Adamo Stefano Boni

M.C. was found guilty of accessing child pornography.

The Crown sought an 18-month custodial sentence, while the Defence proposed an 18-month conditional sentence.

The court considered significant mitigating factors, including M.C.'s history as a victim of childhood sexual trauma, extensive ongoing counselling, recovery from substance addiction, and strong family support.

The judge found M.C.'s cumulative circumstances to be exceptional, concluding that a custodial sentence would be highly problematic as it could interrupt his rehabilitation and risk relapse, thereby undermining the objectives of deterrence and denunciation.

An 18-month conditional sentence was imposed, followed by 18 months probation, along with ancillary orders (DNA, SOIRA for 20 years, and a s.161 order for 10 years), with strict conditions designed to ensure continued therapy and community safety.

The applicant, M.C., sought to exclude evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, alleging violations of his s. 8 (unreasonable search) and s. 10 (right to counsel) rights by Canada Border Services Officers (BSOs) during a search of his electronic devices at Pearson International Airport.

The court found that the BSO had a particularized suspicion, triggering a constitutional detention, and failed to caution M.C. or advise him of his s. 8 rights before the search, thus violating s. 8.

The court also found that BSOs violated M.C.'s s. 10(b) right to counsel by adhering to a policy that restricted detainees to only duty counsel, denying his request to speak to his uncle, a criminal lawyer.

While a subsequent police interview by Constable Imber was found not to violate M.C.'s s. 10 rights and his statement to Imber was voluntary, the search warrant obtained by police was deemed invalid as it was based on constitutionally tainted information from the initial unlawful border search.

Applying the Grant test for s. 24(2) exclusion, the court found the Charter breaches serious, the impact on M.C.'s rights significant, and society's interest in the rule of law favoured exclusion.

The evidence recovered from M.C.'s electronic devices was therefore excluded from his trial.

The applicant, Mathew Cohen, sought a stay of proceedings under Section 24(1) of the Charter as a remedy for unreasonable delay under Section 11(b).

The total delay was 63 months.

The court applied the R. v. Jordan framework, subtracting defence-attributable delay and exceptional circumstances, specifically the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court found that the defence's prolonged pursuit of disclosure regarding a police officer's notes was futile and attributed some delay to the defence.

The court also determined that the pandemic's impact on court operations constituted a significant and long-lasting discrete exceptional circumstance, extending beyond the defence's concession.

Ultimately, the net delay was calculated at just over 25 months, which is below the 30-month Jordan ceiling for Superior Court cases.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The applicant brought an application for a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Charter, citing a total delay of 20.82 months.

The Crown argued that the COVID-19 pandemic, delayed disclosure, and personnel changes constituted exceptional circumstances justifying the delay.

The court rejected these arguments, finding no causal link between the pandemic and the delay, and noting that the Crown and police failed to provide timely disclosure.

The application was granted, and the charges were stayed.

This decision from a Gardiner hearing addresses factual determinations for sentencing after Curtis Murray and Corey Murray were convicted of second-degree murder.

The court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder was planned and deliberate, motivated by revenge against a specific group, and that the victim was killed under the mistaken belief he was part of that group.

While the judge's legal view was that these facts would typically constitute first-degree murder, the jury's verdict of second-degree murder was respected.

The court also determined that Curtis Murray was the leader and instigator, with Corey Murray being a willing but more of a follower, which was considered a mitigating factor for Corey.

The appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking following a search of his vehicle's trunk in response to a 911 call reporting a male possibly armed with a gun.

The appellant appealed on the basis that the search violated his s. 8 Charter rights and that the evidence should have been excluded under s. 24(2).

The majority upheld the conviction, finding the trunk search was authorized by common law as a justified safety search incident to investigative detention.

The concurring judge agreed the evidence should be admitted under s. 24(2) but found the search itself violated s. 8 of the Charter, disagreeing with the majority on the scope of permissible searches incident to investigative detention.

The applicants, Nicola Nero, Dean Wiwchar, and Martino Caputo, sought a stay of proceedings under sections 11(b) and 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging a breach of their right to a trial within a reasonable time.

This application followed their convictions for conspiracy to commit murder and first-degree murder.

The court analyzed the total delay, defence delay (considering it collectively for co-accused), and whether the delay was justified by exceptional circumstances (discrete events such as preliminary inquiry issues, counsel unavailability, interlocutory appeals, and extensive disclosure from multiple police forces) or case complexity.

The court found that after deducting periods attributable to defence delay, the net delay for each applicant was below the presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

Furthermore, the court determined that the case's inherent complexity, the involvement of multiple defendants and prosecutions, voluminous disclosure from various police agencies, and an international aspect constituted exceptional circumstances justifying any delay beyond the ceiling.

The court also considered the case as transitional, noting the parties' reasonable reliance on the law as it existed prior to Jordan.

Consequently, the applications for a stay of proceedings were dismissed, as no breach of the applicants' s. 11(b) rights was demonstrated.

The applicants brought a Garofoli application challenging the validity of wiretap authorizations and related investigative orders obtained during an organized crime investigation into drug importation through Toronto Pearson International Airport.

They alleged that a police officer deliberately misled judicial officers through fraudulent or misleading statements and omissions in affidavits supporting production orders, dialled number recorder warrants, and the wiretap authorization.

The court reviewed allegations of misstatements, non‑disclosure, and conflation of information and applied the Garofoli framework, including excision and amplification of affidavit material where appropriate.

The court concluded that the inaccuracies were innocent errors rather than deliberate fraud and that, after correcting the affidavit, sufficient grounds remained to justify the authorization.

As a result, no Charter breach under s. 8 was established and the wiretap evidence remained admissible.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on charges of impaired driving and driving over 80.

The trial judge and summary conviction appeal judge had excluded breathalyzer evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding that police officers violated the accused's s. 8 rights by walking onto his driveway to investigate him.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the officers' entry onto the driveway was justified by the implied licence doctrine.

Because the accused did not ask the officers to leave, they were lawfully on the property when they made the breathalyzer demand, meaning no s. 8 violation occurred.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of s. 117.04(1) of the Criminal Code, which authorizes search warrants for weapons on public safety grounds, arguing it violated s. 8 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal held that the provision violates s. 8 because it lacks a requirement that the peace officer have reasonable grounds to believe that weapons are likely to be found on the person or premises to be searched, and that such grounds be presented to the issuing justice.

The Court found this omission allowed for overbroad searches and could not be saved under s. 1.

The provision was declared of no force or effect, with the declaration suspended for six months, and the search warrant for the appellant's residence was quashed.

The appellant challenged his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with an excessive blood alcohol level on the basis that police exceeded their authority under s. 48 of the Highway Traffic Act, resulting in arbitrary detention contrary to s. 9 of the Charter.

After a speeding and weaving stop, the officer directed the appellant from his vehicle to the police cruiser because of an overwhelming smell of cologne, uncertainty about the source of any alcohol odour, the presence of a passenger, and the officer's cold.

The Court of Appeal held that s. 48 authorized reasonable investigative steps at the roadside to determine whether grounds existed for a breath demand, and that the brief movement to the cruiser was minimally intrusive and reasonable in the circumstances.

The detention was lawful, the resulting evidence was properly admitted, and the appeal was dismissed.