CITATION: Family and Children’s Services of Lanark, Leeds, and Grenville v. S.W., 2026 ONSC 2100

COURT FILE NO.: FC-23-108-2

DATE: 2026/04/09

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

Family and Children’s Services of Lanark, Leeds, and Grenville

Applicant

– and –

S.W., K.R.M., and R.D.

Respondents

Nyasha Size, Counsel for the Applicant

Dominique Smith, Counsel for the Respondent Mother, S.W.

Mellington Godoy, Counsel for the Respondent Father, K.R.M.

Claudia Bordes, Counsel for the Respondent Grandmother, R.D.

HEARD: February 26, 2026

REASONS FOR JUDGEMENT

ANNE LONDON-WEINSTEIN J.

Overview

1Family and Child Services (the “Society”) has brought a motion pursuant to rule 16 of the Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99, seeking a finding that the children are in need of protection pursuant to section 74(2) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 14, Sched. 1. It seeks a disposition that the children be placed in extended society care.

2The mother and maternal grandmother of the children oppose the motion. They state that there are genuine issues requiring a trial and that it would not be just to determine these issues through reliance on the summary judgment procedure. The father attended the proceedings but did not participate in the motion. The maternal grandmother seeks a supervision order to herself.

3The motion commenced on February 26, 2026. However, the mother became ill and collapsed part-way through argument. As a result, the parties sought leave to complete their submissions in writing, which was granted. Written submissions were submitted to the court.

4I have relied on the materials filed, oral argument, and submissions filed in writing.

Brief Overview of the Relevant Legal Framework

5The Society brings this motion pursuant to rule 16 of the Family Law Rules—the summary judgment rule.

6The burden of proof rests with the party moving for summary judgment. Pursuant to subrule 16(4), the party moving for summary judgment shall serve an affidavit or other evidence that sets out specific facts showing there is no genuine issue requiring a trial.

7Pursuant to subrule 16(4.1), the responding party to the motion may not rest on mere allegations or denials, but shall set out, in the form of an affidavit or other evidence, specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. The responding party is required to put their best foot forward on the motion. The judge is permitted to assume that the parties have placed before them all of the evidence which they would adduce at trial: see Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. T. (K.), 2000 20578 (Ont. C.J.), at para. 10; Sweda Farms v. Egg Farmers of Ontario, 2014 ONSC 1200, at para. 27.

8Even though subrule 16(4.1) sets out the obligation of the respondent to the motion to provide “in an affidavit or other evidence, specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial”, this does not shift the ultimate burden of proof. Even if the respondent’s evidence does not establish a genuine issue for trial, the court must still be satisfied on the evidence before it that the moving party has established that there is no genuine issue necessitating a trial: Kawartha-Haliburton Children’s Aid Society v. M.W., 2019 ONCA 316, 432 D.L.R. (4th) 497, at para. 80/2.

9Subrule 16(6) provides that, if there is no genuine issue requiring a trial of a claim or defence, the court shall make a final order accordingly.

10Subrule 16(6.1) provides that, in determining if there is no genuine issue requiring a trial, the court shall consider the evidence submitted by the parties and may exercise any of the following powers for that purpose, unless it is in the interests of justice for such powers to be only exercised at trial:

1. Weighing the evidence;

2. Evaluating the credibility of a deponent;

3. Drawing any reasonable inference from the evidence.

11In Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 87, the Supreme Court of Canada set out a two-step process for determining whether summary judgment is warranted.

12Hryniak, at para. 66, sets out that the judge must first determine if there is a genuine issue requiring a trial based on the evidence without reliance on the additional fact-finding powers available to the court. If, after this initial determination, there still appears to be a genuine issue for trial, the judge may resort to the additional fact-finding powers to decide if a trial is required.

13There will not be a genuine issue requiring a trial when the judge is able to reach a fair and just determination on the merits. This will be the case when the process permits the judge to make the necessary findings of fact, allows the judge to apply the law to the facts, and is a proportionate, more expeditious and less expensive means to achieve a just result: Hryniak, at para. 49.

14This procedure remains fair as long as the judge has confidence that the necessary findings of fact can be made and the relevant legal principles properly applied so as to resolve the dispute: Hryniak, at para. 50; Kawartha, at para. 63.

