COURT FILE NO.: CV-16-559525
DATE: 20230206
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
ANGELA GREIG and ROBERT GREIG
Plaintiffs
– and –
IRENE KRITIKOPOULOU
Defendant
Milé Komlen, for the Plaintiffs/Moving Parties/Responding Parties to Cross motion
Larry J. Levine, Q.C., for the Defendant/Responding Party/Moving Party to Cross Motion
HEARD: JULY 7, 2022
VELLA J.
reasons for decision
Contempt Motion
[1] The plaintiffs, Angela and Robert Greig (“the Greigs”) are the daughter and son-in-law of Irene Kritikopoulou (“Ms. Kritikopoulou”).
[2] They seek an order:
(a) declaring that the defendant (responding party) Ms. Kritikopoulou is in contempt of an order of Madam Justice Ferguson, dated July 28, 2017, and the order of Madam Justice Papageorgiou, dated February 15, 2021; and
(b) declaring that the defendant has engaged in a repeated pattern of contempt for the Rules of Civil Procedure and of this Honourable Court’s processes.
[3] Additionally, or in the alternative, the plaintiffs seek an order:
(a) declaring that the defendant has failed to comply with an interlocutory order of this court; and
(b) striking out the defendant’s statement of defence and barring the defendant from filing any further defence in this matter, along with other interim and interlocutory relief.
[4] Ms. Kritikopoulou has brought a cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissal of all of the claims brought against her.
[5] For the reasons that follow, this court finds that the plaintiffs have not proven contempt of court beyond a reasonable doubt against the defendant. Furthermore, this action is not suitable for disposition by way of a motion for summary judgment.
Test and Analysis
[6] Rule 60.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194 states:
MOTION FOR CONTEMPT ORDER
(1) A contempt order to enforce an order requiring a person to do an act, other than the payment of money, or to abstain from doing an act, may be obtained only on motion to a judge in the proceeding in which the order to be enforced was made.
CONTENT OF ORDER
(5) In disposing of a motion under subrule (1), the judge may make such order as is just, and where a finding of contempt is made, the judge may order that the person in contempt,
(a) be imprisoned for such period and on such terms as are just;
(b) be imprisoned if the person fails to comply with a term of the order;
(c) pay a fine;
(d) do or refrain from doing an act;
(e) pay such costs as are just; and
(f) comply with any other order that the judge considers necessary.
[7] The burden is on the Greigs to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the three elements constituting civil contempt with respect to the Ferguson J. and/or Papageorgiou J. Orders.
[8] The test for civil contempt is well established:
(a) The Ferguson J. and/or Papageorgiou J. Orders must clearly and unequivocally state what should and should not be done by Ms. Kritikopoulou;
(b) Ms. Kritikopoulou must have had actual knowledge of the subject Orders; and
(c) Ms. Kritikopoulou must have intentionally done the acts that the Orders prohibit: Carey v. Laiken, 2015 SCC 17, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 79, at paras. 32 – 35; North Elgin Centre Inc. v. McDonald’s Restaurants of Canada Limited, 2021 ONCA 173, at para. 43.
[9] This motion is brought within the context of an action in which the Greigs claim that they have a constructive or resulting trust, creating a beneficial or equitable interest in the home (municipally known as 34 Woodington Ave., Toronto, Ont.) in which they have lived for about 25 years and raised their two children. They plead that the home was a gift by Ms. Kritikopoulou to them. Alternatively, they plead that the home was the product of a joint family venture with Ms. Kritikopoulou, or, in the further alternative that they have spent considerable sums improving the home for which they should now be compensated if they have no beneficial interest.
[10] Angela Greig also alleges that Ms. Kritikopoulou committed physical and psychological abuse against her as a child, and that the psychological abuse has continued throughout her adult married life. Furthermore, Angela and Robert claim that they have been the victims of intentional acts by Ms. Kritikopoulou in the form of threatening eviction from the home and related acts of intimidation, which has caused them mental distress.
[11] The home however is registered in the name of Ms. Kritikopoulou alone. This is the home in which she raised her children, including her daughter, Angela Greig.
[12] Ms. Kritikopoulou was 79 years old at the time of these motions.
[13] Ms. Kritikopoulou suffered a stroke in December 2015 for which she was hospitalized. After that (in or around July 2016), she decided she wanted to go back to the home and that the Greigs needed to leave.
