Ravinder Pal Sawhney

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an earlier order of Doi J. The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding party in the fixed amount of $2,500 inclusive.

The appellants appealed a Superior Court judgment that enforced Minutes of Settlement and granted summary judgment for $90,000 to the respondents.

The Minutes of Settlement required the appellants to pay $40,000 in instalments and deliver consents, including a consent to judgment for $120,000.

The appellants failed to deliver consents and stopped the final $10,000 payment.

The motion judge rejected arguments that the pandemic or respondents' separate arrangements with other settling parties altered obligations, and found no error in converting the motion to summary judgment.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's decision, finding no error in the process or the conclusions, including that the $90,000 award was not a penalty.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The Respondent brought a motion to remove the Applicant's counsel, Clarissa D’Avella, and her law firm, citing a conflict of interest.

The conflict arose from the Applicant's intention to call her previous counsel, Ms. Cebulak (who practices at the same firm as Ms. D’Avella), as a witness in a focused hearing concerning the validity of a separation agreement.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the Respondent failed to demonstrate that the removal was necessary for the proper administration of justice.

The judge applied a flexible approach, considering factors such as the stage of proceedings, the likelihood and significance of the witness's testimony, the good faith of the moving party, and the litigant's right to choose counsel.

The court concluded that the potential for actual conflict or tainting of evidence was remote given the limited and non-controversial nature of the anticipated testimony and the measures proposed by the Applicant to mitigate concerns.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for judgment arising from the defendants' breach of a settlement agreement.

The defendants failed to pay the final installment, sign a consent to judgment, and sign a consent to a dismissal order, citing the COVID-19 pandemic as an excuse to unilaterally alter the terms.

The court found no valid reason for non-compliance, rejected the pandemic excuse, and granted judgment for the plaintiffs in the amount of $90,000 (the $120,000 default amount less $30,000 paid), plus substantial indemnity costs.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's finding of contempt on three access provisions in a custody and access order.

The motion judge had found the appellant in contempt for: (1) failing to provide the children's summer activity schedule by May 1 from 2012 to 2015; (2) denying access during Easter weekend in 2015; and (3) denying access to the son on his birthday in October 2015.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside all three findings of contempt, finding that the record did not support the motion judge's findings and that the motion judge's reasons were insufficient.

The plaintiffs sold their property but were not paid the full purchase price, leaving a balance of $340,000.

The property was subsequently transferred to the defendant McCracken, who assumed the previous owner's debts and placed several mortgages on the property.

The plaintiffs remained on the property rent-free for eleven years.

The court found the plaintiffs were entitled to a vendor's lien for the unpaid purchase price, which took priority over the mortgages placed by McCracken because she had notice of the unpaid debt.

The court dismissed claims for occupation rent and punitive damages, and ordered the funds held in court to be distributed according to the determined priorities.

This endorsement addresses the costs of a motion for child and spousal support brought by Mona Ayesh against Abdelsalam Zeidan.

Ms. Ayesh was successful in obtaining support orders.

She sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis, while Mr. Zeidan claimed his own costs, arguing his offer to settle was more favourable.

The court found Ms. Ayesh was presumptively entitled to costs due to her success and Mr. Zeidan's unreasonable conduct, specifically his failure to provide full financial disclosure, which amounted to bad faith under the Family Law Rules.

Consequently, the court awarded Ms. Ayesh full recovery costs of $14,133.48, enforceable as child support.

The plaintiff, having succeeded in a summary trial under simplified rules for a construction lien claim, sought substantial indemnity costs.

The defendants argued for proportionality and a lower award.

The court found the plaintiff presumptively entitled to costs but rejected substantial indemnity due to issues with the plaintiff's offer to settle (all-inclusive amount and 30-day expiry term).

The court awarded partial indemnity costs, fixing fees at $35,000 plus HST and disbursements, totaling $44,813.92.

The appellant wife appealed a trial judgment concerning the disposition of approximately $53,000 in proceeds from the sale of the matrimonial home.

The trial judge found the husband was the sole owner because the wife had gifted her interest to him to avoid creditors.

The trial judge also found the wife's equalization claim was statute-barred, having fixed the date of separation at December 21, 1996, with the application issued in August 2010.

In the alternative, the trial judge found an equal division would be unconscionable due to the wife's reckless depletion of family property, the husband's payment of all acquisition costs and expenses, and the wife's abusive and controlling behaviour.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's findings regarding the date of separation or ownership of the matrimonial home.

The court reviewed the report of a court-appointed independent solicitor who conducted the election of directors for the Muslim Association of Milton.

Neither party objected to the report or the conduct of the election.

