Leslie Karen Monique Paine

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault and aggravated assault, arguing the trial judge erred by applying a Vetrovec warning to a key defence witness who claimed to have committed the offences.

The Court of Appeal agreed that applying a Vetrovec warning to defence evidence was an error in law.

However, the Court applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, finding no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred given the strong eyewitness identification evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction.

At trial, the judge placed considerable emphasis on the complainant's emotional display during testimony, which related to an alleged threat against his mother.

However, the trial judge had previously precluded evidence on this issue, deeming it unnecessary.

The Court of Appeal held that relying on this emotional display after precluding evidence on the issue was unfair and deprived the appellant of the opportunity to make full answer and defence.

The conviction appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant pleaded guilty to breaking and entering a dwelling house.

The Crown and defence jointly submitted a sentence of 10 months' imprisonment plus 12 months' probation.

The sentencing judge rejected the joint submission and imposed 21 months' imprisonment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by failing to explain how the joint submission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, as required by Cerasuolo.

The Court allowed the appeal and substituted the jointly proposed sentence.

The appellant appealed his conviction, which was based on the eyewitness identification of a police officer who identified him from a single photograph.

The Court of Appeal held that while the verdict was not unreasonable, the trial judge erred by focusing solely on the officer's credibility without addressing the inherent dangers of eyewitness identification or expressly considering whether the defence evidence raised a reasonable doubt as to the reliability of the identification.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was jointly charged with two co-accused of sexually assaulting a 14-year-old complainant.

Following a jury trial, the appellant was convicted while his co-accused were acquitted.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the verdicts were inconsistent and therefore unreasonable.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the verdicts were reconcilable because the Crown's case against the appellant was significantly stronger than against his co-accused, supported by DNA evidence and a post-offence statement.

The appellant was convicted of multiple offences including forcible confinement, assault, and criminal harassment against a former girlfriend, and was sentenced to 21 months' imprisonment.

He appealed the sentence on the basis that the trial judge failed to give him credit for 18 months spent on bail under strict house arrest conditions.

The Court of Appeal held that time spent under stringent bail conditions is a relevant mitigating factor that must be considered, and the failure to do so is an error in principle.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was reduced to 16 months' imprisonment.

The appellant appealed his sentence following a conviction for a vicious beating.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and concluding that the sentence was not outside the appropriate range given the severity of the offence.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing there was insufficient evidence to find him guilty as a party to the offence.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding no admissible evidence of the appellant's prior knowledge of the principal's intention.

The court held that mere presence was insufficient to sustain a conviction as a party.

The conviction was set aside and an acquittal ordered.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder following a fatal stabbing during a bar altercation.

At trial, the appellant raised self-defence and sought to introduce the deceased's criminal record and a transcript of a guilty plea to demonstrate the deceased's propensity for violence.

The trial judge excluded this evidence.

Furthermore, in response to a jury question, the trial judge instructed that 'recklessness' for murder meant foreseeing a 'risk' of death rather than a 'likelihood'.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in excluding the propensity evidence and in the jury charge on recklessness.

The curative proviso was not applied, the appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder after his estranged girlfriend disappeared and her dismembered remains were found two years later.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the testimony of an unsavoury witness who helped dispose of the body, corroborated by circumstantial and forensic evidence.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions, in admitting hearsay and after-the-fact demeanour evidence, and in allowing bad character evidence regarding a subsequent relationship.

The Court of Appeal found that while some bad character evidence was improperly admitted and misused by the Crown, the curative proviso applied because the remaining evidence of guilt was overwhelming.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's disposition was consistent with expert medical opinion and supported by the evidence, and therefore not unreasonable.

The appellant's arguments regarding disclosure and consistency of allegations relating to the index offences were rejected.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and attempted murder following a stabbing incident outside a tavern.

He appealed his convictions and his sentence of life imprisonment with 25 years of parole ineligibility.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the mens rea for attempted murder, as it requires a specific intent to kill.

Consequently, the attempted murder conviction was set aside and replaced with a conviction for aggravated assault.

