Leslie Karen Monique Paine

The appellant appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition ordering that he continue to be subject to a Conditional Discharge.

The Court of Appeal found that the Board made serious errors of law, as there was no positive evidence that the appellant continued to pose a significant threat to public safety.

The appellant had been living in the community for almost five years, adhered to his medication, and had the support of his treatment team for an absolute discharge.

The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was granted an absolute discharge.

The appellants were committed for trial on a charge of conspiracy to commit murder following a preliminary inquiry.

They applied for certiorari to quash the committal, which was dismissed by the Superior Court of Justice.

On appeal, the appellants argued there was insufficient evidence of an agreement to murder the victim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the preliminary hearing judge properly concluded there was some evidence from which a reasonable inference could be drawn that the appellants agreed and intended to murder the victim.

The appellant appealed a conviction for fraud.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it unnecessary to decide if the conduct amounted to theft by conversion.

The Court held that making use of funds while being wilfully blind to their source constitutes dishonesty, satisfying the elements of fraud.

The appellant appealed a conviction for possession of child pornography found on a shared home computer, arguing that the trial judge failed to explain why he accepted the estranged spouse’s evidence and rejected the appellant’s denial.

The court held that, in a case turning on credibility and conflicting evidence about who was responsible for the material, the reasons did not adequately reconcile significant contradictions or explain why no reasonable doubt remained.

The court also identified material misapprehensions of the forensic and testimonial evidence.

Applying the functional approach to sufficiency of reasons, the court concluded that meaningful appellate review was foreclosed and the verdict was unsafe.

The appellants, husband and wife, were convicted of second degree murder in the death of their seven-year-old son, who died following months of severe physical abuse.

On appeal, the appellants sought to introduce fresh medical evidence regarding the cause of death and challenged the trial judge's jury instructions on aiding and abetting, out-of-court statements, and propensity reasoning.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding that the fresh evidence did not meet the required cogency threshold to affect the verdict, particularly given the tactical decision not to call such evidence at trial.

The Court also found no reversible errors in the jury instructions or evidentiary rulings, and upheld the 18-year parole ineligibility period for the stepmother.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his detention in a medium secure unit.

The appellant and amicus curiae argued the Board erred by not ordering a hybrid disposition that would allow the hospital to move him to minimum security at its discretion, as recommended by psychiatrists.

The Court of Appeal held the Board was entitled to reject the psychiatric evidence and require an early review hearing instead.

The appeal was dismissed, but the Board was ordered to convene the requested early review hearing forthwith.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing that an error in the warrant of committal overstated his sentence by five months, preventing him from seeking early parole as intended by the sentencing judge.

The Crown conceded the error.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and accepted a joint submission to reduce the custodial portion of the sentence to time served.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder.

He raised several grounds of appeal, including the trial judge's instructions on unlawful confinement, attempted sexual assault, drunkenness, the adequacy of a Vetrovec warning, the use of prior consistent statements, and post-offence conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds, finding the evidence of identity overwhelming and the trial judge's instructions sufficient.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder in the death of his wife.

At trial, he admitted causing her death but claimed he did not mean to kill her, raising defences of self-defence, necessity, and accident.

He alleged his wife had tried to poison him and set a fire in their home, and that she died from traumatic asphyxia during a struggle when he accidentally kneeled on her chest.

The trial judge instructed the jury on accident as to unintended consequences but refused to leave accident as to the actus reus.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in failing to leave the defence of an accidental act with the jury, as there was an air of reality to the appellant's claim that he kneeled on his wife accidentally.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was serving a conditional sentence when he was arrested for new offences.

A warrant for his arrest for breaching the conditional sentence was issued and later executed.

The breach hearing commenced 33 days after the warrant was executed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for the breach, arguing the hearing was not held within the 30-day period required by s. 742.6(3) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the 30-day period is triggered by the execution of the warrant for the breach, not its issuance or the arrest for the new offences, and that the 33-day delay was as soon as practicable in the circumstances.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder.

On appeal, he argued that his right to the assistance of an interpreter under s. 14 of the Charter was violated because his assigned interpreter was not accredited.

He also raised several grounds of appeal relating to the trial judge's jury instructions on identification evidence, the mental element for murder, post-offence conduct, and intoxication, as well as evidentiary rulings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant failed to establish a violation of his s. 14 Charter rights, as he had agreed to the interpreter arrangement and never complained of any lack of understanding during the trial.

The Court also found no reversible errors in the jury instructions or evidentiary rulings.

The appellant appealed his conviction.

Fresh evidence was introduced demonstrating that the appellant was not criminally responsible by reason of a mental disorder at the time of the offence.

The Crown and amicus curiae agreed with substituting a finding of not criminally responsible.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions, substituted a verdict of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder, and referred the matter to the Review Board.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board, arguing the Board erred in its treatment of an impugned letter contained in his hospital records.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board properly admitted the letter as part of the hospital records without using it for the truth of its contents, and that the Board's decision was reasonable on the totality of the evidence.

The appellant, a youthful first offender, pleaded guilty to offences arising from a sophisticated counterfeiting operation and was sentenced to 21 months' incarceration.

He appealed, arguing the trial judge erred by rejecting a conditional sentence and failing to credit his strict pre-trial bail conditions.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge did not err regarding the bail conditions, as they did not impose undue hardship.

However, the Court found that a conditional sentence was appropriate given the appellant's youth, rehabilitation efforts, and the paramountcy of specific deterrence for youthful first offenders.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence varied to 21 months conditional.

The appellant appealed his sentence after being convicted of sexual assault, choking, unlawful confinement, uttering threats, assault, and failing to comply with a probation order.

The sentencing judge found the appellant to be a long-term offender and imposed a 9-year determinate sentence for the sexual assault and related offences, plus consecutive sentences for other offences and a 10-year supervision order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the sentence appropriate given the appellant's extensive record and the horrific circumstances of the offences.

The appellant was convicted of multiple sexual offences against his two step-daughters and designated a dangerous offender.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on bad character evidence, reasonable doubt, and prior inconsistent statements.

He also appealed his sentence, arguing he was entitled to the benefit of the newly enacted long-term offender provisions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury instructions, while pre-dating Lifchus and not perfect, did not result in an unfair trial.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed; although the appellant was entitled to the benefit of the long-term offender provisions, the court applied the curative proviso because the expert evidence overwhelmingly established that his risk could not be controlled in the community.

The appellant, an aboriginal offender, appealed his sentence.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge erred in law by failing to apply s. 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code or the Gladue principles.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, reducing the sentence to time served, as the appellant's mandatory release date was in one month and no restorative purpose would be served by further incarceration.

The probation period was extended from twelve to fifteen months to enable restorative treatment.

The appellant appealed his sentence, seeking proper credit for pre-sentence custody.

With the Crown's consent, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and varied the trial judge's order, noting that with proper credit, the appellant's statutory release date would have been November 12, 2006.

The appellant, an Aboriginal offender, appealed his sentence.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge erred in law by failing to consider section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code, which requires a different methodology for assessing a fit sentence for an Aboriginal offender.

The Court of Appeal, having reviewed a full Gladue report, granted leave to appeal and varied the sentence to time served (approximately 5 months) followed by probation.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge over-emphasized general deterrence, failed to give sufficient weight to mitigating factors, and failed to consider pre-trial bail conditions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence fit given the deliberate and prolonged course of deceitful conduct that seriously impacted the victim.

The court also held that the failure to advert to pre-trial bail conditions was not fatal.