[14] The Greigs did not agree to leave, as they assert that Ms. Kritikopoulou gave the house to them as a wedding gift in 1991 and that they have lived there ever since, raising their two, now adult, children. Angela alleges that her mother abused her and that the home was effectively recompense for that alleged abuse.
[15] Ms. Kritikopoulou deposed that she left the home of her own accord shortly after Angela’s wedding because, in her view, the couple was constantly bickering. She went to live with someone whom she has described as a friend ever since. The Greigs state that this friend is in fact Ms. Kritikopoulou’s common law spouse. Ms. Kritikopoulou denies that characterization.
[16] In response to the Greigs’ refusal to allow her to come back to the home, Ms. Kritikopoulou tried to regain possession of the home by self-help remedies (such as changing the locks, allegedly sending men to intimidate them, and allegedly entering the house and slashing the mattress of the grandson who remains living there). The Greigs have moved temporarily to another location because, they say, Angela in particular fears Ms. Kritikopoulou and her alleged agents. Robert deposed that he attends the home regularly to ensure it is in good repair.
[17] The Greigs then started this action for declaratory relief, claiming a beneficial and equitable interest in the home together with other equitable and injunctive relief, in May 2016, and brought a motion for injunctive relief after they allegedly experienced aggression from Ms. Kritikopoulou and others on her behalf.
[18] On June 28, 2017, Ferguson J. issued an interim injunction order granting interim access to, and custody of, the home to the Greigs and restraining Ms. Kritikopoulou and her agents from entering the property and obstructing or interfering by any means or preventing them from using or accessing the home.
[19] On July 3, 2017, Ms. Kritikopoulou again attempted to enter the home by force, contrary to the Ferguson J. interim injunction order.
[20] On July 27, 2017, Ferguson J. found that the defendant had violated the interim injunction. Justice Ferguson granted the plaintiffs’ motion for an interlocutory injunction, enjoining the defendant and her agents from purporting or threatening to evict the plaintiffs and their family and from, inter alia, encumbering the home until the action is fully disposed of by order of this Court. The order also restrains Ms. Kritikopoulou and her agents from contacting the plaintiffs and their family.
[21] On August 1, 2018, Ferguson J. ordered costs in the sum of $20,000 payable by Ms. Kritikopoulou forthwith.
[22] After repeated attempts, primarily by the Greigs, to advance the litigation, the Greigs and Ms. Kritikopoulou, now represented by new (current) counsel, consented to an order dated February 15, 2021, issued by Papageorgiou J., fixing a timetable, peremptory against Ms. Kritikopoulou to ensure this matter could be set down for trial by June 1, 2021. Ms. Kritikopoulou was also ordered, on a peremptory basis, to pay the outstanding costs order of $20,000 issued by Justice Ferguson on August 1, 2018, with interest. Those costs have now been paid, albeit belatedly.
[23] The subject paragraphs of the Ferguson J. Order and the Papageorgiou J. Order are clear and unequivocal in stating what Ms. Kritikopoulou must do and is prohibited from doing.
[24] Ms. Kritikopoulou clearly encumbered the home by obtaining a mortgage on it on June 3, 2021 in the sum of $550,000, and that act was in violation of the Ferguson Order. The mortgage has since been discharged, on advice of Ms. Kritikopoulou’s current lawyer.
[25] The real issue is whether Ms. Kritikopoulou had actual knowledge of the Ferguson J. Order.
[26] The plaintiffs rely on the Ontario Court of Appeal decision of James Henry Ting (Re), 2021 ONCA 622, for the proposition that actual knowledge of the subject order will be inferred where the alleged contemnor’s lawyer has knowledge. However, I do not believe that the ratio from that decision is so broad. In that case, Mr. Ting was held in contempt of court for failing to attend at an examination in aid of the foreign bankruptcy of his father, ordered by the court. The court was satisfied that Mr. Ting was fully aware of the fact that he had been ordered to attend at the examination, which the court inferred from the circumstances, including from the fact that his counsel assisted in the drafting of the order and consented to its form and content. In other words, in that case the court inferred actual knowledge from the surrounding circumstances.
[27] The evidence before me demonstrates that Ms. Kritikopoulou is not literate in English. Her mother tongue is Greek, and she cannot read or write in English. She could not read the terms of either order and, notwithstanding the fact that she was in court, she could not understand what was being said.
