellant contended the trial judge's credibility assessment was piecemeal and failed to resolve inconsistencies.

The Court, applying principles from R. v. G.F., affirmed the heightened deference owed to trial judges' credibility findings.

It found that the trial judge conducted a thorough and nuanced analysis, explaining which parts of the complainant's evidence were accepted or found unreliable, and considering corroborating evidence.

The Court concluded there was no error in the trial judge's analysis and dismissed the appeal from convictions.