15Within the context of a child protection hearing, a fair determination on the merits must recognize that Charter rights are engaged for a vulnerable segment of our society. As a result, courts have stressed the need to adopt a cautious approach to granting summary judgment in child protection hearings. This cautious approach promotes the principle enunciated in Hryniak of reaching a fair and just determination on the merits: Kawartha, at para. 76.

16The court is required to engage in a careful screening of the evidence to eliminate evidence which is not properly admissible. Evidence which is inadmissible at trial should be given no weight on a motion for summary judgment: Kawartha, at para. 80/3.

Facts

17The children who are the subject of these proceedings are B.W., who is almost three years old, and B.M., who is two years old. The mother of the children is S.W., and the father is K.M. S.W. resides in Brockville, Ontario. S.W. has three older children. Two of those children reside in the custody of their father, M.G., and the youngest child resides in the custody of his father, K.H. Both custody orders were made pursuant to s. 102 of the CYFSA.

18K.M. has two older children who are not in his care.

19The children do not identify as First Nations, Inuit or Metis. K.M. is Metis. The Society’s current protection applications before the court request that the children be placed in the extended care of the society with access to the parents and maternal grandmother.

20The Society has been involved with the family on an ongoing basis for a decade. The child protection concerns include risk of physical and emotional harm to the children due to the mother’s alleged inability to manage her emotions, some mental health issues, and a history of conflict and violence in her relationships, including with her parents, with whom she ordinarily resides. The Society alleges a history of domestic violence and unsafe behaviours.

21I reviewed all of the material filed in these proceedings, including all of the affidavit evidence. The affidavit of Melissa MacLean dated October 10, 2025, at para, 2, set out concerns of the children being exposed to conflict through the relationship of the mother and father, as well as some instances of violence between the mother and the maternal grandmother. These incidents include allegations of physical assault, including in the presence of the children. There are allegations of assault which the maternal grandmother did not disclose to the Society.

22The mother was incarcerated when she gave birth to B.W. The child was removed, with a warrant, from the mother on April 28, 2023. The child was then placed, on a temporary without prejudice basis, with the Society on May 2, 2023.

23The Society completed a kinship assessment on the maternal grandmother while the mother was incarcerated. The assessment revealed a concern regarding the maternal grandmother’s ability to protect B.W. by ensuring they were not exposed to adult conflict or impacted by the mother’s behaviours.

24On February 14, 2024, Justice Rees placed the child with the maternal grandmother and her husband, R.W., on a supervision order.

25After the mother was released from custody, access between the parents and the child progressed from being supervised by the Society on their premises and at the EarlyON centre, to being supervised by the maternal grandmother, and eventually unsupervised in the community. The mother and father were consistent in their access until they moved into an apartment with the family.

26On June 14, 2024, the mother and father got into a verbal argument that escalated and the father left the apartment, according to the affidavit evidence of Melissa MacLean, dated July 18, 2024, at para. 7.

27On June 23, 2024, there was a physical altercation between the mother and the maternal grandmother that resulted in police being notified. There was some punching and hair-pulling, and the maternal grandmother had a bruise on her head. There was a concern that B.W. may have been frightened or injured when the mother and maternal grandmother engaged in a physical altercation while BW was in her mother’s arms.

28After this incident, the Society verified concerns regarding child exposure to adult conflict with a risk of physical harm, with the maternal grandmother’s inability to protect the child as the primary safety risk. A safety plan which would prevent the mother and the maternal grandmother from being together while the child was in their care was developed.

29The child B.W. returned full-time to the maternal grandmother’s care. Before driving back to Brockville, the maternal grandmother and the child B.W. met up with the parents at a McDonald’s restaurant. This meeting was held in violation of the safety plan which had been in place at the time. That safety plan prohibited the mother, the father and the maternal grandmother to be together in the presence of BW due to the fight the week before.

30On July 17, 2024, another safety planning meeting was held with the family to mitigate risk toward the child. The maternal grandmother and the mother were not to be together with the child without the express consent of the Society.

