Wendy Hope Greenspoon-Soer

Following the release of the Court's decision on the appeal, submissions were received regarding the apportionment of costs.

The Court fixed costs of the appeal payable to the Receiver, the respondent 100 Ontario Inc., and the respondent Issam A. Saad, each in the amount of $15,000.

The appellant entered into an Agreement of Purchase and Sale with a court-appointed receiver to purchase real estate.

The receiver brought a motion for approval and vesting.

However, late-breaking offers emerged, including one 37% higher than the appellant's offer.

The motion judge declined to approve the sale and instead ordered a six-day extension of the bidding process.

The appellant appealed, arguing the motion judge misapplied the principles from Royal Bank of Canada v. Soundair Corp. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge properly exercised discretion in reopening the auction process given the magnitude of the late offer and the receiver's alternative recommendation.

The Applicant, a mortgagee, sought to vary a previously consented receivership order concerning three properties (Harwood Properties) in Ajax.

The original order, which appointed a receiver, included provisions requiring consultation with the Town of Ajax on sales and a new development agreement with a right of re-purchase for the Town.

These terms were agreed upon in exchange for the Town's consent to the receivership and a stay of its own action regarding a re-purchase right and priority dispute.

The Applicant argued that changed circumstances, specifically the unacceptability of the development agreement terms to potential purchasers, justified varying the order and determining the priority of its mortgage over the Town's re-purchase right.

The court dismissed the motion, emphasizing the finality of consent orders and that the Applicant had agreed to the terms, which resolved a pending priority dispute.

The court found no misrepresentation by the Town that would vitiate the Applicant's consent and held that the comeback clause should not be used to prejudice parties who relied on the original order.

The applicants successfully obtained an order for forfeiture of a $150,000 deposit due to the respondent's breach of an agreement of purchase and sale.

The respondent sought to avoid costs by pleading impecuniosity.

The court rejected the impecuniosity plea, finding it unsubstantiated and noting the respondent's unreasonable litigation conduct, including failing to pursue a claim against her real estate agent and rejecting a reasonable offer to settle.

The court awarded costs to the applicants, fixed at $17,100.

The applicants (sellers) sought declarations that the respondent buyer breached an Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS) for a property and that the $150,000 deposit be forfeited.

The buyer argued she did not properly sign the APS due to her agent's conduct (non est factum, undue influence) and sought to convert the application to an action to add her agent.

The court found the buyer had indeed signed and breached the APS, rejecting her defences as not vitiating the contract between the buyer and sellers.

The court ordered the forfeiture of the deposit, finding it was not disproportionate to the sellers' damages and that retaining it was not unconscionable.

The deposit held in trust was ordered released to the sellers.

The applicants were given a deadline to decide on pursuing further damages.

The defendants brought a motion to discharge a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) registered against a property.

The plaintiff, who had sold the property to relatives of her real estate broker with an alleged unwritten agreement to repurchase, had fallen into default on rent and faced health issues.

The court, exercising broad discretion under Section 113 of the Courts of Justice Act, granted the plaintiff a "last chance" to repurchase the property at current market value, to be determined by a specific appraisal process.

Failure to meet the conditions by September 30, 2020, would result in the CPL's discharge.

The plaintiffs, a franchisor group ("Tiny Hoppers"), brought a motion for summary judgment seeking repayment of $500,000 and absolution from further payments, alleging the defendants (franchisees, "Dino & Kidz") breached a settlement agreement by failing to disassociate from the brand and making defamatory statements.

The defendants brought a cross-motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the plaintiffs' claim and payment of $224,000, the balance owing under the settlement.

The court found that the defendants had taken reasonable steps to disassociate themselves and had not made defamatory or disparaging statements.

Consequently, the plaintiffs' motion was dismissed, and the defendants' counterclaim for the outstanding payment was granted.

A plaintiff brought a motion for leave to issue a writ of possession against defendants following their default on a second mortgage and non-compliance with previous court orders.

A defendant sought a further adjournment to file responding material, citing a disorder, but this request was denied due to insufficient evidence and a history of previous adjournments.

The court noted the defendants' consistent failure to meet deadlines and make payments, including the plaintiff's payment of the first mortgage to prevent default.

The motion for leave to issue a writ of possession was granted.

The court heard three motions for summary judgment in two related actions concerning second and third mortgages on a property.

The defendant, Hassan Talani, challenged the validity of these mortgages, claiming the property was a matrimonial home requiring spousal consent and that prior mortgages prohibited subsequent encumbrances.

He also counterclaimed against his real estate lawyer, Laman Meshadiyeva, alleging negligence and exploitation of a gambling addiction.

The court rejected Talani's arguments, finding no genuine issue for trial regarding the matrimonial home status or the validity of the mortgages.

The court also dismissed Talani's counterclaim against Meshadiyeva due to lack of evidence.

Partial summary judgment was deemed appropriate, removing the mortgagees and lawyer from the litigation while allowing other discrete claims to proceed.

A condominium corporation appealed from a damages award of $18,000 and sought leave to appeal a costs award of $17,000 made under section 134(5) of the Condominium Act, 1998.

The respondent unit owners had leased their condominium to tenants who vandalized common elements.

The corporation claimed $33,381.28 in damages and $52,637.56 in costs.

The application judge found certain repair expenditures disproportionate and reduced the damages award.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the application judge erred in assessing security camera installation costs and in conflating two distinct types of costs under the Act.

The damages award was increased to $25,458 and the costs award was increased to $34,000.

The plaintiffs, Harold Gerstel and 2102503 Ontario Inc., sought to remove arbitrators, set aside an arbitration agreement, and lift a stay of court proceedings in a business dispute that had been referred to a rabbinical court (Beis Din) for binding arbitration.

The plaintiffs alleged bias on the part of the arbitrators and unfair treatment, particularly regarding the production of financial records and communications between the arbitrators and the defendants.

The court dismissed the motions, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias or breach of equality and fairness, emphasizing judicial restraint in interfering with community-based arbitration processes, while affirming the court's residual jurisdiction to ensure fundamental principles are upheld.

The parties entered into an oral joint venture to redevelop a residential property, with profits to be shared equally after completion and sale.

After disputes arose during construction, the defendant excluded the plaintiff from the project, refused to acknowledge the plaintiff’s interest in the property, obtained a second mortgage without notice, and ultimately sold the unfinished property without the plaintiff’s consent.

The court found the arrangement constituted a partnership under the Partnerships Act and that the defendant’s conduct amounted to a repudiation and breach of the partnership agreement.

The plaintiff was therefore justified in ceasing further financial contributions after being excluded from the project.

Liability was determined in Phase 1, with damages and accounting to be addressed in a subsequent phase.

Counter-applicants sought relief relating to a commercial property, including vacating an existing Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) registered by the applicants and obtaining leave to register their own CPL.

The moving parties alleged they advanced substantial funds to entities controlled by an individual who promised mortgage security but failed to properly register it, and that fraudulent transfers of mortgage interests had occurred.

The court found that the counter-applicants had demonstrated a reasonable claim to an interest in land and that there remained triable issues regarding the validity of the mortgage interests.

Although the applicants had not prosecuted their claim diligently, the court declined to discharge the existing CPL at this stage given the procedural posture and ongoing litigation.

Leave was granted to the counter-applicants to issue a CPL while the earlier CPL remained in place.