6 total
Appeal from Ontario Review Board detention order dismissed as appellant remained a significant threat to public safety.
The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his detention.
It was uncontested that the appellant posed a significant threat to public safety, precluding an absolute discharge.
The Court of Appeal found the Board's conclusion that a detention order was the least onerous and least restrictive disposition was fully supported by the evidence and free of legal error.
Fresh evidence indicated the appellant was incapable of consenting to treatment, making a conditional discharge unavailable.
The appeal was dismissed.
Roadside statements before access to counsel did not constitute refusal of breath demand.
The appellant was convicted at trial of refusing to comply with a breath demand under ss. 254(3) and (5) of the Criminal Code after police interpreted statements made during a roadside conversation as a refusal to accompany them to the station for breath testing.
The appellant had been arrested, advised of his right to counsel, and requested to speak to a lawyer before the officers continued discussing the breath demand with him.
The appeal court held that the accused’s statements during the brief roadside discussion were tentative and formed part of a single ongoing exchange occurring while he sought legal advice.
Relying on authorities such as R. v. Jumaga, the court concluded that a definitive refusal cannot be established where the accused has requested counsel and has not yet been given a reasonable opportunity to obtain legal advice.
The trial judge erred in treating the roadside discussion as constituting the actus reus of refusal.
The conviction was set aside and an acquittal entered.
Conviction appeal dismissed as trial judge properly assessed credibility and made no W.(D.) error.
The appellant appealed his conviction for pushing the complainant down the stairs, arguing the trial judge erred by determining credibility based solely on demeanour and failing to properly apply the W.(D.) framework.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Summary Conviction Appeal Judge that the trial judge considered all the evidence, recognized inconsistencies, and properly concluded the defence evidence did not raise a reasonable doubt.
Request to reopen sentence appeal denied as the court lacks jurisdiction once the final order is entered.
The appellant, convicted of armed robbery, sought to reopen and reconsider a sentence appeal decision that reduced his life sentence to 16 years but imposed a 7-year period of parole ineligibility.
Duty counsel argued the court incorrectly applied its discretion under the Criminal Code regarding the length of the parole ineligibility period.
The Court of Appeal denied the request, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to reopen an appeal once it had been heard on the merits and the final order had been entered.
The court noted that such a challenge to the correctness of the decision must be directed to the Supreme Court of Canada.
Life sentence for 70-year-old bank robber set aside and replaced with 16-year term.
The 70-year-old appellant, a career criminal, pleaded guilty to robbery after threatening bank staff with a fake bomb.
The trial judge imposed a life sentence primarily to give the parole board flexibility in managing his release.
On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred by imposing a maximum sentence without considering a fixed penitentiary term that would achieve the same goals of specific deterrence and public protection.
The appeal was allowed, and the life sentence was substituted with a 16-year term with parole eligibility delayed for seven years.
Parole ineligibility reduced, but convictions and denunciatory sentence otherwise upheld.
The appellant challenged convictions arising from a prolonged campaign of extreme intimate-partner violence and intimidation, arguing that the Crown improperly re-litigated facts underlying a prior acquittal and that courtroom security measures for a protected witness created unfair prejudice.
The court held that the fraud exception to issue estoppel applied because the earlier acquittal had been procured through threats and intimidation causing false testimony, and it rejected the mistrial ground after finding the judge's instruction cured any prejudice from the security presence.
On sentence, the court upheld the denunciatory basis for an order under s. 743.6 of the Criminal Code but varied the parole ineligibility period because only Schedule I or II offences under the Corrections and Conditional Release Act could be used in the calculation.