Court File and Parties
COURT FILE NO.: CR-19-50000541 DATE: 2020-01-03 ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN: HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN – and – HOWARD BURKE AND DEVON DINALL
Counsel: R. Robinson, for the Crown T. Okada-Phillips, for Howard Burke S. Pennypacker, for Devon Dinall
HEARD: 12 November 2019
S.A.Q. Akhtar J.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW
Introduction
[1] Howard Burke and Devon Dinall were found guilty by a jury of drug-related offences and the possession of monies obtained through their drug-related activities.
[2] They now stand to be sentenced for their crimes.
Factual Background
[3] Mr. Burke and Mr. Dinall were separately involved in the business of dealing drugs. They occupied different positions within the drug trafficking network run by Mr. Burke’s son, Jason, whose principal transactional drug of choice was cocaine.
[4] Howard Burke was Jason Burke’s supplier, acting as a middleman seeking to provide his son with large amounts of cocaine for resale. Mr. Dinall stood at the other end of the trafficking spectrum, receiving cocaine from Jason Burke and reselling it in smaller amounts to clients in the St. Catherines area.
[5] Mr. Burke and Mr. Dinall caught police attention through Project Kronic, an investigation of Jason Burke’s drug ring. Judicially authorised intercepted communications led to the identification and large-scale arrest of the drug ring members with Mr. Burke and Mr. Dinall caught in the same net.
[6] The wiretaps recorded Mr. Burke telling Jason Burke that he had obtained a large amount of cocaine for the purpose of resale. They also revealed that Mr. Burke had provided his other son, Lemar, with similar amounts of the same drug. When the police raided and searched Mr. Burke’s home, they found $76,880 in cash, separated into bundles, concealed in his attic.
[7] The same wiretaps also showed that Mr. Dinall was receiving smaller quantities of cocaine from Jason Burke to sell to various customers in the St. Catherines area. That cocaine was “fixed” by Mr. Dinall i.e., treated to produce crack cocaine before trafficking. One of the recorded conversations suggested that Mr. Dinall had concealed cocaine in his backyard before being ordered to remove it by Jason Burke for fear of discovery by police.
The Factual Findings
[8] Mr. Burke and Mr. Dinall’s conviction by a jury means that I, as a sentencing judge, have to determine which facts formed the basis for the convictions and, in turn, the foundation for the sentences that must be imposed.
[9] The law relating to how a sentencing judge approaches the factual determination of a jury verdict is set out in R. v. Ferguson, 2008 SCC 6, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 96, at paras. 17-18:
Two principles govern the sentencing judge in this endeavour. First, the sentencing judge “is bound by the express and implied factual implications of the jury’s verdict”: R. v. Brown, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 518, p. 523. The sentencing judge “shall accept as proven all facts, express or implied, that are essential to the jury’s verdict of guilty” (Criminal Code, s. 724(2)(a)), and must not accept as fact any evidence consistent only with a verdict rejected by the jury: Brown; R. v. Braun (1995), 95 C.C.C. (3d) 443 (Man. C.A.).
Second, when the factual implications of the jury’s verdict are ambiguous, the sentencing judge should not attempt to follow the logical process of the jury but should come to his or her own independent determination of the relevant facts: Brown; R. v. Fiqia (1994), 1994 ABCA 402, 162 A.R. 117 (C.A.). In so doing, the sentencing judge “may find any other relevant fact that was disclosed by evidence at the trial to be proven” (s. 724(2)(b)). To rely upon an aggravating fact or previous conviction, the sentencing judge must be convinced of the existence of that fact or conviction beyond a reasonable doubt; to rely upon any other relevant fact, the sentencing judge must be persuaded on a balance of probabilities: ss. 724(3)(d) and 724(3)(e); see also R. v. Gardiner, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 368; R. v. Lawrence (1987), 58 C.R. (3d) 71 (Ont. H.C.). It follows from the purpose of the exercise that the sentencing judge should find only those facts necessary to permit the proper sentence to be imposed in the case at hand. The judge should first ask what the issues on sentencing are, and then find such facts as are necessary to deal with those issues.
[10] The defence argue that in this case the factual matrix before the jury was unclear because the evidence allowed for the possibility that Mr. Burke and Mr. Dinall were trafficking not only in cocaine but also marihuana. Accordingly, they argue that the Crown’s submission regarding the value and weight of the cocaine trafficked by both men is not accurate. The defence contends that the actual amounts are significantly lower than that claimed by the Crown. I do not agree.
