Anna Maria Brylewski

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with having a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg/100 ml.

The trial proceeded as a blended voir dire addressing Charter violations.

The court found three Charter breaches: (1) the approved screening device demand was not made forthwith, violating sections 8, 9, and 10(b); (2) the accused was denied his right to counsel of choice when police discouraged him from contacting his preferred legal services provider; and (3) the accused was arbitrarily detained for approximately 7.5 hours after providing breath samples without proper assessment under section 498 of the Criminal Code.

The breath samples were excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The over 80 charge was dismissed due to exclusion of evidence.

On the impaired driving charge, the court found the Crown failed to prove impairment beyond a reasonable doubt, as the connection between the vehicle observed at the accident scene and the accused's vehicle could not be established with certainty, and the physical observations of impairment were equivocal.

The accused was acquitted on both counts.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused was found asleep in the passenger seat of a vehicle in a ditch.

The Crown sought to rely on breath test results obtained more than two hours after the alleged offence, thereby losing the statutory presumption of identity.

The Crown attempted to rely on expert opinion evidence to extrapolate the accused's blood alcohol concentration at the time of the alleged offence.

The court found that the Crown failed to establish the factual assumptions underlying the expert opinion and rejected the Crown's invitation to perform retrograde extrapolation calculations.

The charge was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on an 'over 80' charge.

The trial judge had excluded breath certificate evidence after finding Charter breaches under ss. 8 and 9, based on a misapprehension of evidence regarding the officer's grounds for a breath demand and an incorrect test for the reliability of the Approved Screening Device (ASD).

The appeal court found the trial judge misapprehended evidence by concluding the ASD 'fail' was the *only* ground for the Intoxilyzer demand, and erred in requiring proof of ASD calibration.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The defendant was charged with care and control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with care and control with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown's case relied on observations of impairment by the arresting officer and breath analysis results.

The court found that the police failed to conduct the breath tests as soon as practicable, contrary to statutory requirements, thereby eliminating the presumption of identity for the blood alcohol readings.

Additionally, the court found insufficient evidence of impairment based on the totality of circumstances, including video evidence contradicting the officer's testimony regarding the defendant's physical coordination.

Both charges were dismissed.

The defendant was charged with driving with more than 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood and impaired driving.

The Crown conceded that the impaired driving charge could not be supported and it was dismissed.

The court considered three issues: whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to demand an approved screening device (ASD) sample; whether the ASD demand was made "forthwith"; and whether the Intoxilyzer samples were taken "as soon as reasonably practicable." The court found that while reasonable suspicion existed based on the odour of alcohol on the defendant's breath, the ASD demand was not made forthwith—there was at least a nine-minute delay between formation of suspicion and the demand.

Additionally, the Intoxilyzer tests were not taken as soon as practicable, as the officer believed he had three hours to conduct the tests rather than understanding the requirement for prompt administration.

The court excluded the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter and acquitted the defendant on the remaining charge.

Two accused persons were jointly charged with dangerous driving while racing contrary to section 249.4(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged they were operating motor vehicles in a race on Forrest Lea Road.

The trial judge found that while both accused were driving at excessive speeds on an unfamiliar rural road without paying attention to traffic signs, they were not engaged in racing as contemplated by the statute.

The judge found the accused were driving one behind the other, not side by side in competitive fashion.

The judge convicted both accused of the lesser included offence of dangerous driving contrary to section 249(1) of the Criminal Code.

The accused was charged with refusing to comply with a demand for a breath sample into an approved screening device contrary to section 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The accused brought a Charter application claiming a violation of section 9 rights, arguing the officer lacked reasonable suspicion that he had consumed alcohol.

The matter proceeded as a blended Charter voir dire and trial.

The court found that the officer had reasonable suspicion based on the odour of alcohol from the vehicle, an unsealed bottle of brandy, and the odour of alcohol on the accused's breath when isolated from the vehicle.

The accused was given multiple opportunities to comply with the demand and refused several times despite clear explanations of the consequences.

The accused's subsequent request to provide a sample after arrest was found to be too late.

The court found the accused guilty of refusing to provide a breath sample.