[28] Remarkably, Mr. Strashin, the lawyer who was representing Ms. Kritikopoulou from the outset of the proceeding, until Mr. Levine’s appointment, swore under oath that he “probably” did not inform Ms. Kritikopoulou of the complete terms of the Ferguson J. Order. While Mr. Strashin deposed that following the August 1, 2017 Order, he told Ms. Kritikopoulou that she could not go back to her house until this case was finished, he did not tell her about any of the other injunctive relief and specifically that she could not encumber the Home. He also did not send her a reporting letter or a copy of the Ferguson J. Order because of Ms. Kritikopoulou’s illiteracy in English. He also failed to tell her about the certificate of pending litigation (“CPL”) against the title of the Home that was previously issued by Master Mills in 2016. As an aside, neither the CPL nor the Ferguson J. Order granting the injunction were registered against the title of the Home by the Greigs’ own lawyer. Therefore, when Ms. Kritikopoulou took out a mortgage against the Home, there was nothing on title to alert the mortgagee as to the existence of the CPL or injunction.
[29] Unlike the Ting case, Mr. Strashin has confirmed that he did not tell Ms. Kritikopoulou about the relevant contents of the Ferguson Order beyond telling her not to return to the home. The surrounding circumstances do not support an inference that Ms. Kritikopoulou had actual knowledge.
[30] Therefore, the plaintiffs have failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the second element of the Carey test: the defendant did not have actual knowledge of the relevant terms of the Ferguson J. Order.
[31] Furthermore, the mortgage has since been discharged and therefore this alleged contempt has been purged.
[32] In terms of the Papageorgiou J. Order, the record shows that since Mr. Levine has been appointed by Ms. Kritikopoulou as her lawyer, there has been cooperation and completion of many of the pretrial steps, albeit late.
[33] It appears to me that this matter is now on track with the retainer of Mr. Levine as Ms. Kritikopoulou’s lawyer.
[34] Whether or not to issue a contempt order is ultimately within the discretion of the court: Carey, at para. 36. Indeed, the court may ultimately decline to make a finding of contempt even where the three elements have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The purpose of a contempt order is primarily coercive rather than punitive insofar as the court is seeking to obtain compliance with its order.
[35] Indeed, in its recent decision of Moncur v. Plante, 2021 ONCA 462, 57 R.F.L. (8th) 293, the Ontario Court of Appeal stated at para. 10:
- Exercising the contempt power is discretionary. Courts discourage the routine use of this power to obtain compliance with court orders. The power should be exercised cautiously and with great restraint as an enforcement tool of last rather than 1st resort. A judge may exercise discretion to decline to impose a contempt finding where it would work an injustice. As an alternative to making a contempt finding to readily, a judge should consider other options, such as issuing a declaration that the party reached the order or encouraging professional assistance.
[36] I decline to exercise my discretion to find contempt in this matter with respect to the noncompliance by Ms. Kritikopoulou with the Papageorgiou J. Order as to do so would work an injustice in the circumstances of this case. I am satisfied that with current counsel, the defendant will abide by any future orders made by this court.
[37] I am however prepared to issue a declaration that Ms. Kritikopoulou breached the order of Papageorgiou J. Furthermore, I am prepared to consider a further timetable for the final pre-trial steps to be made on a peremptory basis against Ms. Kritikopoulou. It appears to me that the parties will be able to prepare such a timetable. Mr. Levine suggested that an expedited trial would be warranted. The Greigs do not oppose such a request. Given the length of time this matter has been outstanding, and the elderly age and health of Ms. Kritikopoulou, I am prepared to expedite this trial, subject to assurances that the mandatory mediation will be held in a timely manner and all other pre-trial steps will similarly be completed.
[38] Any costs that have been incurred by the plaintiffs as a result of any delay caused by the defendant’s noncompliance with the Papageorgiou J. Order can be addressed by way of costs at the conclusion of this proceeding.
Motion for Summary Judgment
[39] Ms. Kritikopoulou brings a motion for summary judgment against the plaintiffs for dismissal of the entire action. In short, she submits that, as there is nothing in writing conveying any interest in the home to the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs cannot be successful. The defendant denies all allegations of abuse and breach of fiduciary duty. The defendant did not bring a motion for partial summary judgment in the alternative.