[11] At trial, there was no dispute that Mr. Burke and Mr. Dinall were involved in trafficking drugs. The sole issue before the jury was whether the drugs were cocaine, as posited by the Crown, or marihuana, as testified to by both Mr. Burke and Mr. Dinall. Neither the Crown nor the defence, at any stage of the proceedings, advanced the position that Mr. Burke and Mr. Dinall were trafficking both types of drugs.
[12] Nor do I find that there was any type of ambiguity in the evidence adduced at trial.
[13] I find support for the drugs being exclusively cocaine in the terminology and slang used by both Mr. Burke and Mr. Dinall. I also find that the monetary values referenced in the conversations accord with the drugs being cocaine when considered alongside the evidence given by Detective John Margetson, the expert witness called by the Crown.
[14] I also take account of the amount of money seized from Mr. Burke and Mr. Dinall’s residences.
[15] Approximately $76,800 was found in Mr. Burke’s attic, an amount consistent with the sale of large amounts of cocaine. The amount of money found in Mr. Dinall’s home, whilst smaller, was notable in the way in which it was bundled: in packages of $1,500 wrapped in elastic. This amount corresponds with Detective Margetson’s description of ounce-level cocaine selling in the range of $1,300-1,800.
[16] Mr. Okada-Phillips, counsel for Mr. Burke, and Ms. Pennypacker, on behalf of Mr. Dinall, raise an additional argument relating to the money based on the jury charge. The jury was instructed that in order to convict of possession of proceeds obtained by crime, one of the essential elements they had to find was that the amount of money in Mr. Burke and Mr. Dinall’s possession had to be over $5,000. This instruction, argue Ms. Pennypacker and Mr. Okada-Phillips, means that it was possible the jury found that only part of the money related to the sale of cocaine.
[17] Again, I disagree. The instructions to the jury were very clear: they had to find that “the money” found was “only obtained through” the trafficking of cocaine. This part of the charge was created at the behest of all parties to avoid the possibility that the jury convict Mr. Burke and Mr. Dinall by finding the proceeds derived from selling marihuana. In other words, the defence and the Crown requested this form of wording to ensure that the jury only convicted if they found beyond a reasonable doubt that the drug being trafficked by both Mr. Burke and Mr. Dinall was cocaine.
[18] The wording of the charge was canvassed with counsel with no objection on the basis of ambiguity.
[19] For these reasons, I find that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Burke and Mr. Dinall were solely involved in the trafficking of cocaine.
SENTENCING: HOWARD BURKE
Introduction
[20] Mr. Burke was convicted of two counts: trafficking in cocaine and possession of $76,880 obtained by trafficking cocaine.
[21] The amount of cocaine that Mr. Burke trafficked is the subject of some dispute. The Crown seeks to place the amount as 2.876 kilogrammes with 1.014 actually delivered to recipients and the remaining 1.862 kilogrammes trafficked by offer. I agree with Mr. Okada-Phillips that the Crown has triple counted the same “9-pack” of cocaine offered to Jason Burke on different occasions. Whilst the three separate offers may amount to three different instances of trafficking, the amount of cocaine remains the same. In my view, deducting two of those instances, which amount to a total of 500 grammes, as well as one of the 56 grammes offered on two occasions to Jason Burke, brings the total to 2.320 kilogrammes of cocaine.
[22] With respect to the length of sentence, Mr. Robinson, for the Crown, seeks a total sentence of nine years. Mr. Okada-Phillips submits that a three-year sentence would be appropriate.
Personal Circumstances
[23] Mr. Burke is now 57 years of age and arrived in Canada from Jamaica. He had little by way of education and has difficulties in reading. Despite his disadvantaged background, Mr. Burke did make a career for himself: he ran a successful trucking company which employed several people. He is currently separated from his partner and has 14 children all but one of whom are adults. His sole dependant is ten years old.
Aggravating and Mitigating Features
[24] Mr. Robinson relies on two prominent aggravating features.
[25] First, he asks the court to consider the large volume of cocaine that Mr. Burke trafficked to others. Second, he points to Mr. Burke’s prior criminal record which reveals a number of dated assault, weapons and drug convictions dating back from 1980. However, in March 2011, Mr. Burke pleaded guilty to conspiring to traffic in a scheduled substance and received a sentence which reflected pre-sentence custody amounting to 42 months.
