Kim A. Mullin

The applicant sought a declaration that three school board trustees breached the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act by voting on a 'Sanctity of Life' motion.

The applicant alleged the trustees had an indirect pecuniary interest because they received $400 campaign contributions and endorsements from a teachers' union that opposed the motion.

The court dismissed the application, finding no evidence of any agreement with the union, no indirect pecuniary interest under section 2 of the Act, and that any hypothetical interest was too remote and insignificant to influence the trustees.

The appellants brought a second motion for reconsideration of a prior Court of Appeal decision that had dismissed their appeal and affirmed a judgment against them.

The appellants sought to set aside or vary the prior decision on grounds of fraud, mistake, and significant new material facts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the appellants were recycling arguments already considered and rejected, mischaracterizing the basis of their first motion to reconsider, and presenting arguments without merit regarding the respondent's standing and the credibility of witnesses.

The court further ordered that the appellants could not initiate further proceedings without paying outstanding costs and obtaining leave of the panel.

On appeal from a Divisional Court decision, the Court of Appeal considered whether the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) had jurisdiction to impose a 25 percent cap on the alternative parkland dedication requirement under section 42 of the Planning Act.

The Town of Richmond Hill had adopted an Official Plan policy allowing for parkland dedication at a rate of one hectare per 300 dwelling units.

Developers challenged this policy, and the OMB imposed a 25 percent cap on the amount of land required to be conveyed.

The Divisional Court set aside the cap, finding the OMB lacked authority to impose it.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, holding that the legislature has given municipalities exclusive authority to determine the rate under section 42(3), subject only to the requirement that an Official Plan contain specific policies dealing with parkland provision and the use of the alternative requirement.

The OMB's role is limited to reviewing whether such policies are appropriate and accord with provincial policies, not to set or cap the rate itself.

The appellants moved under Rule 59.06(2)(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure for reconsideration of the Court of Appeal's decision maintaining awards of damages against them.

The appellants contended that the trial judge miscalculated damages as of a specific date by failing to consider post-date gains from a transaction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the appellants were attempting to reargue an issue that had been decided against them at trial and on appeal, and that the theory of damages was not raised in the original appeal.

The Conservation Review Board held a pre-hearing conference regarding an objection to a Notice of Intention to Designate a property under the Ontario Heritage Act.

The Board granted party status on consent to the Annex Residents Corporation and two adjacent property owners.

The Board also granted an adjournment of the pre-hearing conference to allow the City Heritage Committee to consider a modified development proposal that would preserve the existing heritage building.

The applicant sought an interlocutory injunction to suspend a building permit issued by the town for the construction of a dock on a neighbouring waterfront property.

The applicant argued the proposed location differed from a previously approved site plan and would eventually house a boathouse that would obstruct his view.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test and dismissed the motion, finding that while there was a serious issue to be tried regarding the planning process, the applicant failed to demonstrate irreparable harm from the dock's construction, and the balance of convenience favoured the respondent property owner.

The applicant sought declarations that the City of Hamilton was deemed to have consented to a demolition application under the Ontario Heritage Act due to insufficient notice, and orders for the Chief Building Official to process a demolition permit application.

The core issue was whether the City's notice of refusal, sent to a director's residence rather than the corporation's registered office or the address on the second application, constituted sufficient notice.

The court, relying on Supreme Court of Canada precedent, found that Section 67 of the OHA does not provide an exhaustive list of notice methods and that the City had taken a "positive step" to give notice, which was actually received and acted upon by the applicant's sole director.

Consequently, the application was dismissed.

Shareholders of two successive corporate ventures to develop oil and gas fields in Russia sued defendants for fraudulent misrepresentation, deceit, and conspiracy.

The defendants had induced the plaintiffs to invest US$50 million in a sham public company (Magellan) by falsely representing that another investor (BDW) had committed to investing US$70 million.

When the fraud was discovered, the parties reorganized under a new company (Koll), but the defendants continued to deceive the plaintiffs about asset values and IPO prospects to induce further investment.

The trial judge awarded full compensatory damages to the plaintiffs.

On appeal, the court upheld liability for pre-June 2006 conduct but set aside liability for post-June 2006 conduct based on unpleaded fraudulent misrepresentation claims regarding IPO-related statements, while maintaining liability for wrongful garnishment of remaining Magellan funds.

The applicant brought a motion to consolidate or hear together two applications seeking the removal of a mayor and a councillor for alleged breaches of the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that one of the applications had already been fully argued and was no longer 'pending' as required by Rule 6.01.

Furthermore, the court held that the applications required individualized reviews of separate impugned votes, meaning there were no common material facts that would justify joinder or risk inconsistent judicial findings.

The applicant sought leave to appeal an interlocutory decision of the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) which allowed the respondent developer to amend conditions of a 1996 zoning approval for a trailer park.

The applicant argued the OMB failed to properly apply Rule 106 of its Rules of Practice and Procedure by not reopening the entire hearing after 20 years had passed.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that the OMB's interpretation of its own procedural rules was reasonable, the decision was based on evidence, and the matter did not raise a question of law of sufficient general or public importance.

