Emma Susan Andrée Michelle Loignon-Giroux

The appellant appealed convictions for mischief and obstructing police arising from his presence in a restricted area on Wellington Street during the Freedom Convoy occupation of Ottawa on February 19, 2022.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding police had common law authority to secure the area, that his arrest violated s. 9 of the Charter, that the search incident to arrest breached s. 8 of the Charter, and that the evidence should have been excluded.

The appeal court found the trial judge correctly applied the ancillary powers doctrine and properly assessed the officer's reasonable grounds for arrest.

The appeal was dismissed on all grounds.

The appellant, Scott Hockaday, appealed his conviction on two counts of mischief related to his participation in the 2022 Ottawa "Freedom Convoy" protest.

The court reviewed the lawfulness of his arrest, the admissibility of evidence obtained as a result, and the sufficiency of evidence regarding his intent.

The appeal was dismissed, with the court finding that the arresting officer had reasonable grounds, the trial judge made no palpable and overriding error, and the evidence supported the conviction.

The accused, Patrick King, was sentenced for offences including mischief, counselling mischief, counselling obstruction of police, and disobeying a court order arising from his leadership role in the 2022 "Freedom Convoy" protest in Ottawa.

The Crown sought a ten-year prison sentence, arguing the protest constituted an unprecedented occupation of the nation's capital, while the defence argued for time served and probation.

Justice Hackland rejected the Crown's position, noting that while the protest caused significant community harm, a ten-year sentence was disproportionate and lacked precedent.

The court sentenced the accused to a total of 12 months, consisting of nine months of pre-sentence credit and a three-month conditional sentence, followed by 12 months of probation.

The court allowed the appeal of Erwin Blanco’s conviction for sexual assault, finding that the trial judge’s reasons were insufficient regarding the complainant’s state of mind and the issue of consent.

The trial judge failed to reconcile conflicting evidence about whether the complainant consented to the sexual activity, particularly her statements that she thought the activity “felt nice” and that she was “very tired.” The court also found that the trial judge did not properly address whether any consent was vitiated by abuse of a position of trust or authority under section 273.1(2)(c) of the Criminal Code.

As a result, a new trial was ordered.

Criminal trial arising from the accused’s role in the downtown Ottawa convoy occupation in early 2022.

The court found the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was an organizer, leader, and online influencer who counselled and participated in mischief by encouraging blockades, horn honking, resistance to police efforts to clear the area, and later breaches of an injunction prohibiting the use of air horns and train horns.

The court acquitted on intimidation counts, holding the specific intent required by s. 423 of the Criminal Code was not established because the pressure tactics were directed at changing government policy rather than intimidating identified persons within the meaning of the provision.

The accused was convicted of counselling obstruction of police but acquitted of personal obstruction, and the defence of officially induced error was rejected for lack of an air of reality.

At the conclusion of the Crown's case in a first-degree murder trial, the accused applied for a directed verdict, seeking to remove the elevation of murder to first degree based on unlawful confinement and criminal harassment from jury consideration.

The court orally dismissed the application regarding criminal harassment.

In these written reasons, the court granted the application concerning unlawful confinement, finding no evidence of a distinct act of confinement separate from the murder itself, thus precluding first-degree murder liability on that ground.

Randall Hillier, charged with multiple offences related to the "Freedom Convoy" sought a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Charter, arguing his right to be tried within a reasonable time was violated.

The total delay was approximately 34 months and 28 days.

The court deducted 65 days for defence-caused delay (counsel's refusal to attend a pretrial conference) and 40 days for exceptional circumstances (Supreme Court's Haevischer decision requiring re-hearing of a motion).

The net delay of 31 months and 13 days still exceeded the 30-month Jordan ceiling, leading the court to grant the application and stay the charges.

The Crown sought rulings on the voluntariness of a statement given by the accused to police and the admissibility of prior discreditable conduct evidence.

The court found the statement voluntary and admissible, applying the *Oickle* factors.

However, the court dismissed the application to admit prior discreditable conduct evidence, finding its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value, despite its relevance to party liability, citing concerns about reasoning prejudice and the unproven nature of some prior charges.

The accused brought applications for first-party disclosure and third-party production arising from charges connected to the Freedom Convoy protest.

The court applied the Stinchcombe disclosure regime and the O’Connor likely relevance framework, while first addressing asserted claims of solicitor-client privilege and work product privilege.

