Christopher Gibson

This is a ruling on a motion to disqualify a witness, Gabrielle St. George, in ongoing matrimonial and civil litigation.

Vito Ierullo sought to call Ms. St. George, the estranged sister of Rae Marie Ierullo (referred to as Ms. Adragone), to provide evidence concerning a loan assignment, the transfer of a family home, and allegations of forgery and fraudulent documents.

Rae Marie Ierullo objected, arguing the proposed evidence was largely hearsay, lacked direct knowledge, and was motivated by ill-will.

The court found the evidence to be speculative, based on animus, and largely hearsay, concluding that its admission would unnecessarily expand the scope of the trial into collateral family and estate issues.

The motion to permit Ms. St. George to testify was dismissed.

This mid-trial ruling addresses the qualification of an expert witness, D.J. Myles Martin, proposed by the applicant (Rae Marie Ierullo) in a combined family and civil trial concerning business valuations.

The respondent (Vito Ierullo) challenged the expert's qualifications.

The court applied the Mohan and White Burgess tests for expert admissibility, considering factors such as formal education, professional qualifications, experience, and independence.

The court declined to qualify the expert, citing his lack of formal CBV accreditation, limited litigation support experience, and an undisclosed social relationship with the applicant, which raised concerns about his objectivity and non-partisanship.

In a complex, combined family and civil proceeding, the husband brought motions to further amend his pleadings and compel third-party financial disclosure shortly before a rescheduled trial.

The court dismissed the majority of the requested amendments, finding them to be an attempt to retool his narrative and expand the issues on the eve of trial.

The court ordered the third parties to file an affidavit regarding the availability of the requested records but relieved them from the balance of the summons.

Finally, the court ordered the wife to pay $40,000 in costs thrown away for a previously adjourned trial date.

This endorsement addresses the appropriate resolution of costs and clarification of damages following a wrongful dismissal summary judgment motion.

The court determined that for the purpose of comparing a judgment to a Rule 49 offer, damages awards for wrongful dismissal are reduced by statutory termination payments.

Consequently, the plaintiff did not obtain a result more favourable than their Rule 49 offer, nor did the defendant's offer trigger cost consequences under Rule 49.10(2) as the court's award exceeded it when statutory payments were factored in.

The court also ruled that tax consequences are not relevant in a Rule 49 analysis.

The plaintiff was awarded partial indemnity costs, and the net value of the judgment was clarified.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment for wrongful dismissal after being terminated without cause by the defendant.

The court found the matter suitable for summary judgment.

Applying Waksdale, the court held the entire termination clause was void because the 'for cause' provision violated the Employment Standards Act by contracting out of minimum statutory entitlements.

The court awarded a five-month reasonable notice period, finding the plaintiff reasonably mitigated his damages by securing new employment, and calculated damages for base salary, commissions, and benefits, while denying lost pension contributions.