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Appeal from Consent and Capacity Board dismissed; finding of incapacity to consent to treatment upheld.
The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board finding him incapable of consenting to psychiatric treatment under the Health Care Consent Act.
The appellant, who had been found Not Criminally Responsible for uttering death threats, suffered from a delusional disorder and refused antipsychotic medication, denying he had a mental illness.
Applying the Vavilov framework, the Superior Court of Justice reviewed the Board's decision on a standard of palpable and overriding error.
The court found no error in the Board's conclusion that the appellant's refusal of treatment was a result of his delusional disorder, rendering him unable to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of his decision.
The appeal was dismissed.
Motion for leave to appeal dismissed with no costs due to outstanding capacity issues.
The moving party, Stefano Carella, brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Dietrich J. dated February 20, 2020.
The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.
No order was made as to costs due to an outstanding issue regarding whether the moving party was capable of instructing counsel.
Timetable set for filing materials on a motion for leave to appeal regarding capacity issues.
A case management conference was held to schedule a motion for leave to appeal an order regarding capacity and representation issues.
The court noted delays due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the self-represented status of two respondents.
The court set a timetable for the filing of materials and directed that the motion for leave to appeal proceed in writing.
A father must pay section 7 expenses despite third-party contributions, unless prior consent was omitted.
This case involved a two-day trial to determine outstanding s. 7 child support expenses for two children following a divorce.
The respondent father disputed payment based on arguments that the applicant mother did not personally incur the expenses (they were paid by extended family) and that he did not provide prior consent as required by a Final Order.
The court addressed the necessity and reasonableness of the expenses, the impact of third-party payments, and the requirement for prior consent, ultimately ordering the father to pay a significant portion of the claimed expenses and establishing a new communication protocol for future expenses.
State-funded counsel denied because trial fairness concerns were not established.
The applicant sought a conditional stay of assault-related charges until the state funded counsel under the Rowbotham jurisdiction.
The court found that the applicant had exhausted legal aid remedies and, on a balance of probabilities, was financially unable to retain counsel privately, even at legal aid rates.
However, the court held the case was not sufficiently complex and the applicant had not shown that a fair trial was unlikely without counsel, particularly given his demonstrated ability, the trial judge’s obligation to assist a self-represented accused, and the likely appointment of counsel under s. 486.3 for cross-examination of the complainant.
The Rowbotham application was dismissed.