Wendy Hope Greenspoon-Soer

The plaintiff sought access to documents seized pursuant to an Anton Piller Order executed six months prior.

The defendants opposed, arguing the Order did not explicitly permit access and that review was premature.

The court found that the terms of the Order contemplated access by the Independent Supervising Solicitor (ISS) to identify and inspect records.

Given the passage of time and the discovery stage of the proceeding, the court directed the ISS to inspect the seized material and produce relevant records to the parties, noting the ISS provides protection against disclosure of irrelevant or privileged material.

The plaintiff sought a direction allowing the Independent Supervising Solicitor (ISS) to commence reviewing evidence seized pursuant to an Anton Piller Order.

The defendants objected, noting the order did not permit review and seeking to schedule a motion to set aside the order.

The court declined the plaintiff's request, finding the purpose of the order—preservation of evidence—had been achieved and noting concerns that the standard clause preventing review was inexplicably omitted from the draft order.

The court also declined to schedule the motion to set aside the order, finding no urgency since the original materials were returned to the defendants and the ISS was not reviewing the copies.

An expedited schedule for documentary production was ordered instead.

In the context of a receivership involving a partially constructed residential development, the debtors' representative sought to appeal orders approving a sales process and specific vesting orders.

The Receiver brought a motion declaring no appeal as of right existed, while the debtors sought an extension of time and leave to appeal.

The Court of Appeal held there was no appeal as of right under s. 193(c) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act because the debtors failed to demonstrate a direct loss exceeding $10,000.

The Court also denied leave to appeal, finding the proposed appeal lacked merit, raised no issues of general importance, and would unduly hinder the progress of the receivership.

Following the release of the Court's decision on the appeal, submissions were received regarding the apportionment of costs.

The Court fixed costs of the appeal payable to the Receiver, the respondent 100 Ontario Inc., and the respondent Issam A. Saad, each in the amount of $15,000.

The appellant entered into an Agreement of Purchase and Sale with a court-appointed receiver to purchase real estate.

The receiver brought a motion for approval and vesting.

However, late-breaking offers emerged, including one 37% higher than the appellant's offer.

The motion judge declined to approve the sale and instead ordered a six-day extension of the bidding process.

The appellant appealed, arguing the motion judge misapplied the principles from Royal Bank of Canada v. Soundair Corp. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge properly exercised discretion in reopening the auction process given the magnitude of the late offer and the receiver's alternative recommendation.

The Applicant, a mortgagee, sought to vary a previously consented receivership order concerning three properties (Harwood Properties) in Ajax.

The original order, which appointed a receiver, included provisions requiring consultation with the Town of Ajax on sales and a new development agreement with a right of re-purchase for the Town.

These terms were agreed upon in exchange for the Town's consent to the receivership and a stay of its own action regarding a re-purchase right and priority dispute.

The Applicant argued that changed circumstances, specifically the unacceptability of the development agreement terms to potential purchasers, justified varying the order and determining the priority of its mortgage over the Town's re-purchase right.

The court dismissed the motion, emphasizing the finality of consent orders and that the Applicant had agreed to the terms, which resolved a pending priority dispute.

The court found no misrepresentation by the Town that would vitiate the Applicant's consent and held that the comeback clause should not be used to prejudice parties who relied on the original order.

The applicants successfully obtained an order for forfeiture of a $150,000 deposit due to the respondent's breach of an agreement of purchase and sale.

The respondent sought to avoid costs by pleading impecuniosity.

The court rejected the impecuniosity plea, finding it unsubstantiated and noting the respondent's unreasonable litigation conduct, including failing to pursue a claim against her real estate agent and rejecting a reasonable offer to settle.

The court awarded costs to the applicants, fixed at $17,100.

The applicants (sellers) sought declarations that the respondent buyer breached an Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS) for a property and that the $150,000 deposit be forfeited.

The buyer argued she did not properly sign the APS due to her agent's conduct (non est factum, undue influence) and sought to convert the application to an action to add her agent.

The court found the buyer had indeed signed and breached the APS, rejecting her defences as not vitiating the contract between the buyer and sellers.

The court ordered the forfeiture of the deposit, finding it was not disproportionate to the sellers' damages and that retaining it was not unconscionable.

The deposit held in trust was ordered released to the sellers.

The applicants were given a deadline to decide on pursuing further damages.

The Applicants, purchasers of a condominium unit, sought a declaration that they validly terminated their Agreement of Purchase and Sale and were entitled to the return of their $54,449.90 deposit.

They argued termination based on a clause in the Occupancy License, the vendor's failure to invoke a statutory provision, or entitlement to relief from forfeiture.

The court found that the termination clause required mutual consent, which was not obtained.

It also determined that the vendor was not obligated to invoke the statutory provision and, in any event, could not have done so.

While acknowledging the deposit was disproportionate to the vendor's damages given the property's resale at a significant profit, the court denied relief from forfeiture, finding no unconscionability due to the parties' sophistication, legal advice, and the purchasers' clear intent not to close the transaction.

The Applicants' request was dismissed.

The applicant purchaser sought a declaration that a mortgage registered on the property by the vendor's brother shortly before closing was void.

The vendor claimed the mortgage formalized a pre-existing equitable mortgage for past loans.

The court found no credible evidence of an equitable mortgage and concluded the mortgage was registered with the intent to defeat, hinder, or delay creditors, including the purchaser.

