Vinayak Mishra

The plaintiff, a waste disposal broker, brought a motion for summary judgment alleging the defendant waste disposal service provider breached non-solicitation, non-compete, and confidentiality provisions of a four-year waste disposal services agreement, as well as the duty of good faith.

The defendant brought a cross-motion for judgment on unpaid invoices totalling $37,611.47.

The court interpreted the restrictive covenants narrowly, finding they were geographically limited to Ontario, that the definition of "GIC Client" required an active commercial relationship, and that business relationships were location-specific rather than entity-wide.

The plaintiff failed to establish any breach of the restrictive covenants, confidentiality obligations, or duty of good faith.

The plaintiff's motion and action were dismissed, and the defendant was granted judgment on its counterclaim for unpaid invoices.

The applicants sought leave to appeal an arbitrator's Partial Award on questions of law pursuant to section 45(1) of the Arbitration Act, or alternatively to set aside the award pursuant to section 46(1)6 on grounds of unequal treatment.

The arbitrator had awarded damages to the respondents in a commercial dispute arising from a share purchase agreement.

The court found that the arbitration agreement contained a clear bar to appeals on questions of law, making an appeal impossible.

The court also found that the applicants had failed to raise any pure questions of law.

The applicants' application was dismissed, and judgment was entered in favour of the respondents in accordance with both the Partial Award and Final Award.

The Interim Receiver, TDB Restructuring Limited, sought court approval to commence a marketing and sales process for the real properties of Thomas Dylan Suitor, who had been adjudged bankrupt.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that the powers of an interim receiver under section 46 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act are limited to preservation and protection of assets, and do not extend to a full marketing and sale process unless the property is perishable or likely to depreciate rapidly in value.

The court found insufficient evidence that the properties met this threshold and noted that a full receivership under section 243 of the BIA would be required for such powers.

The court granted a bankruptcy order against Thomas Dylan Suitor, finding that the applicant, The Fuller Landau Group Inc. (as Receiver of The Lion’s Share Group Inc.), established the necessary statutory requirements under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The court found that Mr. Suitor was personally liable under promissory notes as both borrower and guarantor, that he owed debts exceeding $1,000, and that he had ceased to meet his liabilities generally as they became due.

The court also found the existence of multiple creditors and/or special circumstances justifying the order, and declined to exercise its discretion to refuse the order.

The court considered cross-applications between Michelle Goldstein Zaldin and Seymour Goldstein regarding the enforcement of a shotgun clause in a shareholders’ agreement for their jointly owned insurance and investment businesses.

The court found that a binding agreement was reached for Ms. Zaldin to purchase Mr. Goldstein’s shares, and that Mr. Goldstein’s failure to obtain necessary regulatory approvals constituted a breach that prevented closing.

The court granted specific performance in favour of Ms. Zaldin, declined to imply additional terms into the agreement, and awarded her costs.

The court considered cross-applications between Michelle Goldstein Zaldin and Seymour Goldstein regarding the enforcement of a shotgun clause in a shareholders’ agreement for their jointly owned insurance and investment businesses.

The court found that a binding agreement was reached for Ms. Zaldin to purchase Mr. Goldstein’s shares, and that Mr. Goldstein’s failure to obtain necessary regulatory approvals constituted a breach that prevented closing.

The court granted specific performance in favour of Ms. Zaldin, declined to imply additional terms into the agreement, and awarded her costs.

The Receiver of The Lion's Share Group Inc. brought a motion to appoint an interim receiver over the property of the debtor pursuant to section 46 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The Receiver argued that the debtor owed over $23 million under various promissory notes and personal guarantees, and that an interim receiver was necessary to prevent the dissipation of assets.

The debtor opposed the motion, arguing he was not personally liable under the guarantees and that the transactions in question were in the ordinary course of business.

The court granted the motion, finding that the Receiver was likely to succeed on the bankruptcy application and that there was an immediate need to protect the estate given the debtor's recent transactions and the complex web of related entities.

This is a costs endorsement following a decision where the appeal was allowed in part and the cross-appeal was also allowed.

The appellant Estate succeeded against one of three respondents, while respondent D.O. was completely successful on the cross-appeal, though one aspect was conceded and the other involved a lesser amount.

Given the divided success, the Court of Appeal ordered that each party bear their own costs of the appeal and cross-appeal.

This appeal and cross-appeal arose from a matrimonial dispute concerning financial advances and child support.

The Estate of T.O. (husband) appealed the trial judge's dismissal of a claim for $341,000 in advances to Ridgeway (a corporation indirectly owned by D.O., the wife), arguing the limitation period was misapplied.

D.O. cross-appealed the finding of her liability for a $40,346 advance made by the husband's corporation and a child support calculation error.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Estate's appeal against Ridgeway, finding the 2013 advances were demand loans and thus not statute-barred.

It dismissed the appeal against D.O. and 201.

The cross-appeal was allowed, setting aside D.O.'s liability for the $40,346 advance (as the creditor was a non-party corporation) and correcting the child support calculation.

The appellant moved to amend the notice of appeal to clarify that relief is sought against two corporations added as parties below.

The respondent opposed due to late notice.

The Court of Appeal adjourned the appeal and cross-appeal, ordering the motion to amend to be heard in writing with a set schedule for submissions.

Costs were reserved to the disposition of the motion, and the panel remained seized of the motion but not the main appeal.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment dismissing the appellants' action as statute-barred.

The appellants, a former employee and his investment corporation, sued the respondents for breach of a post-retirement compensation agreement, claiming a permanent 3% interest in a partnership.

The motion judge found the claims statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, ruling that a single breach with continuing consequences occurred, not a series of breaches giving rise to a rolling limitation period.

The motion judge also found the request for declaratory relief was, in substance, a claim for compensatory relief and therefore also statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, dismissing the appeal.

Following a successful appeal, the appellant sought its costs of the original application on a substantial indemnity basis, citing the respondent's bad faith dealing.

The Court of Appeal declined to award substantial indemnity costs, finding the respondent's conduct did not rise to the level of reprehensible, scandalous, or outrageous.

The Court awarded the appellant partial indemnity costs fixed at $100,000.

Parkland Fuel Corporation sought $88,282 in costs after successfully defending an application brought by Quickie Convenience Stores Corp. Quickie argued for no costs or a 50% reduction, citing divided success on legal issues and Parkland's late presentation of jurisdictional arguments.

The court found Parkland largely successful in the application's overall outcome, but acknowledged Quickie's partial success on one issue (compliance with first notice and offer obligations) and considered Parkland's delayed jurisdictional arguments.

Ultimately, the court awarded Parkland $52,900 in partial indemnity costs, representing a 20% reduction from their claimed amount.

The applicant, Maryam Rezaee, brought a motion for a mandatory injunction to restore her as manager of a hospitality business, alleging that a corporate restructuring which transferred control to her son, Raymond Zar, was unenforceable due to *non est factum* and constituted oppression.

She also sought alternative prohibitory injunctions.

The respondent, Raymond Zar, brought a cross-motion to remove an existing interim order preventing property encumbrance, arguing non-disclosure of independent legal advice during the *ex parte* application for that order.

The court dismissed Maryam's motion for both mandatory and prohibitory injunctions, finding she did not meet the "strong prima facie case" standard for mandatory relief or the "irreparable harm" standard for either.

The court also dismissed Zar's cross-motion, thereby maintaining the interim order pending the resolution of the Certificates of Pending Litigation motion.