[26] This conviction, says Mr. Robinson, involved the trafficking of both marihuana and cocaine. However, Mr. Burke denied this to be the case and testified at this sentencing hearing that he pleaded guilty only to conspiring to traffic marihuana.
[27] The Crown filed documentary evidence showing that prior to the plea in 2011, the Crown and Mr. Burke’s counsel at the time (not Mr. Okada-Phillips) had agreed to a statement of facts underlying the plea which would pave the way for a joint submission on sentence. Those facts, read in at the March 2011 plea hearing, included particulars that Mr. Burke had participated in an agreement to buy and sell marihuana at the pound level and cocaine at the ounce level.
[28] Mr. Burke claimed that he could not remember “cocaine” being read out as part of the agreed facts and maintained that he would not have pleaded to conspiring to traffic cocaine.
[29] I find Mr. Burke’s testimony to be completely unbelievable. It makes little sense for his counsel to have read those words in without instruction. Frankly, it beggars belief that Mr. Burke would not have heard the allegations of cocaine being read aloud in court as part of the offence and not deny them if untrue. It is somewhat noteworthy that Mr. Burke does not even deny the fact that this was read out but asserts only that he cannot remember cocaine being referred to. Again, I find this to be incredible and reject his testimony in its entirety.
[30] I conclude that the Crown has, through the documentary evidence, demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that in March 2011 Mr. Burke pleaded guilty to conspiring to traffic both marihuana and cocaine.
[31] There are other additional aggravating features in this case.
[32] First, it goes without saying that the nature of the drug is insidious. Cocaine and crack cocaine are highly addictive substances whose destructive effects do not end with the user. Families and friends of the addicted are impacted by their pain and suffering. The widespread community is also affected as addicts desperate to purchase the drug to appease their addictions commit crimes so that they can fund future drug purchases. Because of this fact, courts have stressed the importance of denunciation and deterrence when sentencing in these types of cases: R. v. Moran, 2018 ONSC 6857, at para. 10; R. v. C.N.H. (2002), 62 O.R. (3d) 564 (C.A.), at paras. 35-36.
[33] Secondly, it is clear that these crimes occurred purely for the benefit of Mr. Burke’s bank balance, with the high volume of cocaine being trafficked for the incentive of substantial profits. The money found in Mr. Burke’s attic supports this position. I would note that because I treat this as an aggravating feature on the trafficking count, any sentence imposed in relation to the proceeds of crime will run concurrently.
[34] There are also some mitigating features. Mr. Burke was gainfully employed and ran his own apparently successful business in the truck transport industry. He employed others in that business. I have already outlined the fact that Mr. Burke faced challenges in life, particularly in education. His fortitude in building a business shows some indication there may be rehabilitative prospects. That, of course, is tempered by the obvious fact that after serving a lengthy custodial period for the 2011 offence, Mr. Burke chose to re-enter the world of cocaine trafficking.
The Range of Sentence
[35] Caselaw regarding the trafficking of a significant amount of cocaine suggests a range of six to twelve years.
[36] In R. v. Bajada (2003), 173 C.C.C. (3d) 255 (Ont. C.A.), a 51-year-old offender who trafficked half a kilogramme of cocaine was convicted after trial and received a six-year sentence on appeal. He had a criminal record with several drug convictions.
[37] In R. v. Amante, 2016 ONCA 18, a repeat drug offender who pleaded guilty received seven years for trafficking one kilogramme of cocaine. The sentence was upheld on appeal.
[38] In R. v. Nero, 2008 ONCA 622, the Crown appealed the sentence of an offender who had trafficked one kilogramme of cocaine on two separate occasions. Even though the offender had pleaded guilty and had an unrelated record, the court found the offence to be serious: the offender had committed the offences on bail and had a further kilogramme of cocaine on his person when arrested. The court found that the appropriate sentence would have been eight years. However, given the offender had already been sentenced to an additional four years for theft, the court imposed a five-year sentence for the trafficking offences.
[39] In R. v. Muise, 2008 ONCA 665, an offender who trafficked three kilogrammes of cocaine received eight years after pleading guilty. He had a criminal record including a conviction for minor drug related offences. The sentence was upheld on appeal.
