Adam J. Wygodny

The defendants brought a motion for the production of a report prepared by the plaintiff's Barbadian counsel (the CGF Report) and a list of documents reviewed by that counsel.

The plaintiff claimed solicitor-client and litigation privilege over the report and the list of documents.

The court held that the CGF Report was protected by solicitor-client privilege as it contained legal advice, and the plaintiff had not waived this privilege.

However, the court found that the list of documents reviewed by counsel was not privileged, as it merely constituted facts, and ordered its production.

A cross-motion by the plaintiff to strike portions of an affidavit was resolved by the court placing no weight on the hearsay paragraphs.

The applicants brought a contempt motion against the respondents for failing to produce financial records as ordered by a prior court order.

Although the records were eventually produced, leading to no formal finding of contempt, the court found that the respondents' lengthy delay and non-compliance necessitated the motion.

The court awarded substantial indemnity costs to the applicants, finding the respondents' conduct in delaying disclosure and forcing the contempt motion to be reprehensible and to constitute special circumstances justifying a higher scale of costs.

The Regional Municipality of York (the "Region") brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the claim of 2149629 Ontario Inc. ("214"). 214 sought damages for negligence and breach of contract, alleging that the Region's actions caused it to miss a deadline for registering a plan of subdivision, thereby incurring higher development charges.

The court found that 214 knew or ought to have known about the dewatering condition required for registration.

The court determined that the Region was not negligent, there was no principal/agency relationship between the Region and the Township of King, and the Region did not breach its contractual duty of good faith.

Furthermore, the court denied relief from forfeiture, concluding that 214 was not penalized but rather failed to receive a benefit by not meeting the agreement's conditions.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, and 214's claim was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion for partial summary judgment alleging breach of the Copyright Act regarding marketing materials for a residential development.

During argument, the plaintiff realized its legal position was flawed and abandoned the motion.

The defendant sought costs of $34,719 on a substantial indemnity basis, while the plaintiff suggested $6,000.

The court found the motion was peripheral to the main action, unnecessary, and caused significant delay, bordering on an abuse of process.

Applying Rule 20.06, the court awarded the defendant costs on a substantial indemnity basis, fixed at $29,719.12.

Following the dismissal of the moving parties' motion for a rehearing of an appeal, the responding party sought costs on a partial indemnity basis in the amount of $13,094.

The moving parties argued no costs should be awarded as the motion raised a novel issue that clarified the law.

The Court of Appeal held that costs should follow the event and awarded the responding party costs fixed at $4,000 all inclusive.

The moving parties brought a motion for a re-hearing of an appeal, arguing that the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp., released shortly before the appeal decision, altered the applicable standard of review for contractual interpretation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the result of the appeal was not driven by the standard of review and would not have been different under the Sattva test, as the application judge's errors were extricable questions of law.

At a contested status hearing, the plaintiff was required to show cause why its commercial lease dispute action should not be dismissed for delay under Rule 48.14(13).

The court applied the conjunctive test from Khan, finding the plaintiff provided an acceptable explanation for the delay and that the defendant would suffer no non-compensable prejudice.

The action was allowed to continue, and the registrar was ordered not to dismiss the action without further order of the court.

The appeal concerned interpretation of a land development agreement containing a purchase price adjustment clause tied to non-developable acreage and secured by a vendor take-back mortgage.

The application judge treated the fifth anniversary in the clause as a hard deadline, with time of the essence, and held the purchaser lost any right to a price reduction by failing to trigger the process by that date.

The Court of Appeal held that interpretation was commercially unreasonable and inconsistent with the agreement’s structure, the consultant-based determination mechanism, and the surrounding development context.

The fifth anniversary operated as an 'as of' valuation date for measuring non-developable land, not as a limitation-like deadline.

The appeal was allowed, the judgment below set aside, and the purchaser was declared entitled to a price reduction to be determined under the agreement.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the defendants’ counterclaim alleging malicious prosecution, unlawful interference with economic relations, and various claims for damages arising from an earlier injunction and the termination of a referral relationship.

