Joseph Stanley Wilkinson

The appellant was convicted of possession of crack cocaine and fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking following two field strip searches conducted by police in a motel room.

The appellant appealed on the ground that the strip searches violated his Charter rights under section 8.

The Court of Appeal found that both strip searches violated the appellant's section 8 rights because they were conducted in the field rather than at a police station, and the Crown failed to establish exigent circumstances justifying the field searches.

However, the Court of Appeal did not exclude the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of trafficking in cocaine and marihuana, conspiracy to traffic in controlled substances, and participating in a criminal organization.

The principal issue on appeal concerned the admissibility of communications found on a Blackberry seized from a co-accused.

The trial judge had ruled the appellant lacked standing to challenge the search.

Following the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Marakah, the Crown conceded the appellant had standing and that the seizure violated his Charter section 8 rights.

The appellate court applied the Marakah framework and determined the evidence must be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter, as the serious breach of privacy rights and substantial impact on the appellant's Charter-protected interests outweighed society's interest in adjudicating the case on its merits.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder on two grounds: (1) that the trial judge erred in finding his second statement to police was voluntary because the police failed to advise him he was a suspect and had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest him for murder, and (2) that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the use of post-offence conduct evidence regarding the appellant's failure to perform CPR or call 911 after the shooting.

The Court of Appeal rejected both grounds of appeal, finding that the police caution adequately conveyed the salient points to allow the appellant to make a meaningful choice whether to speak, and that the post-offence conduct was properly used as evidence relevant to the mental element of murder.

The appellant, Tessa-Lyn Wookey, appealed her convictions for Dangerous Driving, Impaired Driving, and Refuse Breath Sample, as well as her sentence.

The court found legal error in the trial judge's analysis of the mens rea for dangerous driving, noting a failure to explain "how and why" the driving constituted a marked departure from the standard of care.

For impaired driving, the court found the trial judge erred by concluding impairment was the only reasonable explanation for the driving, without considering other possibilities like dangerous or careless driving.

Consequently, new trials were ordered for Dangerous Driving and Impaired Driving.

The appeal against the Refuse Breath Sample conviction was dismissed, as the trial judge's factual findings regarding the appellant's unequivocal refusals and the officer's non-renewal of the demand were upheld, affirming that the "last chance" doctrine did not apply.

The global sentence appeal was not addressed due to the new trial orders, but the sentence for Refuse Breath Sample was deemed fit.

A Toronto police officer was convicted of attempted murder for firing a second volley of six shots at a knife-wielding man lying on a streetcar floor, 5.5 seconds after an initial volley that had fatally wounded the victim.

The officer was acquitted of second-degree murder.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction and the six-year sentence, finding the verdicts were not inconsistent and that the mandatory minimum sentences for attempted murder with a firearm do not violate the Charter.

The court rejected the officer's constitutional challenges under sections 7 and 12 of the Charter and dismissed his application to adduce fresh evidence on appeal.

The appellant was convicted after a jury trial of two counts of possessing narcotics for the purpose of trafficking and one count of possessing proceeds of crime.

The evidence was obtained through a general warrant under s. 487.01 of the Criminal Code, which authorized covert entry into a leased unit to locate and observe narcotics.

The appellant appealed on grounds relating to the jury charge and the validity of the general warrant.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the general warrant was improperly issued as it was used to circumvent the more stringent requirements of a Controlled Drugs and Substances Act s. 11 warrant.

The court set aside the convictions and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault of his 14-year-old niece on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel.

The trial judge found that the appellant touched the complainant for a sexual purpose, despite his denial.

The appellant argued that trial counsel failed to explore the complainant's difficult relationship with her mother and failed to cross-examine the complainant's sister regarding potential bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant failed to satisfy the prejudice requirement of the ineffective assistance test, as neither issue would have addressed the critical question of whether touching occurred.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court finding no error in principle in the five-month sentence imposed.

Three appellants were convicted of first degree murder, attempted murder, and committing those offences for the benefit of a criminal organization arising from a drive-by shooting in Toronto.

The Crown's case relied heavily on testimony from two gang members who testified the appellants confessed to the shooting.

The appellants challenged numerous aspects of the trial including jury selection procedures, joinder of counts, admission of bad character evidence, ballistics evidence, jury instructions on Vetrovec witnesses, and alleged Charter violations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals of Atkins and Riley but allowed Wisdom's appeal, finding the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of an attempted theft four months after the shooting, which had minimal probative value but significant prejudicial effect.