[40] The Greigs submit that there are genuine issues of fact requiring a trial. They also submit that it is too late to bring this motion, 8 years after the commencement of this proceeding, and in the face of the Kritikopoulou’s breach of the Papageorgiou J. Order which has caused further delay. In the alternative, the plaintiffs submit that I should grant summary judgment in their favour, by way of what has become known as a boomerang judgment.
[41] In brief the Greigs claim that Ms. Kritikopoulou gifted them her home as a wedding present in 1991. They submit that the gift was affirmed when Ms. Kritikopoulou allegedly gave them the title deed to the Home. Alternatively, they claim that the Home is the product of a joint family venture and that they have a beneficial ownership interest in the home. Angela also claims that her mother breached her fiduciary duty, owed to her and her husband, by creating a vulnerable living arrangement at the Home and placing her own needs over those of Angela and her husband. In other words, this part of the claim is founded on the allegation that the mother stands in a fiduciary relationship to her adult daughter and her daughter’s husband. As well, Angela claims assault and battery arising from her mother’s alleged pattern of physical and psychological abuse of her as a child and that the pattern of psychological abuse has persisted into her adult married life.
[42] Ms. Kritikopoulou submits that there is no proof of an inter vivos gift, but, at its highest, a possible intention to gift which is unenforceable: Kavanagh v. Lajoie, 2014 ONCA 187, 317 O.A.C. 274, at para. 13; Bergen v. Bergen, 2013 BCCA 492, 346 B.C.A.C. 207. She denies outright the allegations related to abuse against her daughter and breach of fiduciary duty against her daughter and son-in-law. She points to the fact that title to the home was never transferred in part, or in whole, to the Greigs, and there is no documentation that creates or reflects an intention to create any interest in the home to the benefit of the Greigs.
Test for Summary Judgment
[43] Pursuant to Rule 20, a defendant is entitled to move for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the main action. If the Court is satisfied that there is no genuine issue requiring a trial with respect to all or part of the claim, Rule 20.04(2) mandates that the Court “shall” grant summary judgment.
[44] In Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 87, at para. 45, the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed that summary judgment is a “significant alternative model of adjudication”. Rule 20 provides judges with fact-finding powers (i.e., the power to weigh evidence, evaluate credibility, and draw inferences) if required, in order to resolve claims without the need to have a trial.
[45] The focus is not on what further evidence could be adduced at trial, but rather, on whether a trial is required. A trial will not be required when the summary judgment process “(1) allows the judge to make the necessary findings of fact, (2) allows the judge to apply the law to the facts, and (3) is a proportionate, more expeditious and less expensive means to achieve a just result”: Hryniak, at para. 49.
[46] As confirmed by the Supreme Court, determination of a motion for summary judgment involves a two-step approach. The judge should first determine whether there is a genuine issue requiring a trial based only on the evidence before her, without using the fact-finding powers. If there is no genuine issue requiring a trial, summary judgment must be granted. Second, if there appears to be a genuine issue requiring a trial, the judge should then determine whether “the need for a trial can be avoided” by using the fact-finding powers to weigh evidence, evaluate credibility, and draw inferences: Hryniak at paras. 66-68.
[47] On a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must establish a prima facie case that there is no genuine issue requiring a trial. The onus then shifts to the responding party. It is not sufficient for the responding party to simply rely on the allegations in their pleadings; they must set out, in affidavit form or other evidence, specific facts showing there is a genuine issue requiring a trial. The responding party must put their “best foot forward” and the court is entitled to assume that the record contains all the evidence that the parties would present if the matter proceeded to trial.
Preliminary comment on the Evidence in Motions
[48] Throughout the affidavit evidence of Angela, she referenced documents that were contained in her extensive affidavit of documents, including psychiatric and medical notes, and receipts for improvements to the Home that she alleges she and Robert made. These documents were not attached as exhibits to any affidavit in this motion. The documents tendered through affidavits of documents do not constitute evidence at this motion. Furthermore, medical records would have to be tendered either as business records (which excludes opinion evidence) or through the affidavit or other evidence of the health care practitioner who offers any opinion evidence.
[49] The profession is reminded that the court applies the same evidentiary principles on a motion as it does at a trial or hearing of an application. Rule 39 is the main rule that governs evidence on motions, and r. 4.06 addresses the formal requirements of affidavits.
