N. A. Melchiorre

The applicants sought an order under the Mining Act to cancel a note of pending proceedings on several mining claims.

The Tribunal previously found the application premature as it lacked sufficient evidence that the underlying litigation against the respondent had been discontinued.

The applicants subsequently provided documentation confirming that the respondent had changed its corporate name and that the litigation had been wholly discontinued.

Satisfied that the litigation was resolved, the Tribunal ordered the cancellation of the note of pending proceedings, excluded the time the note was in effect from the computation of time for assessment work, and set a new anniversary date for the claims.

A daughter claimed $57,000 from her mother, alleging she had made monthly investment payments of $1,000 between April 2005 and December 2009 toward a twelve-unit rental property in exchange for a promise that the property would eventually be transferred to her and rent proceeds would be shared.

The mother denied the claim on multiple grounds: statute of limitations, insufficient proof of payments, and that the claim was premature as the property was to be transferred upon her death.

The court found the daughter had proven the $57,000 in payments on a balance of probabilities and established unjust enrichment.

The court applied an equitable set-off of $10,800 for rent-free occupancy and services rendered, reducing the award to $46,200.

The court rejected the statute of limitations defence, finding the limitation period commenced on January 28, 2018, when the mother indicated the relationship was at an end, and the action was commenced within two years.

The court also rejected the clean hands doctrine and premature claim defences.

This decision addresses the costs of a dismissed summary judgment motion.

The defendant's motion for summary judgment, arguing the plaintiff's claim was statute-barred, was dismissed.

The plaintiff, as the successful party on that motion, sought substantial indemnity costs.

The court, applying Rule 20.06 and Rule 57.01, determined that substantial indemnity was not warranted due to the absence of bad faith or unreasonable conduct.

The court fixed the plaintiff's costs at $7,500.00 plus HST, payable by the defendant, finding the plaintiff's claimed costs excessive and disallowing certain disbursements as overhead.

The Applicant, Ms. Baxter, sought an order for costs against the Respondent, Mr. Pykari, related to Mr. Pykari’s dismissed motion to vary child and spousal support on a temporary basis.

The court awarded Ms. Baxter costs in the amount of $8,500, inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST.

The decision applied family cost rules, emphasizing the presumption that a successful party is entitled to costs, and considered factors such as the parties' behaviour, the complexity of issues, and proportionality.

The court found that Mr. Pykari's original motion was best left for trial due to insufficient evidence and dated income information, and noted that both parties shared responsibility for delays and lack of disclosure, which influenced the final costs award.

The respondent sought to vary interim child and spousal support orders, arguing for annual adjustments to child support and termination or reduction of spousal support due to decreased income and accumulated arrears.

The applicant opposed, arguing the issues were for trial due to complex income determination, including the respondent's business income and potential imputation of income to both parties.

The court dismissed the motion, finding insufficient evidence to determine income for support purposes and that the issues were best left for a full trial.

The defendant, Terry Dyck, brought a motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss the plaintiff, Warren Hughes's, claim on the grounds that it was statute-barred by the Limitations Act, 2002.

The parties, both former investment advisors, had entered into a Joint Advisory Agreement which dissolved upon the termination of Dyck's employment.

Hughes subsequently filed a claim against Dyck for breach of contract, misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty.

The court applied the principles for summary judgment from Hryniak v. Mauldin and the discoverability principles from the Limitations Act.

The court found that there were genuine issues requiring a trial, including the need to weigh evidence and assess credibility.

The motion judge concluded that the earliest date triggering Hughes's claim was his own termination from Wellington, or alternatively, Dyck's termination, both of which fell within the two-year limitation period.

Consequently, the motion for summary judgment was dismissed.

The plaintiff, a renovation company, brought a motion seeking a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) against a residential property owned by the defendant, who was the mother-in-law's son-in-law.

The plaintiff claimed over $200,000 for renovation services and materials provided to the property.

The defendant asserted the work was deficient and had listed the property for sale.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiff's claim was for money damages arising from a construction contract, not for an interest in land.

The court held that the plaintiff's failure to perfect its construction lien rights could not be circumvented by seeking a CPL or by invoking equitable remedies like constructive trust, as this would subvert the statutory scheme of the Construction Lien Act.

The applicant, an Indigenous child welfare agency, sought judicial review of a Minister's decision amending the designations of child welfare agencies in the Thunder Bay area.

The decision expanded the jurisdiction of another Indigenous agency to provide services to its affiliated families residing in Thunder Bay.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Minister's decision was a policy decision that met the requirements of procedural fairness and was reasonable under the Vavilov framework.

Following the dismissal of the applicants' motions for a stay of a Ministerial Directive, the court determined the costs of the motions.

The intervenor's request for costs was denied, as the opposition to the stay was already mounted by the respondents.

The respondent Tikinagan sought partial indemnity costs of approximately $108,000.

The court found this amount excessive, noting the public interest nature of the case, the overlap of work with the main applications, and the principle of proportionality.

Costs were fixed at $50,000 payable to Tikinagan, with each applicant responsible for $25,000.

The applicants, two Indigenous representative groups, brought motions for a stay of a Minister's Directive and Designations that authorized three children's aid societies to provide child and family services in Thunder Bay.

The applicants argued the Directive interfered with their inherent right to self-government and was issued without proper consultation or statutory compliance.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test and found that while there was a serious issue to be tried, the applicants failed to establish irreparable harm or that the balance of convenience favoured a stay.

The motions for a stay were dismissed.

The applicants, Dilico Anishinabek Family Care and Fort William First Nation, brought a motion for a stay of a Minister's Directive and Designation pending their applications for judicial review.

The Directive designated Tikinagan Child and Family Services to provide child and family services to certain Indigenous children in Thunder Bay.

The court applied the three-part test for a stay.

While finding a serious issue to be tried, the court concluded the applicants failed to establish irreparable harm or that the balance of convenience favoured granting the stay.

The motion was dismissed, with written reasons to follow.

The applicant commenced an application under the Civil Remedies Act, 2001 seeking forfeiture of seized cash.

The proceeding settled pursuant to a Rule 49 offer to settle made by the respondent that returned most of the funds but left costs to be assessed by the court.

The respondent sought costs on the basis that it was largely successful.

The court held that under Rule 49.07(5)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, where a defendant’s offer to settle does not address costs and is accepted, the plaintiff (or applicant) is entitled to costs to the date of service of the offer.

The court awarded the applicant partial indemnity costs to that date and also determined costs relating to a separate refusals motion.

The applicant brought a motion for a preservation order under the Civil Remedies Act, 2001 against thirteen properties alleged to be proceeds of unlawful activity related to drug trafficking and money laundering.

The respondents opposed the motion, arguing there were no reasonable and probable grounds, that the applicant failed to make full and frank disclosure on the initial ex parte motion, and that continuation of the order was not in the interests of justice.

The court found reasonable and probable grounds to believe that eight of the properties were acquired with proceeds of crime due to unexplained funding gaps, but discharged the order for five properties where legitimate funding sources were demonstrated.

The court dismissed the non-disclosure arguments and found that continuing the preservation order for the eight properties was not clearly against the interests of justice.

Following an application under the Partition Act for the sale of a jointly owned property, the parties resolved the substantive issues and sought a determination on costs.

The applicant sought costs from the date she first demanded a sale, arguing the respondent's initial failure to respond necessitated the litigation.

The court awarded the applicant $7,500 in costs for the period prior to the respondent retaining counsel, finding the respondent's intransigence caused unnecessary litigation.

For the period after the respondent retained counsel, the court ordered the parties to bear their own costs, save for $550 awarded to the respondent for reviewing real estate documents.