Court File and Parties

Court File No.: 22-11402129 Date: 2025-09-18 Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Between: His Majesty the King – and – Khalid Al-Hajj, Accused

Counsel:

• Anya Kortenaar, for the Crown
• Neil Weinstein, for Mr. Al-Hajj

Heard: August 22 and September 5, 2025; oral decision given September 17, 2025

Reasons for Sentence

SOMJI J.

Introduction

[1] Khalid Al-Hajj has pled guilty to one count of obtaining a material benefit from the sale of sexual services contrary to s. 286.2 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. Mr. Al-Hajj was in a romantic relationship with the complainant S.L. For a portion of that relationship, particularly between April 8 to August 16, 2022, S.L. sold sexual services which Mr. Al-Hajj facilitated and financially benefitted from.

[2] The issue to be decided is what is a fair and reasonable sentence. All references to statutory provisions are to the Criminal Code, unless otherwise stated.

Facts

[3] This matter commenced as a trial before me, but after one day of testimony, the complainant failed to return to court. The Crown and Defence resolved the matter by way of a guilty plea. All previous admissions and evidence heard is disregarded. The only facts for consideration on sentence are those set out in an Agreed Statement of Facts ("ASF") filed before the court on May 1, 2025, which are as follows:

1. Khalid Al-Hajj and S.L. met in early April 2022 and began a romantic relationship. S.L. was in her late 30s and Mr. Al-Hajj in his late 20s.

2. From April 8 to August 16, 2022, S.L. sold sexual services nearly every day, mostly in Ottawa but also in Kingston and Toronto. Mr. Al-Hajj participated in the sale of her sexual services in this timeframe in the following ways:

a. Mr. Al-Hajj and S.L. shared a "work phone". That was the phone number used in the sexual advertisements on Leolist.cc (a website for the sale of sexual services) for clients to contact. On most occasions, Mr. Al-Hajj was the one operating the phone.

b. Mr. Al-Hajj posted S.L.'s sexual advertisements on Leolist.cc. He paid by cryptocurrency in order to post the ads.

c. Mr. Al-Hajj reserved several hotel rooms in order for S.L. to perform sexual services, namely: Sandman Hotel Ottawa, Marriott Airport Hotel Toronto, Delta Kingston, and Royal York Toronto. The hotels were booked in Mr. Al-Hajj's own name and paid using his credit card. Mr. Al-Hajj drove S.L. to outcalls and to the hotels.

d. Over text message on the work phone, Mr. Al-Hajj would make arrangements with clients, determine the rate, length, and timing of sexual services. He would then communicate this information to S.L., and she would perform the sexual services. He would set the schedule, and S.L. would inquire when the next client would be and when the next break would be.

e. Mr. Al-Hajj received a material benefit from the sale of S.L.'s sexual services. In the timeframe of April to August 2022, he received:

i. E-transfers from johns totaling $2,130;

ii. Cash in the bank account totaling $24,985; and

iii. He paid for many expenses including cryptocurrency and hotel bills ($9,800) and on one occasion he paid $1600 for S.L.'s rent.

3. S.L. called the police on April 17, 2022, following a breakdown of their relationship. Mr. Al-Hajj was arrested on August 19, 2022.

[4] Sentencing was adjourned for the purpose of obtaining a pre-sentence report ("PSR").

Analysis

A. Position of the Parties

[5] The Crown seeks a jail sentence of two years jail less eight days (pre-sentence custody), a three-year probation order, and various ancillary orders. The Crown agrees that the appropriate sentence is a non-penitentiary jail term just short of two years but argues that given the scope of the accused's conduct in facilitating the complainant's sex work, a conditional sentence does not sufficiently meet the sentencing principles of denunciation and deterrence and therefore, is not a fit and proper sentence in these circumstances.

[6] Defence does not dispute that a reformatory jail sentence is appropriate but argues that the statutory preconditions and jurisprudence support the availability of a conditional sentence for this type of offence. Defence argues that the circumstances of this offence and this offender warrants the imposition of a conditional sentence.