The appellant was convicted of 40 counts including drug trafficking, criminal organization offences, weapons offences, proceeds of crime, extortion, and criminal interest rate offences.

He was sentenced to 19 years imprisonment with a 9.5-year parole ineligibility period.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld most convictions but allowed the appeal in part.

The court found no Charter violations regarding search and seizure or trial delay.

However, the court quashed convictions for entering into criminal interest rate agreements, finding the trial judge erred in applying a presumption of knowledge without requiring proof of mens rea.

The court also reduced the sentence from 19 to 15 years and set aside the parole ineligibility order except for criminal organization convictions.

The appellant appealed his conviction on several drug trafficking charges arising from Project Dolphin, a joint forces investigation into drug trafficking in Thunder Bay.

The central issue concerned the admissibility of evidence extracted from the appellant's Blackberry device, which was seized incident to an arrest that was later found to be arbitrary.

The trial judge found Charter breaches but admitted the evidence under section 24(2).

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the Grant framework for admissibility of constitutionally-tainted evidence.

The court also upheld the admission of hearsay evidence from a deceased co-conspirator and evidence from a co-conspirator's guilty plea under the co-conspirators' exception to the hearsay rule.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The trial judge had found that police surveillance officers observed a co-accused placing a bag in the appellant's vehicle trunk, which the trial judge relied upon to conclude the appellant was acting in a joint venture to traffic cocaine.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge had misapprehended the evidence regarding this key fact.

This misapprehension was material to the conviction and, standing alone, required a new trial.

The court rejected the appellant's alternative submission that the verdict was unreasonable.

The court also addressed a procedural issue regarding a conspiracy charge that had been withdrawn but upon which the trial judge had rendered findings of guilt and imposed a concurrent sentence.

The accused applied for production of the complainant's medical records pursuant to section 278.3 of the Criminal Code in a sexual assault case.

The court conducted an in camera hearing to determine whether the records should be produced for judicial review.

The court found that the complainant's waiver of her privacy rights was invalid because she did not have knowledge of the statutory protections or the consequences of waiving them.

The court also rejected the defence argument that the Crown had a duty to review the records and take a position on likely relevance.

On the substantive issue, the court found that the accused failed to establish that the records were likely relevant to any issue at trial or to the competence of the witness.

The application was dismissed.

During pre-trial proceedings involving allegations of abuse of process related to police handling of solicitor-client privileged communications intercepted under Part VI wiretap authorizations, the court had ordered production of privileged materials for judicial review under the McClure framework.

The Crown sought a judicial stay rather than comply with the order, asserting that compliance would require disclosure of solicitor-client privileged communications between police and Crown counsel.

The defence agreed to the requested remedy.

Considering the public interest in preserving solicitor-client privilege and the lengthy procedural history of the case, the court exercised its discretion to terminate the prosecution by entering a judicial stay of proceedings.

The accused brought a successive application seeking declarations that certain police-intercepted communications were protected by solicitor-client privilege.

The court reviewed audio recordings of intercepted telephone sessions and the supporting affidavit filed under seal.

It held that most of the communications involved discussions between the accused and his solicitor within the context of a professional retainer and therefore attracted solicitor-client privilege.

However, two intercepted sessions consisting only of a solicitor leaving voicemail messages requesting a return call did not contain privileged legal communications.

The court declared privilege over the substantive communications and ordered the supporting affidavit sealed to protect the privilege.

During a pre-trial Charter motion concerning alleged breaches of s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms during a criminal investigation, the accused brought a sub-motion seeking a declaration that certain intercepted call summaries and corresponding audio recordings were protected by solicitor-client privilege.

The court considered whether communications reflected in two specified call sessions were made within a solicitor-client relationship and for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal advice.

Finding that a professional retainer existed, that the communications involved legal advice, and that they were intended to be confidential, the court concluded that the privilege applied.

No waiver, severability issue, or exception to privilege was established.

The communications were therefore declared subject to solicitor-client privilege.

During pre‑trial proceedings, the accused advanced a Charter challenge alleging a breach of s. 8 arising from an alleged unreasonable search and seizure.

The court addressed issues relating to production of third‑party banking records held by a financial institution.

To facilitate the ongoing motion, the court clarified the scope of a subpoena duces tecum issued to a bank employee and specified categories of internal bank materials to be produced, including anti‑money laundering manuals, online instructions to branches, and training materials relevant to the relevant time period.

The endorsement was issued to ensure production of the documentation necessary for the continuation of the pre‑trial Charter application.