Kim A. Mullin

The plaintiff sought leave to appeal an order discharging a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) regarding a real estate transaction.

The plaintiff argued the motions judge erred in finding the property was not unique, that damages were an adequate remedy, and in relying on a no-registration clause.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's exercise of discretion and concluding that the issues did not transcend the interests of the parties.

The City of London passed an interim control by-law freezing land development along a specific corridor after discussing the matter in two closed meetings.

A property owner applied to quash the by-law, arguing the closed meetings violated the open meeting requirement under section 239 of the Municipal Act, 2001.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Planning Act provisions allowing interim control by-laws to be passed without prior notice or hearing do not create an exception to the open meeting requirement.

The Court upheld the decision to quash the by-law for illegality, emphasizing the importance of transparency and democratic legitimacy in municipal decision-making.

The applicant, City of Toronto Economic Development Corporation (TEDCO), was successful on an application for judicial review regarding a freedom of information request made by the respondent, Showline Limited.

TEDCO sought partial indemnity costs of $18,479.00 against Showline.

Showline argued that no costs should be awarded as it was merely exercising its statutory rights and the case raised novel issues of statutory interpretation.

The Divisional Court held that costs should follow the event, noting that Showline is a private commercial entity that mounted a vigorous response.

Applying the principles from Boucher, the court found the requested amount fair and reasonable and awarded TEDCO $18,479.00 in costs against Showline.

The applicant, a college professor, filed a human rights complaint alleging discrimination on the basis of handicap.

He also filed 14 grievances covering the same allegations under his collective agreement.

The Ontario Human Rights Commission exercised its discretion under s. 34(1)(a) of the Human Rights Code not to deal with the complaint, finding it could be more appropriately dealt with through the grievance and arbitration procedure.

The applicant sought judicial review, arguing the Commission's decision was patently unreasonable because it failed to investigate the efficacy of the grievance procedure.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the Commission is not required to conduct a full-scale investigation into the efficacy of the grievance procedure and its decision was not patently unreasonable given the overlap between the grievances and the complaint.

The appellant municipality appealed a decision striking down a by-law that limited the size of billboards to 80 square feet.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that while the by-law infringed freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Charter, it was saved under section 1 as it minimally impaired the respondent's freedom of expression.

The Information and Privacy Commissioner moved for an order sealing the private part of its record pending a judicial review application.

The underlying application was brought by a requester seeking access to police and securities commission records regarding allegations of his involvement in organized crime.

The sealing order was not opposed, but the requester's counsel sought access to the sealed record subject to a confidentiality undertaking to prepare for the judicial review.

The police and securities commission opposed access, citing the extreme sensitivity of the intelligence records.

The court granted access to the requester's counsel, finding that the benefit of full and informed submissions outweighed the risks of disclosure, provided counsel signed an expanded undertaking not to act for the client in any other proceeding arising out of the information.

The City of Guelph entered into an agreement to sell lands within a redevelopment area under the Planning Act.

The lands included a closed street.

The abutting owner argued that under s. 315 of the Municipal Act, the City was required to offer the lands to it first.

The application judge held that the Planning Act provided a complete scheme and excluded s. 315.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that while the complete scheme argument was unsatisfactory, there was a genuine conflict between s. 315 of the Municipal Act and s. 22(8)(b) of the Planning Act.

Under s. 71 of the Planning Act, the Planning Act prevails in the event of a conflict.

The appeal was dismissed.