B. General Sentencing Principles

[7] Section 718 sets out the fundamental purpose and objectives of sentencing:

The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful, and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives:

(a) to denounce unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or to the community that is caused by unlawful conduct;

(b) to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences;

(c) to separate offenders from society, where necessary;

(d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders;

(e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and

(f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims or to the community.

[8] As discussed below, denunciation and deterrence are the primary sentencing considerations for offences committed pursuant to ss. 286.2 and 286.3, sometimes referred to as sexual commodification offences: R. v. Bedi, 2024 ONSC 5320, at para. 69; R. v. Joseph, 2020 ONCA 733, 153 O.R. (3d) 145, at para. 134; R. v. Morgan, 2018 ONSC 2007, at para. 17, aff'd 2019 ONCA 468.

[9] Section 718.2(a) stipulates that a sentencing judge must increase or reduce the sentence to account for any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender and lists factors that are deemed to be aggravating.

[10] Sections 718.2(b)-(e) requires a sentencing judge to consider the following additional principles when imposing a sentence:

(b) a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances;

(c) where consecutive sentences are imposed, the combined sentence should not be unduly long or harsh;

(d) an offender should not be deprived of liberty, if less restrictive sanctions may be appropriate in the circumstances; and

(e) all available sanctions, other than imprisonment, that are reasonable in the circumstances and consistent with the harm done to victims or to the community should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders.

[11] Finally, in imposing a sentence, I must consider the proportionality principle ensuring that the sentence reflects the gravity of the offence and the responsibility of the offender: s. 718.1. Proportionality also has a restraining function and serves to guarantee that a sentence is individualized, just and appropriate: R. v. Bissonnette, 2022 SCC 23, [2022] 1 S.C.R. 597, at para. 51.

C. Circumstances of the Offence

[12] Mr. Al-Hajj admits that he materially benefitted from the complainant's sex work over a four-month period. There are e-transfers and funds in his bank account that establish his earnings from the complainant's sex work. The exact amount of the earnings made, how they were shared, or what profit he made is not delineated within the ASF. Nonetheless, the quantum is determinative of the offence because, as noted in R. v. Kloubakov, 2025 SCC 25, exploitation results from the mere fact of a person profiting from the sale of another human being's sexual activity and not by the quantum of profit: at para. 92.

[13] There are various aggravating factors. First, Mr. Al-Hajj was in an intimate relationship with S.L. at the time of the offence: s. 718.2(a)(ii).

[14] Second, s. 718.201 recognizes the increased vulnerability of female persons as victims of intimate partner violence. While there is no evidence that Mr. Al-Hajj specifically engaged in any coercion, threats, or violence against the complainant, he did facilitate S.L.'s participation in sex work which it is recognized places sex workers, disproportionately women and girls, at risk of violence and abuse: Kloubakov, at paras. 75 and 113.

[15] Third, Mr. Al-Hajj played an active role in facilitating the complainant's sex work. He operated the "work phone", put out advertisements, reserved rooms in various cities, collected payments, and transported S.L. to various hotels and cities to perform sexual services. The sexual services were provided on an almost daily basis for a four-month period. As per the s. 725 jurisprudence discussed below, facts related to the accused's conduct in facilitating the sex work over and above earning a material benefit can be considered even if the accused is found guilty of one offence. For example, in R. v. Musara, 2023 ONSC 97, Nakatsura J. found that while the accused was acquitted of various trafficking-related charges, the mere fact of the acquittals did not mean His Honour could not consider, in sentencing the accused, any evidence of exploitation by the accused found on the facts. In this case, I have considered the accused's active involvement in facilitating the complainant's sex work as an aggravating factor notwithstanding that he only pled guilty to the material benefit offence.

D. Circumstances of the Offender

[16] Mr. Al-Hajj is 31 years of age. He was born and raised in Ottawa but relocated to Abu Dhabi from 2000 to 2008 due to his father's employment. His father is from Lebanon and his mother is from Syria. He grew up in a stable and supportive family structure and continues to maintain the support of his parents with whom he presently resides. Mr. Al-Hajj also has the support of his new partner who was previously a friend and with whom he has been in an intimate relationship for over a year.

