Michael Wilchesky

The appellant, John Dunford, appealed the dismissal of his claim for damages against the Hamilton-Wentworth District School Board and Hamilton Health Sciences Corporation.

Dunford alleged that Dr. James E. Anderson, who was involved with the Cool School program, sexually abused him and that the hospital was vicariously liable.

The trial judge found that Dr. Anderson committed the tort of sexual battery but concluded the hospital was not vicariously liable due to insufficient closeness in the relationship.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s findings, holding that the correct legal test was applied and that the policy rationales for vicarious liability were properly considered.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondents.

The plaintiff brought an action against the defendant hospital for damages arising from sexual abuse he suffered in 1983 while attending an alternative school located on the hospital's grounds.

The plaintiff alleged that the director of the school, who was also his tutor, sexually battered him and that the hospital was vicariously liable and negligent.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the director did commit sexual battery against the plaintiff.

However, the court dismissed the action, concluding that the hospital was not vicariously liable because the relationship between the hospital and the director was not sufficiently close, as the director operated the school independently.

The court also found that the plaintiff failed to establish negligence on the part of the hospital.

The plaintiff, W.C., brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendant, R.S., for sexual assault and battery.

The claim stemmed from a sexual relationship that began when the plaintiff was approximately 14 years old and the defendant, her father's cousin, was significantly older and in a position of trust.

The defendant had previously pleaded guilty to a criminal charge related to the relationship.

The court found that the defendant's admitted facts in the criminal proceedings, combined with his evidence on the motion, established liability for sexual battery.

The court determined that any "consent" at the outset was not legally effective due to the plaintiff's age, inexperience, and the defendant's exploitation of a position of trust.

The court rejected the defendant's argument that lack of resistance implied consent.

The motion for summary judgment on liability was granted.

The court also assessed damages, awarding $225,000 in general damages and $50,000 in aggravated damages, plus $14,400 for future therapy, totaling $289,400.

Punitive damages were not awarded given the prior criminal sentence.

This was a motion for default judgment seeking damages for physical and sexual assault, battery, intimidation, and intentional infliction of mental suffering.

The defendant, who was the plaintiff's first cousin, was noted in default after failing to file a defence.

The defendant had previously been criminally convicted for the sexual assault, which was deemed conclusive proof of the tort.

The plaintiff, who had a history of prior abuse, suffered significant psychological harm exacerbated by the defendant's actions and subsequent criminal trial.

The court awarded non-pecuniary damages, including for loss of competitive advantage, and punitive damages, along with pre- and post-judgment interest and costs.

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' action for lack of jurisdiction.

The plaintiff, a teacher, alleged that her principal sexually harassed and assaulted her, and that the school board reprised against her.

The plaintiff's union had declined to pursue a grievance on her behalf due to the passage of time.

The court applied the Weber test and held that the essential character of the dispute was workplace-related and fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of a labour arbitrator under the collective agreement.

The court found no 'remedial gap' that would grant it jurisdiction simply because the union chose not to pursue the grievance.

The motion was granted and the action was dismissed.