The court applied the badges of fraud and declared the mortgage void under the Fraudulent Conveyances Act, ordering its discharge.

The defendants brought a motion to discharge a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) registered against a property.

The plaintiff, who had sold the property to relatives of her real estate broker with an alleged unwritten agreement to repurchase, had fallen into default on rent and faced health issues.

The court, exercising broad discretion under Section 113 of the Courts of Justice Act, granted the plaintiff a "last chance" to repurchase the property at current market value, to be determined by a specific appraisal process.

Failure to meet the conditions by September 30, 2020, would result in the CPL's discharge.

The plaintiffs, a franchisor group ("Tiny Hoppers"), brought a motion for summary judgment seeking repayment of $500,000 and absolution from further payments, alleging the defendants (franchisees, "Dino & Kidz") breached a settlement agreement by failing to disassociate from the brand and making defamatory statements.

The defendants brought a cross-motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the plaintiffs' claim and payment of $224,000, the balance owing under the settlement.

The court found that the defendants had taken reasonable steps to disassociate themselves and had not made defamatory or disparaging statements.

Consequently, the plaintiffs' motion was dismissed, and the defendants' counterclaim for the outstanding payment was granted.

The parties, who own neighbouring lands, have a long history of disputes regarding their development.

The plaintiffs previously obtained an interlocutory injunction restricting the defendants from developing certain lots, which was later overturned.

The defendants sought damages resulting from the injunction, including interest rate differentials and carrying costs.

The plaintiffs brought a summary judgment motion seeking reimbursement for road construction costs and interest on letters of credit.

The court awarded the defendants damages for interest rate differentials and amendment fees caused by the injunction, but denied carrying costs for general delays.

On the summary judgment motion, the court ordered the defendants to pay their share of the asphalt and curb costs as agreed in a prior consent order, but rejected the plaintiffs' claims for additional municipal standard upgrades.

A plaintiff brought a motion for leave to issue a writ of possession against defendants following their default on a second mortgage and non-compliance with previous court orders.

A defendant sought a further adjournment to file responding material, citing a disorder, but this request was denied due to insufficient evidence and a history of previous adjournments.

The court noted the defendants' consistent failure to meet deadlines and make payments, including the plaintiff's payment of the first mortgage to prevent default.

The motion for leave to issue a writ of possession was granted.

The court heard three motions for summary judgment in two related actions concerning second and third mortgages on a property.

The defendant, Hassan Talani, challenged the validity of these mortgages, claiming the property was a matrimonial home requiring spousal consent and that prior mortgages prohibited subsequent encumbrances.

He also counterclaimed against his real estate lawyer, Laman Meshadiyeva, alleging negligence and exploitation of a gambling addiction.

The court rejected Talani's arguments, finding no genuine issue for trial regarding the matrimonial home status or the validity of the mortgages.

The court also dismissed Talani's counterclaim against Meshadiyeva due to lack of evidence.

Partial summary judgment was deemed appropriate, removing the mortgagees and lawyer from the litigation while allowing other discrete claims to proceed.

Following a series of motions and applications in a complex family estate and joint venture dispute, the court determined the appropriate costs awards.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to Mattamy Homes for an abandoned summary judgment motion and a successfully defended summary judgment motion.

The litigation guardian was also awarded partial indemnity costs.

However, the joint attorneys for property were awarded substantial indemnity costs of $180,000 against the Bistricers, as the court found the Bistricers' conduct in the litigation to be reprehensible, duplicitous, and driven by ulterior motives.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination on the basis of race, colour, ancestry, place of origin, and ethnic origin after a federally regulated bank denied his credit card application.

The Tribunal initiated a summary hearing to determine if the matter fell under federal jurisdiction.

The Tribunal dismissed the application, finding that lending and the granting of credit by a Schedule I bank are core banking activities that fall exclusively within federal jurisdiction under section 91(15) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The applicants and respondent are brothers involved in a dispute over their late father's estate.

The applicants, acting as estate trustees, and the respondent both brought motions for directions regarding various issues, including the validity of a codicil, alleged undue influence, accounting of personal property, and distribution of sale proceeds.

The court ordered that the disputed issues be litigated as an action, with the respondent as plaintiff and the applicants as defendants.

The court also ordered the parties to attend mediation prior to trial, with the costs of the mediator to be borne by the estate.

A condominium corporation appealed from a damages award of $18,000 and sought leave to appeal a costs award of $17,000 made under section 134(5) of the Condominium Act, 1998.

The respondent unit owners had leased their condominium to tenants who vandalized common elements.

The corporation claimed $33,381.28 in damages and $52,637.56 in costs.

The application judge found certain repair expenditures disproportionate and reduced the damages award.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the application judge erred in assessing security camera installation costs and in conflating two distinct types of costs under the Act.

The damages award was increased to $25,458 and the costs award was increased to $34,000.

The plaintiffs, Harold Gerstel and 2102503 Ontario Inc., sought to remove arbitrators, set aside an arbitration agreement, and lift a stay of court proceedings in a business dispute that had been referred to a rabbinical court (Beis Din) for binding arbitration.

The plaintiffs alleged bias on the part of the arbitrators and unfair treatment, particularly regarding the production of financial records and communications between the arbitrators and the defendants.

The court dismissed the motions, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias or breach of equality and fairness, emphasizing judicial restraint in interfering with community-based arbitration processes, while affirming the court's residual jurisdiction to ensure fundamental principles are upheld.