Communications between the Crown Attorney’s office and police, and emails involving PPS counsel, were held privileged and were not producible.

The court ordered limited disclosure to itself of specified police and PPS materials, including certain duty book notes, reports, and potentially relevant communications and footage, but dismissed the balance of the broader disclosure requests for lack of likely relevance.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on two counts of mischief arising from the Ottawa Freedom Convoy protests.

The trial judge had excluded the respondent's statements to police as involuntary and obtained in violation of his Charter rights, and found insufficient evidence to prove he was a party to the mischief.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in her voluntariness analysis by requiring verbatim notes, misapplied the law on psychological detention, and failed to consider the evidence as a whole regarding the respondent's participation in the protest blockade.

A new trial was ordered.

The applicant sought a bail review to vary his release conditions, specifically a no-contact order with his wife, following charges of intimate partner violence.

The complainant provided a full recantation under oath, stating she had embellished the original allegations and wished to resume cohabitation.

The court applied the ladder principle and found that, given the recantation and the applicant's compliance with the original order, the no-contact condition was no longer necessary.

The application was granted, allowing contact subject to the complainant's written and revocable consent.

The accused faced multiple Criminal Code and Provincial Offences Act charges arising from an incident during the "Rolling Thunder" event in Ottawa.

Charges included dangerous operation of a conveyance, flight from police, failing to stop after an accident, resisting arrest, refusing a breath demand, and breaching release conditions.

The court found the accused guilty of dangerous operation, flight from police, resisting arrest, refusing a breath demand, and breaching a geographical release condition.

The accused was found not guilty of failing to stop after an accident and breaching a release condition related to participating in "Freedom Convoy" events, as the court found "Rolling Thunder" to be a distinct event.

Provincial offence charges for driving without an ignition interlock device and without insurance were dismissed, while charges for failing to obey police directions and having open liquor in a vehicle resulted in convictions.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals on two counts of mischief arising from his participation in the Freedom Convoy protest in Ottawa.

The respondent cross-appealed his conviction for obstructing a peace officer and sought to introduce fresh evidence regarding the invocation of the Emergencies Act.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the Crown's appeal, finding the trial judge erred in law by failing to consider the respondent's actions—including his refusal to leave the area and his encouragement of others—as aiding and abetting the ongoing mischief.

The court dismissed the respondent's appeal, holding that the police were acting in the lawful execution of their duties and that the fresh evidence would not have affected the result.

Convictions for mischief were entered and the matter was remitted for sentencing.

The applicant, a former provincial legislator charged with offences related to the Freedom Convoy protest, applied for a change of venue from Ottawa, arguing pervasive bias prevented a fair trial.

The Crown argued the court was bound by a prior coordinate decision denying a change of venue for another convoy participant.

The court found it was not bound by the prior decision due to significant differences in evidence, notably a targeted social media campaign against the applicant.

However, the court dismissed the application, concluding that existing procedural safeguards, including robust jury screening, were sufficient to ensure a fair trial.

The accused, Bevin Kerry Degale, faced charges of aggravated sexual assault and assault.

The assault charge was dismissed on a non-suit motion.

The aggravated sexual assault charge proceeded based on circumstantial evidence, as the complainant did not testify.

The court found the actus reus of aggravated sexual assault (sexual touching, serious bodily harm, and lack of consent) proven beyond a reasonable doubt, relying on res gestae hearsay statements and forensic evidence.

However, the mens rea (knowledge of lack of consent or intent to cause bodily harm) was not proven due to the absence of direct evidence regarding the interaction.

Consequently, the charge of aggravated sexual assault was dismissed.

This ruling addresses the admissibility of five hearsay statements made by the complainant in a criminal trial for aggravated sexual assault and assault.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine if the statements were admissible under the common law res gestae exception or the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The judge admitted two statements under res gestae, and partially admitted a third under the principled exception (a gesture and statement about location, but not the assertion of assault).

The remaining two statements were deemed inadmissible due to a lack of substantive reliability or because the police notes did not constitute a "statement" of the declarant.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions for two counts of causing a disturbance and one count of assault arising from two separate incidents at a Tim Horton's and a Walmart where he refused to wear a mask.

He argued the trial judge provided insufficient reasons and failed to analyze the essential elements of the offences.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's oral reasons were adequate when read in the context of the evidence and submissions, and that the findings of guilt were supported by the evidence.