Barbara Lynch

The applicants, Nicola Nero, Dean Wiwchar, and Martino Caputo, sought a stay of proceedings under sections 11(b) and 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging a breach of their right to a trial within a reasonable time.

This application followed their convictions for conspiracy to commit murder and first-degree murder.

The court analyzed the total delay, defence delay (considering it collectively for co-accused), and whether the delay was justified by exceptional circumstances (discrete events such as preliminary inquiry issues, counsel unavailability, interlocutory appeals, and extensive disclosure from multiple police forces) or case complexity.

The court found that after deducting periods attributable to defence delay, the net delay for each applicant was below the presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

Furthermore, the court determined that the case's inherent complexity, the involvement of multiple defendants and prosecutions, voluminous disclosure from various police agencies, and an international aspect constituted exceptional circumstances justifying any delay beyond the ceiling.

The court also considered the case as transitional, noting the parties' reasonable reliance on the law as it existed prior to Jordan.

Consequently, the applications for a stay of proceedings were dismissed, as no breach of the applicants' s. 11(b) rights was demonstrated.

The applicants were found guilty by a jury of conspiracy to murder and first-degree murder.

Prior to sentencing, they applied for a stay of the conspiracy count, arguing that entering convictions for both offences would violate the rule against multiple convictions for the same delict.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the offences lacked both the factual and legal nexus required to engage the rule.

The conspiracy was complete weeks before the murder, and the legal elements of the offences protect different societal interests.

The offender was convicted of counselling a murder after attempting to hire an undercover police officer to kill her husband.

The sentencing court considered principles of denunciation and deterrence applicable to murder-for-hire schemes, noting that such conduct is treated similarly to attempted murder for sentencing purposes.

The offender had no criminal record and had a difficult personal history involving early arranged marriage, illiteracy, and cultural subjugation, which the court treated as mitigating factors.

However, the offence was deliberate, planned, and involved prior attempts to hire others to commit the killing, which were aggravating factors.

After reviewing comparable authorities and the applicable sentencing range of approximately three to eight years, the court imposed a sentence of three and one-half years’ imprisonment.

The accused was charged with hiring someone to commit murder.

The intended target was her husband, and the hit man she hired was an undercover police officer.

The court found the undercover officer's evidence credible and reliable, despite the lack of an audio recording of their conversations.

The accused provided the officer with details about her husband, a photograph, and a deposit.

The court found the accused guilty of the crime charged.

The applicant sought an order declaring the respondent a vexatious litigant under s. 140(1) of the Courts of Justice Act after the respondent initiated numerous civil, administrative, regulatory, and private criminal proceedings arising from the refusal of the Ministry of the Attorney General to reimburse legal fees incurred in defending withdrawn criminal charges.

The court reviewed the respondent’s litigation history, including unsuccessful human rights complaints, Small Claims actions, private criminal informations, and professional complaints against opposing counsel and decision-makers.

Applying established criteria for vexatious proceedings, the court concluded the respondent persistently instituted meritless proceedings, pursued improper purposes, repeatedly re-litigated determined issues, and failed to pay multiple costs awards.

The court held that these actions constituted an abuse of the court’s processes and justified a vexatious litigant designation.

The respondent was ordered to obtain leave of the Superior Court before instituting or continuing any civil proceedings, but the request to impose a similar restriction on private criminal prosecutions was denied.