[40] In R. v. Tello, 2018 ONSC 2259, an offender of previously good character was convicted of trafficking two kilogrammes of cocaine for which he received an eight-year sentence. He was further convicted of trafficking one kilogramme of cocaine for which he received a concurrent six-year sentence.
[41] In R. v. Kum, 2012 ONSC 1314, a 57-year-old offender was convicted after trial of trafficking three kilogrammes of cocaine. The sentencing judge treated him as a first offender and sentenced him to eight years’ imprisonment.
[42] In R. v. Starchik, 2010 ONCA 776, 271 O.A.C. 29, the court upheld an eight-year sentence for an offender with an extensive related record convicted of trafficking four kilogrammes of cocaine.
[43] In R. v. Oraha, 2012 ONSC 1439, a 25-year-old first-time offender who conceded an agreed statement of facts read in at trial was convicted of trafficking three kilogrammes of cocaine and received nine years in prison.
[44] In R. v. Grant, 2009 MBCA 9, 236 Man. R. (2d) 54, the court upheld an eleven-year aggregate prison sentence for an offender convicted of trafficking one kilogramme of cocaine and two kilogrammes of methamphetamine. The sentencing judge had determined that seven years was appropriate for the cocaine offence.
[45] In R. v. Paris (2006), 208 O.A.C. 385 (C.A.), the court upheld a 12-year sentence as being fit and within the range for those convicted of trafficking in “multi-kilos” of cocaine.
[46] Finally, in the recent case of R. v. Gill, 2019 ONCA 902, the offender was sentenced to a nine-year jail sentence after being found guilty of trafficking 3.3 kilogrammes of heroin, a drug equally as destructive as cocaine. She had no previous convictions, had been gainfully employed, had health issues and suffered physical and emotional abuse during a previous arranged marriage. In upholding the sentence, the Court of Appeal for Ontario remarked, at para. 26:
This was a very serious offence involving the importation of 3.3 kilograms of a highly addictive drug. The appellant, although not a directing mind of the scheme, was an essential link in the chain from source to street. She was a mature adult, well beyond the naivete of youth. Her involvement was not for the purpose of fuelling her addiction, rather for financial reward, however meagre it may have been when held up against the penal consequences.
The Appropriate Sentence for Howard Burke
[47] I accept that sentencing an offender is an individualised process and that a comparison of caselaw is helpful in defining a range rather than a precise length of time.
[48] I am bound by the principle of proportionality set out in s. 718.1 of the Criminal Code. I am also bound by the principles set out in s. 718 of the Criminal Code which provide that denunciation and deterrence must be balanced with the aims of rehabilitation and promoting a sense of responsibility.
[49] As I have noted, the impact of cocaine seeps much further than the immediate user and extends into the deeper reaches of society acting as a source of further criminal acts by addicts who are unable to fund their drug cravings unless they obtain funds through illegal activity. Robberies, break and enters, assaults, and threatening behaviour are the by-product of cocaine addiction. Traffickers who enable, fuel and cause these addictions do so for one reason: to make money out of the misery their commercial activities have created. As mentioned, Mr. Burke was no exception.
[50] Denunciation and deterrence ensure that other potential traffickers realise that they will suffer severe consequences when caught and convicted. On the other hand, Mr. Burke’s prospects for rehabilitation seem quite gloomy in light of his return to trafficking cocaine after his prior conviction for a similar offence. His denial of the specifics of his prior conviction also weighs heavily against his chances of rehabilitation and his sense of responsibility.
[51] Mr. Burke’s plea of not guilty at this trial and his continued protests of innocence are not aggravating features. However, they disentitle him to the significant discount that would follow a guilty plea.
[52] Mr. Okada-Phillips asks the court to take into account the principle of parity. Mr. Burke’s son, Jason Burke, pleaded guilty shortly before his trial was to commence and, pursuant to a joint submission, the parties will ask for a five-year sentence.
[53] I agree that Jason Burke was the leading player in providing drugs to various resellers, including Devon Dinall. However, Mr. Burke was the potential provider of cocaine and an essential link in the supply chain. Moreover, unlike Mr. Burke, Jason Burke pleaded guilty and I am informed that his plea was to ounce level cocaine trafficking. Finally, I would add that in cases of joint submissions, there are many other factors at play - including the Crown’s ability to prove particular charges - which operate in the formation of a proposed sentence.
