Joseph Stanley Wilkinson

The applicants brought a pre-trial motion seeking a stay of proceedings for abuse of process, alleging widespread police misconduct in the execution of wiretap authorizations, particularly regarding the interception of privileged solicitor-client communications.

During the motion, police witnesses testified about their handling of intercepted communications, prompting the applicants to seek disclosure of the legal advice the police received from Crown counsel.

The Crown asserted solicitor-client privilege over the advice.

The court held that while the individual officers did not waive privilege, the applicants met the threshold to pierce the privilege under the 'innocence at stake' exception as adapted for an abuse of process motion.

The court ordered a stage-two in-camera review of the privileged communications to determine if they should be disclosed to the defence.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for historical sexual offences against his step-nephew and stepson.

He argued ineffective assistance of counsel, improper use of similar act evidence, and errors in assessing his testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no miscarriage of justice from trial counsel's conduct and no errors in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as fresh medical evidence did not demonstrate inadequate care in prison.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and administering a stupefying substance, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing his credibility.

The trial judge had rejected the appellant's testimony on the basis that he tailored his evidence to fit arguments raised during a voir dire regarding his police statement.

The Court of Appeal held that this reasoning improperly turned the appellant's statutory right to be present at his trial against him, undermining his right to a fair trial.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The applicant brought a motion for a preservation order under the Civil Remedies Act, 2001 against thirteen properties alleged to be proceeds of unlawful activity related to drug trafficking and money laundering.

The respondents opposed the motion, arguing there were no reasonable and probable grounds, that the applicant failed to make full and frank disclosure on the initial ex parte motion, and that continuation of the order was not in the interests of justice.

The court found reasonable and probable grounds to believe that eight of the properties were acquired with proceeds of crime due to unexplained funding gaps, but discharged the order for five properties where legitimate funding sources were demonstrated.

The court dismissed the non-disclosure arguments and found that continuing the preservation order for the eight properties was not clearly against the interests of justice.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder and theft after hijacking a tractor-trailer of frozen chickens and shooting the driver.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting cell phone propagation maps and test calls, and in his jury instructions regarding the W. (D.) framework and the distinction between disbelief and fabrication of an exculpatory statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the evidentiary rulings or the jury instructions.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on a charge of second degree murder.

At trial, the accused advanced an alternate suspect defence and claimed the police investigation was inadequate.

The trial judge excluded the Crown's proposed rebuttal evidence from the alternate suspect, instructed the jury that they must acquit if they could not decide which of the two men committed the murder, and repeatedly warned the jury about wrongful convictions.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in excluding the rebuttal evidence, in giving the co-principal instruction where there was evidence of joint participation, and in repeatedly referencing miscarriages of justice in the jury charge.

The cumulative effect of these errors warranted a new trial.

The accused brought a successive application seeking declarations that certain police-intercepted communications were protected by solicitor-client privilege.

The court reviewed audio recordings of intercepted telephone sessions and the supporting affidavit filed under seal.

It held that most of the communications involved discussions between the accused and his solicitor within the context of a professional retainer and therefore attracted solicitor-client privilege.

However, two intercepted sessions consisting only of a solicitor leaving voicemail messages requesting a return call did not contain privileged legal communications.

The court declared privilege over the substantive communications and ordered the supporting affidavit sealed to protect the privilege.

The accused applied for a review of a detention order under section 520 of the Criminal Code.

The accused was charged with instructing a criminal organization and drug trafficking offences, with the Crown's case relying heavily on evidence obtained from an encrypted mobile device.

The reviewing judge found the Justice of the Peace committed errors in principle by making logically inconsistent findings between the primary and secondary grounds, and by failing to adequately consider the impact of a section 8 Charter argument on the strength of the Crown's case.

Furthermore, late disclosure revealing that police searched the device without a warrant and failed to obtain an extension for its detention constituted a material change in circumstances.

The detention order was vacated and the accused was released on strict conditions with substantial sureties.

During a pre-trial Charter motion concerning alleged breaches of s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms during a criminal investigation, the accused brought a sub-motion seeking a declaration that certain intercepted call summaries and corresponding audio recordings were protected by solicitor-client privilege.

The court considered whether communications reflected in two specified call sessions were made within a solicitor-client relationship and for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal advice.

Finding that a professional retainer existed, that the communications involved legal advice, and that they were intended to be confidential, the court concluded that the privilege applied.

No waiver, severability issue, or exception to privilege was established.

The communications were therefore declared subject to solicitor-client privilege.