[50] Where a party intends to rely on litigation expert opinion evidence, the requirements listed in r. 53.03 must be complied with.
[51] If the business records exemption to hearsay is being relied upon, notice under the Ontario Evidence Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.23, must be delivered, and the formal requirements constituting business records must still be demonstrated.
[52] Furthermore, the use of examination for discovery transcripts at motions is governed by r. 39.04 and 31.11. Again, the same principles for admissibility apply at a motion, as apply at trial.
[53] As for hearsay evidence, while it is admissible through an affidavit on a motion, providing the source of the information and belief is identified, and the deponent affirms that they believe the matters to be true, it must still be probative and not outweighed by the prejudicial impact, if it is to be attached any weight – particularly on a material contested fact.
[54] Transcripts of cross-examination are admissible as well, but r. 39.02 must be complied with.
[55] Finally, transcripts of a witness before a hearing can be relied upon under r. 39.03, with leave of the presiding judge.
[56] Too many motions are brought, whether for in person hearings or in writing, in which counsel fail to comply with the requisite evidentiary requirements. These failures result in delays caused by adjournments or sending back materials or, in some cases, failure on the motion without prejudice to cure the deficiencies in the evidentiary record. Counsel would be well advised to approach evidence on motions (and applications) in the same manner and with the same level of care as they do at trial.
Genuine Issues Requiring a Trial
[57] In her notice of motion, Ms. Kritikopoulou seeks an order dismissing the Plaintiffs’ action in its entirety.
[58] There is no doubt that there are genuine issues requiring a trial raised with respect to Angela’s allegations of physical and psychological childhood and the adult abuse. The allegations raised in the statement of claim are tenable, and there is compelling but conflicting evidence in the record arising from Angela’s and Ms. Kritikopoulou’s respective affidavits.
[59] A motion for summary judgment is not the proper forum for a resolution of these types of contested allegations relating to historical and contemporaneous abuse (in the absence, at least, of a criminal conviction relating to substantially the same allegations). These allegations require an assessment of credibility between Angela and Ms. Kritikopoulou on the core facts.
[60] As there is no motion for partial summary judgment before me, this is enough to dispose of Ms. Kritikopoulou’s motion. However, even if there was a motion for partial summary judgment before me, this would not be an appropriate matter for partial summary judgment as the allegations of abuse, which range from childhood and into Angela’s married adult life, are inextricably intertwined with her and Robert’s claim of a beneficial or equitable interest in the home: Butera v. Chown, Cairns LLP, 2017 ONCA 783, 137 O.R. (3d) 561; Malik v. Attia, 2020 ONCA 787.
[61] While Ms. Kritikopoulou argued strenuously that there was no genuine issue requiring a trial with respect to her claim of exclusive fee simple ownership of the home, this issue cannot be extricated from the claims of abuse by Angela and the novel claim of fiduciary duty asserted by both Angela and Robert relating to the home.
[62] In any event, the issue concerning whether or not the Greigs have a beneficial or equitable interest arising from a resulting or constructive trust requires the court to make findings of fact on issues that will requiring an assessment of credibility.
[63] The claim by Angela and Robert that Ms. Kritikopoulou gifted the home to them as a wedding gift (giving rise to a resulting trust), or alternatively, that the home is a family venture to which they should have a two thirds’ ownership interest, or, in the further alternative, that a constructive trust has been created by Angela and Robert’s alleged investments in the home, and their reliance on Ms. Kritikopoulou having allowed them to live there, rent free, for 30 years, with the expectation that Angela would inherit the Home, cannot be justly resolved on a paper record.
[64] There will have to be an adjudication at trial as to the circumstances under which Ms. Kritikopoulou left the home for a period of over 25 years and whether the facts support any of the causes of action alleged by the Greigs over the Home, including the test for a family venture: Kerr v. Baranow, 2011 SCC 10, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 269.
[65] For example, there is evidence in the record from Angela and Robert’s son, Greg, and an elderly neighbour (Olympia Parras) who has lived across the street from the home since Ms. Kritikopoulou bought it in 1975. The evidence, if believed, supports Angela and Robert’s version of events and could give rise to a beneficial and/or equitable interest in the Home or a claim for equitable compensation (see, for example, Pecore v. Pecore, 2007 SCC 17, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 795; McNamee v. McNamee, 2011 ONCA 533, 280 O.A.C. 372, at para. 24).