The court held that the defendants failed to establish the elements required for malicious prosecution, particularly malice, and that the inclusion of parties in civil litigation was insufficient to ground such a claim.

Claims for intentional or unlawful interference with economic relations also failed because the evidence did not demonstrate an intention by the plaintiffs to cause economic harm.

The court further found that damages related to the interim injunction should be pursued through enforcement of the undertaking for damages rather than by counterclaim.

Partial summary judgment was granted dismissing most of the counterclaim, with leave granted to amend the counterclaim to seek damages tied specifically to the injunction period.

The applicant purchaser sought a declaration that a vendor take-back mortgage was paid in full, arguing that a price adjustment for non-developable land reduced the balance to zero.

The agreement of purchase and sale required the calculation of non-developable land to occur at the five-year anniversary of the mortgage, but the applicant missed this deadline, claiming it was impossible to determine due to ongoing environmental studies regarding an endangered minnow species.

The court dismissed the application, holding that time was of the essence and the unpredictable nature of the development approval process did not excuse the failure to adhere to the contractually stipulated timeline.

The respondent vendors' cross-application for payment of the outstanding mortgage balance was granted.

The applicant sought a declaration that a vendor take-back mortgage was paid in full, arguing that a price adjustment clause in the Agreement of Purchase and Sale reduced the outstanding balance to zero.

The agreement stipulated that the price adjustment, based on the ratio of non-developable land, was to be calculated at the end of the fifth year of the mortgage term.

The applicant missed this deadline, arguing it was impossible to determine the non-developable land due to ongoing environmental consultations regarding an endangered minnow species.

The court dismissed the application, holding that time was of the essence and the failure to invoke the price adjustment mechanism at the stipulated time precluded any adjustment.

The appellants appealed part of a Master's order denying their motion to dismiss the respondents' counterclaim in a mortgage enforcement action.

The appellants had obtained summary judgment on the main action but sought dismissal of counterclaim allegations including repayment of funds deducted from the mortgage advance and damages for vandalism, breach of contract, conspiracy, and breach of fiduciary duty.

The court held that the appellants failed to link their evidentiary record to the specific counterclaim allegations and therefore did not meet their burden on the summary judgment motion.

The Master correctly applied the governing legal principles and did not commit a palpable and overriding error or exercise discretion on wrong principles.

The appeal was dismissed and costs were awarded to the respondents.

The appellants appealed a Master’s order refusing to dismiss most aspects of a counterclaim on a summary judgment motion in a mortgage enforcement action.

The counterclaim alleged vandalism, burglary, trespass, breach of contract, conspiracy, and repayment of fees deducted from the mortgage advance.

The appellants argued that the Master misapprehended the evidence and improperly shifted the burden by requiring them to disprove the respondents’ allegations.

The court held that the appellants failed to adduce evidence specifically addressing several pleaded claims or linking their evidence to the alleged causes of action.

The Master applied the correct legal principles and committed no palpable and overriding error.

The plaintiff mortgagee brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendant mortgagor and guarantor for the balance owing on a mortgage and for dismissal of the defendants' counterclaim.

The defendants failed to file responding materials on time or submit to cross-examination.

The Master granted summary judgment for the plaintiff on the main action for $102,353.27, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The Master also dismissed the defendants' counterclaim for breach of fiduciary duty but declined to dismiss the remaining counterclaims for trespass and vandalism, finding the plaintiff's evidence insufficient to refute those specific allegations.

The moving party brought a motion pursuant to s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act to set aside an order of Gans J. The Divisional Court considered the criteria for setting aside a Registrar's order, noting that the overriding consideration is what the justice of the case requires.

The court found that Gans J. was entitled to conclude there was insufficient evidence to relieve the appellant from the operation of the rules.

The motion was dismissed with costs payable from the estate and charged against the moving party's interest.