[54] For these reasons, I find that a sentence of nine years is appropriate in this case. I allocate nine years to the trafficking offence with a concurrent sentence of three years to the possession of proceeds of crime. This sentence takes into account the two days Mr. Burke spent in pre-sentence custody. I decline to give any credit for pre-trial bail conditions under the principles set out in R. v. Downes (2006), 79 O.R. (3d) 321 (C.A.). Mr. Burke was under a curfew from 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. and was permitted to leave his residence for work purposes and in the company of his surety. There was no evidence that these conditions were particularly onerous much less that they justified any reduction in sentence. As was made clear in R. v. Ijam, 2007 ONCA 597, at para. 36, “bail is not jail”.
[55] I also make a DNA order under the secondary ground and a forfeiture order of the digital scales, cell phones and cash found as a result of the search warrants executed at Mr. Burke’s residence.
SENTENCING: DEVON DINALL
Introduction
[56] Mr. Dinall was convicted of three counts: conspiracy to traffic cocaine, trafficking cocaine and possession of monies obtained from the trafficking of cocaine.
[57] The total amount of drugs that Mr. Dinall trafficked was approximately 306 grammes of cocaine. The amount of money the Crown alleged to be proceeds of crime amounted to $15,560, some $1,400 found on his person and $14,160 found in his home.
[58] Mr. Robinson seeks a sentence totalling four years whilst Ms. Pennypacker submits that a sentence in the range of eighteen months to two years less one day would be appropriate.
Personal Circumstances
[59] Mr. Dinall is now 66 years old and has been married for 16 years having been with his wife, Jackie, for almost 30 years. He works mainly as a welder and has four children, all of whom are adults, three of whom reside with him.
[60] Mr. Dinall has been afflicted with polio since his childhood in Jamaica but despite this challenge, he trained as a welder and was employed in that occupation.
[61] Mr. Dinall has a prior criminal record although it is dated. The convictions include possession of a weapon in 1985, possession of a narcotic in 1989, assault causing bodily harm and uttering threats. He served short sentences for the last two offences.
Aggravating and Mitigating Features
[62] For the purposes of this judgment, the earlier comments made in relation to Mr. Burke about cocaine trafficking apply equally as an aggravating feature to Mr. Dinall. The difference in this case lies in the amount that Mr. Dinall trafficked, a significantly lesser amount than Mr. Burke but not an insignificant amount in terms of trafficking. I agree with the Crown that Mr. Dinall is best characterised as a mid-level drug trafficker.
[63] There was also a degree of sophistication in the manner in which Mr. Dinall trafficked drugs from his home and built up a network of at least seven customers. Moreover, Mr. Dinall was responsible for “fixing” the cocaine by converting it to crack.
[64] As with Mr. Burke, this was not a case where Mr. Dinall was unemployed or needed money. As mentioned, he had a job and trafficking cocaine was a business venture where he profited from other people’s addictions for his own financial benefit.
[65] I also remind myself that Mr. Dinall’s plea of not guilty is not an aggravating factor but an exercise of his constitutional rights. However, I repeat the observation that the lack of an early plea of guilt means that Mr. Dinall is not entitled to the significant discount in sentence enjoyed by remorseful offenders.
[66] In mitigation, Mr. Dinall is gainfully employed and has overcome an obvious physical challenge caused by childhood polio. He appears to contribute to his local community by participating in holding Christmas dinners for the needy in his community. He has the support of his family who filed letters telling of his contribution to their upbringing.
[67] I also note that on the day of his arrest, Mr. Dinall was made to wait in a police car, handcuffed to the rear, for a significant period of time whilst police processed a large number of accused arrested as part of the takedown that day. I take that into account when determining sentence.
The Range of Sentences
[68] The Crown relies on cases that demonstrate a range of sentences between 30 months and 5 years.
[69] In R. v. Graham, 2018 ONSC 6817, an offender in possession of 73.97 grammes of cocaine and $14,880 in his possession received three years. He had a lengthy criminal record which included convictions for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.
[70] In R. v. Elliott, 2017 ONSC 4308, the offender who had a criminal record with drug convictions received a 31-month sentence for possession of 131.88 grammes of cocaine and possession of $14,525 in monies obtained from crime.