The court dismissed the remaining grounds of appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's instructions on recklessness, responses to jury questions, or conduct of the trial.

The 25-year parole ineligibility period was upheld given the appellant's extensive violent criminal record and the unprovoked nature of the offences.

The appellant was convicted of sexual exploitation and sexual assault against his stepdaughter.

At trial, the judge refused to allow the appellant to cross-examine the complainant on extracts from her diary that were in his possession, and refused to order the production of the entire diary for inspection under s. 278.5 of the Criminal Code.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in both rulings.

The complainant's privacy interest was diminished because she knew the appellant read her diary, and the extracts were relevant to her credibility.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed jury convictions for sexual assault and sexual assault causing bodily harm arising from two encounters with the complainant, and sought leave to appeal a total five-year penitentiary sentence.

The court rejected challenges to the admissibility of expert medical evidence on sexual assault-related injuries, the provision of transcripts to the jury, the charge on credibility, mens rea, bodily harm, and the reasonableness of the verdict.

Although the trial judge erred in failing to instruct the jury that consent is vitiated for sexual assault causing bodily harm only where the accused both intended and caused bodily harm, the court held that no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred on the evidence.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant challenged convictions arising from a prolonged campaign of extreme intimate-partner violence and intimidation, arguing that the Crown improperly re-litigated facts underlying a prior acquittal and that courtroom security measures for a protected witness created unfair prejudice.

The court held that the fraud exception to issue estoppel applied because the earlier acquittal had been procured through threats and intimidation causing false testimony, and it rejected the mistrial ground after finding the judge's instruction cured any prejudice from the security presence.

On sentence, the court upheld the denunciatory basis for an order under s. 743.6 of the Criminal Code but varied the parole ineligibility period because only Schedule I or II offences under the Corrections and Conditional Release Act could be used in the calculation.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal judge's decision that overturned a conviction.

The summary conviction appeal judge had found that the trial judge applied a higher level of scrutiny to the defence evidence than to the Crown evidence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the trial judge made no reversible error in her credibility assessment and that there were no irreconcilable findings to suggest an unequal level of scrutiny.

The appellant was arrested for impaired driving and detained in a police cell for 11 hours with virtually no contact with police officers.

He sought a stay of proceedings, arguing his s. 9 Charter right against arbitrary detention was breached.

The trial judge and summary conviction appeal court judge dismissed the application.

The Court of Appeal found that the 11-hour detention was indeed arbitrary and breached s. 9 of the Charter.

However, the Court concluded that a stay of proceedings was not the appropriate remedy, as the breach occurred post-offence and did not impact trial fairness or the gathering of evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, an off-duty police officer, was convicted of dangerous driving following a road rage incident on a major highway where he aggressively passed the complainant, stopped his vehicle in the passing lane, and flashed his police badge.

He appealed his conviction and 30-day custodial sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied the modified objective test for dangerous driving.

The sentence appeal was allowed in part only to credit the appellant for 10 days of pre-sentence custody, reducing the sentence to 20 days.

The court upheld the custodial nature of the sentence, emphasizing the appellant's abuse of authority and the danger posed to the public.

The appellant appealed convictions for possession of stolen property and possession of cocaine, as well as the associated sentences and a forfeiture order.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions on Counts 1 and 2 and the cocaine charge, finding ample evidence of wilful blindness and possession.

However, the court set aside the conviction on Count 3 (home theatre/DVD equipment) due to insufficient evidence.

The forfeiture order was upheld under s. 490.1(2) of the Criminal Code.

The conviction appeal was allowed in part, and the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault and impaired driving, as well as his sentence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the Crown disproved self-defence under s. 34(2) of the Criminal Code, as the appellant stabbed his assailant without warning when he could have escaped.

The court also upheld the rejection of the necessity defence for impaired driving.

The sentence appeal was allowed in part, reducing the impaired driving sentence from one year to four months concurrent, based on a Crown concession.

The court declined to interfere with the trial judge's refusal to impose a conditional sentence for the assault.