The moving party sought leave to admit an affidavit on its pending motion for leave to appeal.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the points raised in the affidavit regarding the public importance of the issues could be made by counsel without the affidavit, that other municipalities had already been granted leave to intervene, and that the remaining aspects of the affidavit contained inadmissible opinion evidence.

Costs of $5,000 were awarded to the responding parties.

The Town of Richmond Hill sought leave to appeal an Ontario Municipal Board decision imposing a cap on the alternative requirement for parkland dedication under s. 42(3) of the Planning Act.

Several other municipalities sought leave to intervene in the motion for leave to appeal and the appeal itself, arguing the Board's decision could impact their own parkland dedication policies.

The Divisional Court granted the motions to intervene, finding the issue transcended the immediate parties and the proposed interveners could offer distinct and useful perspectives on an issue of public importance.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Ontario Municipal Board decision that dismissed parts of her appeal regarding a municipal Official Plan.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application on the basis that the applicant had an adequate alternative remedy.

Specifically, the applicant failed to request a review or rehearing under section 43 of the Ontario Municipal Board Act, which provides a statutory mechanism to address her claims of procedural unfairness.

The court noted that allowing the judicial review would undermine the legislative scheme, which requires leave to appeal Board decisions.

The defendant appealed a Master's order allowing an action to continue under Rule 48.14(13) of the Rules of Civil Procedure after delay.

The underlying action alleged negligence and breach of contract by an accountant relating to tax consequences of a U.S. real estate transaction, and involved a significant limitation period issue.

The Master found the plaintiffs provided a satisfactory explanation for post‑litigation delay and that no real prejudice to the defendant had been established despite the death of one plaintiff and the defendant’s health concerns.

On appeal, the court held the Master applied the correct legal principles governing delay and status hearings and committed no palpable or overriding error in assessing explanation and prejudice.

The appeal on the merits and the challenge to the costs decision were both dismissed.

The plaintiffs invested $50 million in a Russian oil and gas joint venture, relying on representations made by the defendants regarding the involvement of another major investor and the status of the corporate vehicles.

The plaintiffs later discovered that the corporate vehicles were sham public companies, the other investor had not funded its portion, and the defendants had engaged in stock manipulation and unauthorized issuance of free-trading shares.

The plaintiffs sued for deceit, breach of fiduciary duty, and unlawful conspiracy.

The defendants counterclaimed for breach of contract, inducing breach of contract, and malicious prosecution.

The Superior Court of Justice found several defendants liable for fraudulent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, and conspiracy, awarding substantial damages to the plaintiffs.

The defendants' counterclaim was dismissed in its entirety.

The plaintiffs were required to show cause at a status hearing why their professional negligence action against the defendant accountant should not be dismissed for delay under Rule 48.14(13).

The court applied the conjunctive test from Khan, requiring an acceptable explanation for the delay and no non-compensable prejudice to the defendant.

The court found the delay was adequately explained by the need to gather particulars, the death of a plaintiff, and the defendant's health issues.

Despite the defendant's health and the passage of time, the court found no non-compensable prejudice, noting the case relied heavily on documentary evidence.

The action was allowed to continue, with the condition that the defendant's discovery be conducted via written questions.

The Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs Appeal Tribunal issued an interim decision regarding appeals of a decision by the Ontario Farm Products Marketing Commission.

The Tribunal addressed preliminary matters, including the disclosure of prior involvement by two Vice Chairs, to which no parties objected.

The Tribunal established procedural rules for the admission of documents from the Commission record and ordered the consolidation of appeals by three appellants.

The Tribunal also set the order of presentation for the hearing, granted intervenor status to De Wetering Hill Farms, and established a schedule for the exchange of documents, expert reports, and future hearing dates.

Following an appeal where success was divided, the parties could not agree on the costs of the original application.

The respondent had been totally successful at first instance and was awarded $40,000.

The Court of Appeal reduced the costs award for the application to $20,000, noting that the relief ultimately obtained by the respondent was significantly less than what was originally sought, which added to the time and cost of the proceeding.

The municipality appealed a decision quashing its sign by-law in its entirety and granting the respondent an individual remedy under s. 24(1) of the Charter to erect billboards.

The Court of Appeal found that while the by-law infringed s. 2(b) of the Charter, certain provisions were justified under s. 1 as they minimally impaired freedom of expression to achieve aesthetic objectives.

However, other provisions that effectively eliminated all commercially viable locations for third-party signs were not saved under s. 1 and were quashed.

The Court also held that the application judge erred in granting an individual remedy under s. 24(1) alongside a declaration of invalidity.

The Information and Privacy Commissioner and Showline Limited appealed a Divisional Court decision that quashed an adjudicator's order granting access to records held by the City of Toronto Economic Development Corporation (TEDCO).

The central issue was whether TEDCO's officers were 'appointed or chosen by or under the authority of the council of the municipality' under s. 2(3) of the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Court of Appeal applied a purposive approach to statutory interpretation, finding that because the City is TEDCO's sole shareholder and appoints its directors, the officers appointed by those directors are chosen under the City's authority.

The appeals were allowed, and TEDCO was deemed subject to the Act.