During pre‑trial proceedings, the accused advanced a Charter challenge alleging a breach of s. 8 arising from an alleged unreasonable search and seizure.

The court addressed issues relating to production of third‑party banking records held by a financial institution.

To facilitate the ongoing motion, the court clarified the scope of a subpoena duces tecum issued to a bank employee and specified categories of internal bank materials to be produced, including anti‑money laundering manuals, online instructions to branches, and training materials relevant to the relevant time period.

The endorsement was issued to ensure production of the documentation necessary for the continuation of the pre‑trial Charter application.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference and sexual exploitation of his stepdaughter.

He sought to introduce fresh evidence of an audio tape and alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel, inadequate interpretation services breaching his s. 14 Charter rights, insufficient reasons, and errors in the trial judge's credibility assessment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the fresh evidence did not meet the Palmer test, trial counsel's performance did not result in a miscarriage of justice, and the trial judge made no errors in assessing credibility or providing reasons.

The appellants appealed a decision refusing to quash their committal for trial.

They argued the preliminary inquiry justice lost jurisdiction by refusing to allow them to call witnesses who had provided information relevant to judicial pre-authorizations, which they intended to use to establish Charter breaches.

The preliminary inquiry justice and the appeal judge treated the proposed witnesses as sub-affiants who could only be cross-examined with leave.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the witnesses were properly characterized as sub-affiants and that the refusal to allow their cross-examination at the preliminary inquiry did not impair the appellants' right to make full answer and defence.

The appellant was convicted of robbery with a firearm and related offences.

The Crown's case relied heavily on a co-accused who recanted his preliminary inquiry testimony at trial, providing exculpatory evidence for the appellant.

The trial judge admitted the preliminary inquiry testimony for the truth of its contents but failed to properly distinguish between the exculpatory and inculpatory portions in her Vetrovec warning to the jury.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by instructing the jury to seek confirmatory evidence for both the exculpatory and inculpatory portions of the testimony, rather than tying the exculpatory evidence to the reasonable doubt standard.

The appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, who was self-represented at trial, appealed his conviction for fraud.

At trial, he called the investigating officer as his own witness and elicited prejudicial opinion and investigative hearsay evidence.

The trial judge failed to give a limiting instruction on the use of this evidence and instead invited the jury to use it to support the Crown's case.

The Court of Appeal held that the evidence was admissible only for a limited purpose and required a clear limiting instruction.

The curative proviso could not be applied, as the evidence provided a clear route to conviction.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellants were convicted of second degree murder following the beating death of a young man by a group of attackers.

They appealed their convictions on multiple grounds, including the admission of after-the-fact conduct, the voluntariness of police statements, alleged Charter breaches, jury instructions, and ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all appeals, finding no reviewable errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions, and concluding that trial counsel provided effective representation.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault, arguing the trial judge erred in rejecting his self-defence claim under s. 37 of the Criminal Code by focusing solely on the complainant's injuries.

The incident, captured on video in a holding cell, showed the appellant provoking the complainant and then punching him once in the face, causing serious injuries.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly considered the video evidence and the injuries to determine that the force used by the appellant was excessive in the circumstances.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder in the strangulation and drowning of his former partner.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting hearsay evidence of a phone call where the deceased stated she was with the appellant shortly before her death.

He also argued the Crown engaged in improper cross-examination of defence witnesses and that the trial judge failed to give a limiting instruction regarding a police officer's testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the hearsay statement was reliable, the improper cross-examination did not result in a miscarriage of justice, and the lack of a limiting instruction was the result of a deliberate tactical decision by the defence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for discharging a firearm with intent to wound and related offences, as well as his global sentence of 7 years.

He argued that the trial judge erred in denying a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter for unreasonable delay, and that the trial judge misapprehended evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the 27-month delay was largely attributable to the appellant's changes in counsel and scheduling conflicts, not the Crown.

The court also found no misapprehension of evidence.

The sentence appeal was dismissed, with the court finding no error in the application of the Kienapple principle and concluding the sentence was fit.

The moving party, who was convicted of second-degree murder, brought a motion for an order compelling the disclosure of records relating to the interpretation services provided at his trial.

He sought these records to support a proposed application to introduce fresh evidence on appeal, alleging a breach of his section 14 Charter rights due to incompetent interpreters.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the moving party failed to establish any air of reality to his claims that the interpretation services were deficient or had any adverse impact on the fairness of his trial.

The appellant appealed his sentence to the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle in the sentence imposed by the trial judge that would justify appellate intervention.