31After the safety planning meeting of July 17, 2024, the father reported that the mother and maternal grandmother were not following the safety plan and had been misleading the Society. The father disclosed that they had a physical altercation with the child present on the previous day. The evidence of the father is hearsay and inadmissible for the truth of its contents but is admitted only for narrative purposes; to explain how events unfolded and the child came to be removed from the maternal grandmother’s care on July 17, 2024.

32On July 22, 2024, Justice Desormeau made a temporary and without prejudice order placing the child B.W. in the care of the Society.

33On September 19, 2024, the Society informed the maternal grandmother that B.W. would be removed from the family and that the kinship file would be closed due to ongoing protection concerns.

34When B.W. was removed, the mother was pregnant. On October 19, 2024, the Society received information that the mother had given birth to a child. This evidence is hearsay, and is not admitted for its truth, but merely for narrative, to explain the subsequent steps taken by the Society.

35The family did not notify the Society that the child, B.M., had been born. When a worker visited the family, it is alleged that the maternal grandmother threatened the worker. The child was removed from the care of her parents without warrant on October 20, 2024. The mother was incarcerated as a result of an allegation of assault against the father. Upon her release from custody, the mother began to reside with the maternal grandmother.

36Police have been notified a number of times from June of 2024 to June of 2025 regarding a wide variety of matters, including intimate partner violence, mischief, neighbour disputes and instances involving conflict between the Society and the family.

Analysis

37The grandmother presents a plan to care for the children and suggests that she will prevent violations of the safety plan which would be put in place to avoid exposing the children to conflict and violence.

38The mother and father are not presenting their own plans to care for the children, nor are they, at this stage of the proceedings, proposing to be a part of the maternal grandmother’s plan. However, the mother accepts that all parties should live separately.

39The mother in this case has previously filed three affidavits. She was in custody on November 10, 2025, and, as a result of that fact, the summary judgment motion before Justice Kershman on November 10, 2025, was adjourned due to her inability to meaningfully participate in the proceedings.

40On January 12, 2026, the mother submitted an affidavit after her release from custody on December 22, 2025. The affidavit indicated that the mother had taken steps to obtain and live in a residence in Smiths Falls, Ontario.

41In a February 20, 2026, affidavit, the mother described her difficulties in finding housing. However, her evidence is that she has now obtained housing in Ottawa. I found as a fact that the mother, who provided a signed residential tenancy agreement as Exhibit A to her affidavit, has secured housing in Ottawa. The court also reviewed the photos of the mother in the apartment, which were submitted.

42The evidence is that the mother suffers from health issues and has a seizure disorder. She did collapse in court on February 26, 2026, which resulted in paramedics being called and the motion being adjourned.

43A trial judge may find that the mother’s vulnerability due to her health upon her immediate release from jail may have contributed to the grandmother’s poor decision to permit her daughter to violate the safety plan by residing with her. Under the new plan, the mother will be residing in Ottawa. The significance of this factor in determining what is in the best interests of the children is for the trial judge to determine. The parties are of limited financial means, which impacts the mother’s ability to travel from Ottawa to Brockville. The trial judge may find this factor relevant to the children’s potential exposure to familial violence.

44There were significant issues which preceded the mother’s incarceration. There were two separate incidents of uttering threats toward Society staff members and a separate incident of assaultive behaviour toward the father. The mother was incarcerated for almost seven months in custody on a one-for-one basis in relation to these three separate incidents. She pleaded guilty to criminal charges arising from these incidents.

45The maternal grandmother, who proposes to care for the children, was previously approved to care B.W. in 2023. That plan also included Mr. R.W, who is not part of the current plan. At the time, the Society noted that “it is clear that BW has been provided with appropriate care and the grandparents have been working co-operatively with the Society.” However, the mother was incarcerated at the time. The kinship assessment also stated that the primary safety concern was the caregiver’s capacity to protect B.W. by ensuring that she is not exposed to adult conflict or impacted by her mother’s, at times, aggressive behaviour.

46The grandmother has demonstrated a pattern in the past of failing to protect the children from their mother and of not being candid with the Society. I am required to, and have considered, section 93 of the CYFSA, which permits the court to consider the past conduct of a person toward any child if that person is caring for or has to or may have care for, or have access to a child who is subject of the proceeding.

