Mark Edward Ertel

The appellant G.C. appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual exploitation involving three complainants.

The appeal raised issues regarding the trial judge's application of the rule in R. v. W.(D.), the rejection of the appellant's evidence without sufficient reasoning, and reliance on the absence of a proven motive for fabrication.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the trial judge correctly applied the legal principles, including the W.(D.) rule, and provided reasoned explanations for credibility assessments, demonstrating proper deference to the trial judge's findings.

The applicants brought a Charter motion under s. 11(b) seeking a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay was 36 months and 6 days, with a net delay of 30 months and 28 days after accounting for defence delay, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling set by R. v. Jordan.

The Crown argued the delay was justified by the COVID-19 pandemic as an exceptional circumstance.

The court found COVID-19 to be a discrete exceptional event and that the Crown and justice system took reasonable steps to mitigate the delay.

Consequently, the period of delay attributable to COVID-19 was subtracted, bringing the net delay below the presumptive ceiling.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The applicant, Brandon Cain, sought a review of a detention order.

The court found that the COVID-19 pandemic constituted a material change in circumstances, allowing for a de novo bail review hearing under s. 520 of the Criminal Code.

Considering the elevated risk of infection in the Ottawa Carleton Detention Centre (OCDC), the applicant's prior liver injury, and a strengthened bail plan including a GPS monitoring bracelet and a surety, the court was satisfied that both secondary and tertiary grounds for detention could be overcome.

Despite the serious nature of the charges (violent assault, firearm offences, forcible confinement) and a prior breach of release conditions, the court granted the applicant's release on strict house arrest conditions.

The accused, M.J., was charged with break and enter with intent to commit an indictable offence, sexual assault, and uttering threats.

The Crown alleged that M.J. broke into the complainant's home and sexually assaulted her in the basement.

The trial proceeded over three days with testimony from the complainant, two Crown witnesses, and the accused.

The judge found that the accused's evidence was credible and straightforward, while the complainant's testimony was fraught with inconsistencies regarding dates, timelines, and material facts.

The judge concluded that the accused did not commit the alleged offences and acquitted him on all charges.

The accused, Jorden Larocque-Laplante, was found guilty of second-degree murder.

The court was tasked with determining the period of parole ineligibility, which could range from 10 to 25 years.

The judge considered the accused's character, the brutal nature and circumstances of the offence (including a hate-motivated element), the jury's recommendations, and the devastating impact on the victim's family.

Despite mitigating factors such as youth and remorse, the significant aggravating factors led the court to impose a parole ineligibility period of 13 years.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, sought to have the partial defence of provocation left to the jury.

The Crown argued there was no air of reality to the defence.

The court applied the five-component air of reality test for provocation under s. 232 of the Criminal Code, considering both objective and subjective elements.

The court found that there was sufficient evidence for a properly instructed jury to have a reasonable doubt regarding the Crown disproving the elements of provocation, particularly concerning whether the victim's conduct constituted an indictable offence and whether it would deprive an ordinary person of self-control, despite the accused initiating the confrontation.

The court ruled that the defence of provocation would be left with the jury.

The accused was charged with two counts of assault, one count of assault causing bodily harm, and one count of assault with a weapon.

He applied for a stay of proceedings pursuant to Section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging a violation of his right to trial within a reasonable time.

The total delay from the laying of the information to trial was 18 months and two weeks, exceeding the presumptive 18-month ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The Crown offered earlier trial dates in January 2018, but defence counsel did not respond.

The court found that while the Crown's initial email was an appropriate step, it was insufficient and the Crown failed to take further reasonable available steps, such as bringing an application in Certificate of Readiness court to canvass earlier dates.

The court concluded there were no exceptional circumstances justifying the delay and granted the stay of proceedings.

The defendant pleaded guilty to assault on a 2½-year-old child in her care on March 25, 2015.

The Crown sought 90 days in custody followed by 18 months probation.

The defence sought a conditional discharge with probation.

The court found the defendant was a victim of domestic abuse and control by her husband at the time of the assault, acted out of character, expressed genuine remorse, and had no criminal record.

The court imposed a conditional discharge with 12 months probation, rejecting the Crown's custodial sentence as disproportionate for a first offender.

This criminal trial involved two Ontario Provincial Police officers, Jason Redmond and David Vogelzang, facing charges related to obstruction of justice, breach of trust, and trafficking cannabis, stemming from an undercover operation.

The court acquitted both officers on charges of attempted obstruction of justice and breach of trust concerning a meeting where they discussed a rumour about the undercover officer's identity, finding reasonable doubt regarding their intent to obstruct.

Redmond was found guilty of trafficking cannabis (Count 4, admitted) and knowingly dealing with a forged document (Count 5).

He was acquitted of a second trafficking charge (Count 3, withdrawn) and a breach of trust charge related to the forged document (Count 6), as his actions in creating the document were not connected to his official duties.

The accused was charged with wilfully attempting to obstruct, pervert or defeat the course of justice by failing to appear as a witness for a murder trial, contrary to section 139(2) of the Criminal Code.

The accused had been an eyewitness to a killing and was subpoenaed to testify at the retrial of the accused murderer.

The accused left Canada and travelled internationally, deliberately avoiding his obligation to testify.

The Crown established that the accused had been properly served with a subpoena and had knowledge of his obligation to appear.

The sole issue at trial was whether the actus reus of the offence had been proven.