The court adopted the report in its entirety, confirmed the elected directors for a five-year term, and approved the solicitor's account of $17,854.45 in full, ordering the Association to pay it.

Members of a charitable non‑profit corporation sought to set aside a board election on the basis that the process violated the corporation’s by‑laws and basic principles of fairness.

The court found that the interim board improperly expanded the membership list prior to the election and required members to reaffirm their memberships despite no authority for such requirement in the by‑laws.

The election was also conducted for a two‑year term despite the by‑laws specifying five‑year terms.

These irregularities went to the core of the electoral process and undermined the legitimacy of the result.

The court declared the election void and ordered that a new election be conducted under the supervision of an independent solicitor.

The respondent, Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal, sought costs of $2,000 following a successful application.

The applicant opposed the costs award due to financial circumstances.

The court awarded the requested $2,000, noting it was a fair and reasonable amount given the total bill of costs exceeded $17,000.

The applicant sought judicial review of three decisions by the Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal denying him temporary total disability benefits for a specific period.

The applicant argued the Tribunal failed to apply Board policies, breached its duty of fairness, made findings contrary to the record, and violated s. 15 of the Charter.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Tribunal's decisions were not patently unreasonable, the duty of fairness was met, and the Charter claim could not be raised for the first time on judicial review without an evidentiary record.

The applicant sought judicial review of decisions by an Arbitrator and the Director's Delegate, which found he was not injured in an 'accident' as defined in the Statutory Accident Benefit Schedule 1996.

The applicant, a taxicab driver, was struck on the head with a rock by an assailant while in his cab.

The Arbitrator found his injuries were caused solely by the assault and not by striking any part of the vehicle, thus failing the causation test for an 'accident'.

The Divisional Court held that the standard of review was patent unreasonableness and found the Tribunal's decisions were not only reasonable but correct.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court judgment, arguing that the trial judge erred in calculating the date from which pre-judgment interest was owed on a $10,000 award.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, noting that the appellant failed to provide a transcript of the assessment hearing.

Without a transcript, the court could not review the trial judge's reasons for exercising discretion under section 130(1) of the Courts of Justice Act to alter the interest period.

The appellant appealed an Arbitrator's decision that limited his income replacement benefits and attendant care benefits, awarded a nominal special award, and reduced his arbitration expenses due to his deceit and exaggeration of symptoms.

The respondent cross-appealed, arguing the Arbitrator failed to deduct income tax when calculating the appellant's pre-accident income.

The Director's Delegate dismissed the appellant's appeal, finding the Arbitrator's conclusions on disability, credibility, expenses, and the special award were well-supported by the evidence, including surveillance footage that contradicted the appellant's claims.

The Delegate allowed the respondent's variation application, correcting the benefit rate to account for income tax deductions.

The Delegate also upheld the Arbitrator's ruling that he lacked jurisdiction to order interest accruing after the date of his decision, but ordered the respondent to pay the appellant's post-decision implementation expenses due to its unjustified delay in complying with the original order.

The appellant appealed an arbitration decision that found his claim for weekly income benefits was time-barred.

The appellant argued that the arbitrator's refusal to allow written submissions after the hearing concluded raised a reasonable apprehension of bias, and that there was insufficient evidence he received the mediator's report to trigger the 90-day limitation period.

The Director's Delegate dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence of bias in the arbitrator's procedural rulings or conduct during the hearing.

Furthermore, the arbitrator did not err in concluding that the insurer's clear refusal to pay benefits and the mailing of the mediator's report triggered the limitation period, which had expired before the arbitration application was filed.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and received weekly income benefits until the insurer terminated them on June 30, 1994.

The applicant applied for mediation in 1996 and subsequently for arbitration in November 1997.

The insurer raised a preliminary issue that the arbitration application was statute-barred under section 281(5) of the Insurance Act.

The arbitrator found that the two-year limitation period began running on June 30, 1994, and was extended for 90 days following the mediator's report on September 23, 1996.

As the application was filed nearly 11 months after the extended limitation period expired, the claim for weekly income benefits was statute-barred.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sought statutory accident benefits, including income replacement benefits, supplementary medical benefits, and attendant care benefits.

The insurer terminated income replacement benefits, alleging the applicant failed to attend a medical examination and was malingering.

The arbitrator found that the insurer improperly terminated benefits before obtaining a Designated Assessment Centre report, entitling the applicant to benefits until the report's release.

However, the arbitrator concluded the applicant grossly exaggerated his physical and cognitive symptoms, relying on surveillance evidence and medical inconsistencies, and denied ongoing income replacement benefits.

The arbitrator also awarded limited supplementary medical and attendant care benefits, and a special award due to the insurer's unreasonable delay in initial payments and refusal to fund certain treatments.