47The maternal grandmother did not downplay or explain prior instances where she violated the safety plan by permitting the mother to be in her presence with B.W. She has indicated that this will never happen again, and she takes responsibility for permitting violations of the safety plan in the past.

48The evidence of the maternal grandmother is that she is receiving counselling and is processing the trauma and grief that she has experienced, including working toward processing her feelings about her daughter. Her evidence is that she is working toward learning to set appropriate boundaries with her daughter, which would ensure the protection of the children.

49I also considered that the child B.W. has been in the care of the society for 727 days, approximately 362 days past the statutory timelines. The child B.M. has been in care for 514 days, which is 149 days past the statutory timelines.

50The issue for the court is whether there is a genuine issue for trial as to whether the maternal grandmother is able to protect the children to exposure to family violence. Her past history suggests that she has, in the past, prioritized her daughter’s needs over those of her granddaughters.

51However, the current plan has the mother living in Ottawa, not Brockville. The mother is not pregnant, nor is her health in the same state as it was when she was first discharged from jail, which may have impacted the grandmother’s decision to deviate from the safety plan by allowing the mother to live with her.

52The grandmother is also undergoing counselling to assist her in learning how to set firm boundaries with her daughter by resolving issues related to grief and trauma. The grandmother also has support from her other daughter, K, and emotional support from longtime friend W.L. and pastors D.G. and R.G. In addition to attending counselling, the grandmother is on many waiting lists for additional assistance and has a family court worker.

53There was also some evidence that the grandmother may have health issues which would impact her ability to care for the children. She disputes that evidence. She submitted a letter from Dr. Pajot as an exhibit to her affidavit.

54I did not give any weight to the letter from Dr. Pajot. It is hearsay and is not admissible in its current format on a motion for summary judgment. It lacked the requisite specificity to enable the court to reach a conclusion on the maternal grandmother’s medical issues. Such evidence would need to be admitted pursuant to section 52 of the Ontario Evidence Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.23. Section 52 permits the admission of a signed medical report for the truth of its contents without calling the doctor as a witness, provided 10-days notice has been provided. A medical report, as opposed to a mere letter, would provide a comprehensive review of the maternal grandmother’s medical issues in an admissible format.

55The evidence is also not admissible under s. 35 of the Ontario Evidence Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.23 as it contains opinion evidence. See: Westerhof v. Gee Estate, 2015 ONCA 206.

56However, given the evidence of the grandmother disputing any health concerns that would interfere with her ability to care for the grandchildren, I am not satisfied that she is unable to physically care for them.

Conclusion

57Summary judgment in family matters should be granted only in the “clearest of cases”: B. (F.) v. G. (S.) (2001), 199 D.L.R. (4th) (Ont. S.C.), at paras. 13 and 15.

58It is my respectful view that there are genuine triable issues in this case. While the grandmother’s past conduct will be relied upon at trial to attempt to persuade the trial judge that the children should be put in extended society care, the trial judge will also have to consider the concrete steps the grandmother has taken to ensure that she will be able to properly protect her granddaughters in the future. These steps include counselling, to assist her in setting boundaries vis-a-vis her daughter, and additional support from family and her pastors. The trial judge will also have to consider the impact that the mother living in Ottawa, as opposed to Brockville, will have on the grandmother’s ability to protect the children from the conflict and violence.

59There is also evidence that the children have not thrived in foster care. At this stage of the proceeding, this court is not prepared to make findings in that regard, but it is something which should properly be considered by the trial judge in determining what is in the best interest of these two very young children.

60The children are living in separate homes at the moment. The grandmother has been consistent in terms of spending time with her grandchildren. Even after the visits were moved to Smiths Falls, which greatly increased the financial and practical difficulties of attending visits with the children, the grandmother attended those visits consistently.

61There is a genuine issue for trial in this case.

62The motion or summary judgement is therefore denied. It is hereby ordered that there be a trial to determine what living arrangement is in the best interest of these two children.

Date: April 9, 2026

CITATION: Family and Children’s Services of Lanark, Leeds, and Grenville v. S.W., 2026 ONSC 2100