The court found that despite clerical errors on the subpoena, it was valid and the accused had a legal duty to attend court.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused was charged with multiple Criminal Code and Controlled Drugs and Substances Act offences arising from a joint federal and provincial investigation.

The Crown alleged that the accused knowingly possessed and stored restricted and prohibited firearms, ammunition, crack cocaine, and drug paraphernalia in a shared storage locker.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence and testimony from the co-accused.

The court found that while the circumstances were suspicious, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had actual knowledge of the contents of the bags he delivered to the storage facility, nor could willful blindness be established.

The accused was acquitted of counts 1-30 but found guilty of unlawful possession of ammunition while prohibited.

The Crown appealed a conditional discharge imposed on the respondent following conviction for careless use of a firearm under s. 86(3) of the Criminal Code.

The respondent, a licensed gun owner, fired a semi-automatic restricted firearm inside his apartment while intoxicated, discharging three bullets.

One bullet penetrated into a neighboring apartment where a child's toys were stored.

The Court of Appeal found the conditional discharge demonstrably unfit, holding that the sentencing judge erred in placing insufficient weight on general deterrence and denunciation, and in treating intoxication as a mitigating rather than aggravating factor.

The court allowed the appeal and substituted a suspended sentence with probation.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while disqualified from driving contrary to section 259(4) of the Criminal Code.

A police officer observed a vehicle with a disqualified owner enter a dealership parking lot and detained the defendant standing beside the vehicle.

Without informing the defendant of the reason for detention or his right to counsel, the officer obtained admissions that the defendant had no driver's licence and had been driving that day.

The court found that the detention was lawful based on reasonable suspicion of a criminal offence, but the officer breached sections 9 and 10(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms by failing to advise the defendant of the reason for detention and his right to counsel before questioning.

The court excluded the defendant's statements under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the seriousness of the breaches and their impact on the defendant's rights outweighed society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

With the Crown's essential evidence excluded, the charge was dismissed.

The accused pleaded guilty to producing 957 marijuana plants in violation of section 7(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The mandatory minimum sentence triggered by the aggravating factors was three years imprisonment.

The accused challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum provision under section 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, arguing it constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.

The court found the mandatory minimum sentence to be grossly disproportionate both as applied to the accused and as it would reasonably foreseeably apply to other offenders, particularly those with minimal involvement in large-scale operations on third-party property.

A youth charged with sexual offences brought a section 11(b) Charter motion alleging violation of the right to trial within a reasonable time.

The court applied the new Jordan framework, which established an 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial courts.

The applicant argued for a lower 12-month ceiling for youth cases.

The court found that charges involving one complainant exceeded the presumptive ceiling and could not be justified under either the Jordan framework or transitional principles, resulting in a stay of proceedings.

Charges involving a second complainant were found to be within acceptable delay parameters and proceeded to trial on the merits.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with an alcohol level exceeding 80 mg, arguing arbitrary detention under section 9 of the Charter and seeking exclusion of evidence under section 24(2).

The trial judge found no detention until the approved screening device demand.

The appeal court upheld this finding, concluding that the initial police interaction was a general inquiry, not a detention, and that the officer's subjective belief was not determinative.

Applying the principles from *R. v. Suberu* and *R. v. Grant*, the court found no Charter breach.

Even if a breach had occurred, the court determined that excluding the reliable breath sample evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, considering the officer's good faith and the seriousness of the offence.

A youth charged with sexual offences against two young complainants.

The Crown sought to introduce count-to-count similar fact evidence, using testimony from one complainant to support allegations involving the other.

The court considered whether the evidence met the admissibility threshold under the similar fact evidence doctrine, examining both the probative value and the risk of prejudice.

The court admitted the evidence on two bases: the coincidental use of the term "milk" by both complainants, and the contextual similarities in how the alleged offences occurred.

The accused was charged with operation of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mgs per 100 mls of blood.

The trial proceeded as a blended voir-dire with Charter application arguments.

The court found that the accused was arbitrarily detained in violation of section 9 of the Charter and was not advised of the reason for detention or his rights to counsel in violation of sections 10(a) and 10(b).

The officer detained the accused without reasonable grounds to suspect he was the driver, handcuffed him, searched him, and obtained inculpatory statements without proper caution or rights advisement.

The court excluded all evidence obtained as a result of these breaches under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the administration of justice would be brought into disrepute by admission of the evidence.

An acquittal was entered on both counts.

The accused was tried on two counts arising from an automobile collision: refusing to provide an evidential breath sample contrary to section 254(3) of the Criminal Code, and impaired driving.

The Crown alleged the accused was impaired by alcohol following a rear-end collision.

The court found that while the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to believe the accused had committed an impaired driving offence, the evidential breath demand was not made "as soon as practicable" as required by law, rendering it unlawful.

Additionally, the court found insufficient evidence of an unequivocal refusal due to the officer's failure to record the precise words constituting the alleged refusal.

On the impaired driving charge, the court found the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol.

The accused was acquitted on both counts.

The accused was retried and convicted of impaired driving relating to an accident from 2010.

At the first trial, the accused was sentenced to a 15-month driving prohibition, which was served in full before the conviction was successfully appealed and set aside.

The Crown sought a new driving prohibition upon retrial and conviction.

The court held that imposing a new mandatory driving prohibition would constitute double punishment and violate principles of sentencing and the integrity of the criminal justice system.

The court interpreted section 259(1) of the Criminal Code to permit credit for time already served under the prior prohibition, and imposed a one-day driving prohibition with notation that 15 months had already been served.