[71] In R. v. Soon, 2017 ONSC 2037, a 32-year-old offender of previously good character was convicted of possession of 143.4 grammes of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and received 30 months.
[72] In R. v. Cole, 2017 ONSC 138, a 21-year-old offender who had no criminal record but was convicted of possessing cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after being found with 275.33 grammes of crack cocaine and $4,467 received a sentence of 32 months.
[73] Finally, in R. v. Reid, 2017 ONCA 430, a convicted recidivist was sentenced to five years after being found guilty of possession of 275.32 grammes of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking. When his apartment was searched the police also found CAD$8,425 and USD$1,325 in cash. He had a dated criminal record which included drug convictions.
[74] Ms. Pennypacker, on behalf of Mr. Dinall, relies upon cases with a lower range such as R. v. Woolcock, [2002] O.J. No. 4927 (C.A.) where a 53-year-old offender was in possession of approximately seven grammes of crack cocaine, less than one gramme of marihuana and CAD$926 in cash as well as $60 in US currency. He received a sentence of two years less one day which was reduced to 15 months on appeal.
[75] In R. v. Ahmed, 2016 ONCA 831, the court upheld a sentence of two years’ imprisonment after pleading guilty to a charge of conspiracy to traffic cocaine. The sentence was upheld on appeal with the court approving comments in Woolcock that “the range of sentence for this type of offence is from 6 months to 2 years.”: at para. 4.
[76] In R. v. Thomas, 2016 ONSC 7792, the offender received a sentence of two years less one day after being convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking. The amount of cocaine found in his apartment after the police executed a search warrant was 188.72 grammes of powder cocaine and 20.75 grammes of crack cocaine.
The Appropriate Sentence
[77] As I have already stated, I accept that the sentencing process is an individualised one focusing on the offender and the circumstances of the offence. However, I do not accept that Mr. Dinall falls within the range of cases relied upon by Ms. Pennypacker.
[78] Cases such as Woolcock and Thomas involved significantly lesser amounts of cocaine than those that Mr. Dinall was convicted of trafficking. I also note that in Ahmed, the offender received a two-year sentence after pleading guilty and therefore is assumed to have benefitted from a discounted sentence.
[79] In Reid, the five-year sentence imposed was justified because the offender was held to be a mid-level drug dealer. At para. 34, the court remarked:
The conclusion that the appellant was a mid-level dealer was open to the trial judge on the evidence. The appellant says the only evidence on this point was the expert report of an officer who provided the opinion that the quantities of narcotics and drug paraphernalia were “consistent with street-level trafficking and possibly mid-level sales”. The trial judge, however, was entitled to arrive at her own assessment based on the evidence before her, which included: the amount of cocaine seized from the search of the appellant’s person and his apartment (123.34 grams of powder cocaine and 151.98 grams of crack cocaine); the manner in which the drugs were packaged (pre-weighed in different baggies); the quantities of cash seized from the search of the appellant’s person and the apartment (CDN$8425 and USD$1325 in total, which was organized in denominations with different coloured elastic bands); and the drug trafficking paraphernalia found in his home.
[80] In my view there are many similarities to Mr. Dinall’s case. Even though no drugs were actually seized, it is clear, from the conversations with Jason Burke, the amount of monies found in his house and the manner in which that money was bundled, that Mr. Dinall fell within the definition of a mid-level trafficker.
[81] In my view, the most appropriate sentence in this case, bearing in mind the amount of cocaine trafficked, the money seized by the police, Mr. Dinall’s bail conditions and the fact that he was held in some discomfort in the police car when arrested, is three and a half years. I allocated that period of time to the count of conspiracy to trafficking cocaine, and the same amount of time concurrently to the substantive trafficking cocaine count. In addition, Mr. Dinall is sentenced to one year’s imprisonment for possession of proceeds obtained by crime to be served concurrently with the other offences.
[82] I order a DNA sample to be taken on the secondary ground, in addition to a forfeiture order to be made in respect of the monies, cell phones and marihuana seized.
S.A.Q. Akhtar J.
Released: 3 January 2020
COURT FILE NO.: CR-19-50000541 DATE: 2020-01-03 ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN: HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN – and – HOWARD BURKE AND DEVON DINALL
REASONS FOR SENTENCE S.A.Q. Akhtar J.