M. Smith

Sentencing following guilty pleas to multiple drug trafficking offences and participation in a criminal organization.

The offender had no prior criminal record and no substance abuse history but admitted engaging in trafficking heroin, cocaine, and marijuana solely for profit.

The parties jointly proposed an eight‑year penitentiary sentence.

The principal dispute concerned credit for 1,335 days spent on stringent bail conditions prior to sentencing.

The court held that stringent bail conditions can be considered a mitigating factor but the appropriate credit is discretionary; in the circumstances the offender received two years credit, resulting in six years of imprisonment.

The defendants sought leave to appeal an interlocutory injunction restraining them from soliciting the plaintiff's clients and using its confidential information.

The individual defendants had left the plaintiff's employment to join the corporate defendant, allegedly taking client lists and soliciting clients in breach of non-solicitation agreements.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's application of the strong prima facie case test, the finding of irreparable harm to the plaintiff's business viability, and the balance of convenience.

The plaintiffs sought leave to appeal an order dismissing their motion for leave to examine a non-party treating chiropractor for discovery under Rule 31.10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as leave to appeal a substantial indemnity costs award arising from that motion.

The underlying action alleged chiropractic negligence for performing cervical spine adjustments contrary to a chart notation prohibiting such adjustments.

The motions judge had found that the non-party had already provided the relevant information about the timing of the chart notation and that the plaintiffs’ attempt to question why the notation was made was beyond the scope of the pleaded issues.

The court held that the plaintiffs failed to establish good reason to doubt the correctness of the order or that the proposed appeal raised issues of sufficient importance under Rule 62.02(4)(b).

Leave to appeal both the substantive decision and the costs award was denied.

In a civil jury trial, the plaintiff brought a motion seeking to question sworn jurors for potential bias relating to abortion after the jury panel had already been selected and sworn.

The plaintiff relied on survey evidence suggesting Canadians hold strong views on abortion and argued that questioning jurors was necessary to identify potential prejudice.

The court held that civil juries are presumed capable of setting aside personal views through the trial process and judicial instructions, and that there was insufficient evidence of widespread bias that would justify such questioning.

The court emphasized the discretionary nature of challenges for cause in civil proceedings and warned that permitting such questioning could create delays and open the floodgates to inquiries on many personal characteristics.

The motion was dismissed.

The accused was charged with impaired operation and "over 80" following a traffic stop.

The accused challenged the lawfulness of the approved screening device (ASD) demand and breath sample demand on Charter grounds, alleging violations of sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b).

The court found that while there was a breach of section 10(a) (failure to inform promptly of reasons for detention), the evidence was admissible under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The court found the accused guilty of "over 80" and conditionally stayed the impaired driving charge.

The applicants brought a motion for a stay of proceedings pursuant to s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging that their rights to trial within a reasonable time had been violated by delay exceeding 20 months between accusation and trial.

The applicants argued that Crown delay of approximately 7 months and institutional delay of approximately 8.5 months, combined with inherent and actual prejudice, rendered a fair trial impossible.

The Crown countered that much of the delay was neutral, resulting from mutual agreement of all counsel to delay trial pending exhaustive negotiations on resolution.

The court found that the bulk of the delay resulted from a mutual understanding among all counsel to postpone setting an early trial date to permit further investigation and reconsideration of reasonable prospect of conviction, particularly regarding identification evidence.

The court concluded that s. 11(b) was not breached, as the delay fell within Morin guidelines for a serious multi-accused prosecution, and any actual prejudice was attributable to the fact of the charges rather than the delay itself.

The appellants appealed a Deputy Judge's decision finding them liable for the escape and subsequent death of the respondents' dog while in their care.

The Divisional Court found that while the Deputy Judge correctly identified the standard of care as that of a simple bailee, he erred by applying a higher standard in his specific findings.

The court held that the appellant veterinarian took adequate precautions by using two leashes, and the dog's unprecedented escape was not reasonably foreseeable.

The appeal was allowed and the action dismissed.

The appellant, a journalist, sought access to audio and video tapes that had been admitted as exhibits in a criminal trial resulting in a murder conviction.

The conviction was later overturned on appeal because the tapes were found to have been obtained in violation of the accused's Charter rights and were ruled inadmissible.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the privacy interests of the acquitted person outweighed the public right of access to exhibits judicially determined to be inadmissible against him.