[66] On the other hand, Ms. Kritikopoulou’s evidence is supported by the title deed and the fact that registered title to the home is in her name alone. There is no documentary evidence supporting the purported gift of her home to Angela and Robert, or the creation of any property interest, much less associated terms. Her evidence is also supported by an affidavit from her son, George. She also tendered an affidavit by an expert real estate broker (Gabriel Weisz) to provide the court with an assessment of the fair market rents for the home over the 30 years that Angela and Robert have lived there “rent free”. If her version of events is believed, then Angela and Robert may have been living at the home, rent free, at the will of Ms. Kritikopoulou with no resulting property interest of any kind.
[67] A key factual determination will also have to be made concerning the common intention of the parties in order to ascertain whether the home was a gift: Murdoch v. Murdoch, 1973 CanLII 193 (SCC), [1975] 1 S.C.R. 423, 41 D.L.R. (3d) 367.
[68] These facts must also be determined with the benefit of a trial evidentiary record.
[69] As an aside, while the claim based in fiduciary duty by Angela and Robert against their mother/mother-in-law is somewhat novel, including their argument that the alleged breach of fiduciary duty gives rise to an ownership interest in the Home, I do not consider this claim to be suitable for disposition by a summary judgment motion: see A v. D and E Limited as Trustees of the Z Trust, [2021] NZHC 2997, at paras. 150 – 151, for the general proposition that a breach of fiduciary duty can give rise to the reasonable expectation of an interest in the fiduciary’s property under certain circumstances. Again, this claim is inextricably intertwined with Angela’s claim of childhood physical abuse and ongoing psychological abuse into her adulthood, in which the alleged promise of the home was used to as a form of coercion by her mother, Ms. Kritikopoulou. Angela deposed that it was her and Robert’s understanding that a motivation for gifting them the home was as a compensatory gesture by Ms. Kritikopoulou for the harms caused by the alleged childhood abuse.
[70] Furthermore, Ms. Kritikopoulou has brought this motion very late in the proceedings. Notwithstanding the submission that she was not well represented by her prior lawyer, the plaintiffs are not responsible for the delay in these proceedings – Ms. Kritikopoulou is. In my view it would be unfair to the Greigs to permit this motion to proceed at this late stage in the proceeding and in the face of my finding that the Papageorgiou J. Order was violated: Doef v. Hockey Canada et al., 2022 ONSC 1411, at paras. 43-45 and 48.
[71] Resort to my fact-finding powers under r. 20.04(2.1) would not permit me to make the requisite findings of fact and it is in the interest of justice for these powers to be exercised only at a trial.
[72] The defendant’s motion for summary judgment is accordingly dismissed.
[73] For the same reasons relating to the existence of genuine issues requiring a trial, the plaintiffs’ request for a boomerang summary judgment is also dismissed.
[74] However, I have been urged by the parties to consider ordering that the trial be expedited. They have indicated that they are ready for trial.
[75] In light of Ms. Kritikopoulou’s advanced age (she will be 80 years old shortly), the obvious extreme anxiety that this intra-familial dispute has caused, and the age of this proceeding, I agree a trial of this matter should be expedited, assuming it is essentially trial ready. This order will be subject to the court being satisfied that the requisite steps, including a mandatory mediation and exchange of expert reports, will be satisfied in a short time frame.
[76] To issue the appropriate order, I require further information from the parties concerning the anticipated length of the trial and setting a timetable for the mandatory mediation and setting down the action for trial. Accordingly, a case conference will be held before me. Counsel are to contact my judicial assistant to arrange it.
[77] Counsel for the responding parties shall, respectively, deliver their respective cost outlines (for the motion for contempt and summary judgment motion) and written submissions within 10 business days from the release of this decision. The respective responding submissions will be delivered within 10 business days thereafter. The written submissions are not to exceed 3 double-spaced pages each.
Justice S. Vella
Released: February 06, 2023
COURT FILE NO.: CV-16-559525
DATE: 20230206
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
ANGELA GREIG and ROBERT GREIG
Plaintiffs
– and –
IRENE KRITIKOPOULOU
Defendant
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Vella, J.
Released: February 06, 2023