[17] Mr. Al-Hajj graduated from high school and later completed a program in Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning ("HVAC") at a local college. He worked in the HVAC field for various property management companies. He later launched his own cleaning business, Pride Productions, as well as a general contracting business, Pride Contracting, with another business partner. The PSR author reports that Mr. Al-Hajj works fulltime and presents as a hardworking individual motivated to succeed. The PSR author contacted Mr. Al-Hajj's business partner, Mr. Bilukidi, who reported that he had no concerns about the subject's work ethic or behavior. Mr. Bilukidi chose to go into business with Mr. Al-Hajj about a year ago after hiring him as a handyman and being impressed by his responsiveness and quality of work. Mr. Bilukidi also filed a letter of support. In addition, I reviewed two letters from property managers who similarly attested to Mr. Al-Hajj's strong work ethic and responsible work performance.

[18] Mr. Al-Hajj comes before the court with a prior criminal record with a conviction for possession of stolen property (motor vehicle) and fraud over $5000 which in this case was the false registration of same motor vehicle. Mr. Al-Hajj received a conditional sentence ("CSO") of 120 days for the possession offence and 60 days for the false registration offence. It must be noted, however, that while Mr. Al-Hajj committed these two offences in March of 2022, he was not charged until September 19, 2022. At that time, he had already been charged for the offence of receiving a material benefit and was on strict bail conditions of house arrest with an exception to allow him to work. Mr. Al-Hajj pled guilty to the possession and fraud offence and served his CSO while on bail for the current offence. In this respect, I agree with counsel that while Mr. Al-Hajj is not strictly a "first offender", it is not a situation where Mr. Al-Hajj had been convicted of criminal offences, had the opportunity to benefit from a rehabilitative sentence, and then went on to engage in further criminal activity.

[19] As per the PSR, Mr. Al-Hajj reports that he was working for an underground taxi company in 2022 when he first met the complainant. The complainant, S.L., was ten years older than him. They later started dating and after about four months, he became involved in the offence before the court. He reports the complainant had substance abuse issues and this was a factor in the reason their relationship ended. Mr. Al-Hajj reports, and the author confirmed, that he does not have any substance abuse issues.

[20] Mr. Al-Hajj does not deny that he materially benefitted from his relationship with S.L. On/around the time he became involved in the offence before the court, he had been associating with individuals he described as bad influences for over a two-year period. It was during this period that he committed both this and the above-noted offences. Mr. Al-Hajj reports, and the evidence suggests, that he has since changed his life around and disassociated with those negative peer influences. This was also corroborated by Mr. Al-Hajj's conditional sentence supervisor who attributed Mr. Al-Hajj's involvement in the criminal justice system to poor peer associations and reported to the PSR author that by the end of Mr. Al-Hajj's supervision, he had turned his life around and was suitable for future community supervision.

[21] Mr. Al-Hajj has demonstrated that he is able to abide by court-ordered conditions. In addition to complying with his conditional sentence order for the possession offence, he was also on strict bail conditions for over two and a half years and did not incur any breaches. In May 2025 following his guilty plea, his bail conditions were modified to lift the house arrest and there have been no breaches.

[22] In her report, the PSR author suggests that Mr. Al-Hajj has not taken responsibility for the offence in question and was engaged in victim blaming. Consequently, the PSR author found that he was not remorseful for his conduct. However, the PSR author does not appear to have been aware that following S.L.'s failure to attend court to complete her testimony at trial involving a wider array of human trafficking offences, Mr. Al-Hajj pled guilty to one count of receiving a material benefit pursuant to s. 286.2. Both Defence and Crown agree that the PSR author did not review the ASF and was relying on the police synopsis which refers to the additional trafficking offences. Therefore, Mr. Al-Hajj would have been entitled to take the position with the PSR author, as he did at trial, that he did not engage in some of the conduct suggested by S.L., including human trafficking. Furthermore, as his counsel points out, Mr. Al-Hajj reviewed the ASF prior to entering his plea and has not resiled from the facts therein, including those that relate to his involvement in facilitating the sale of the sexual services. Consequently, I do not put any weight on the PSR's author's suggestion that Mr. Al-Hajj was victim blaming or lacking in remorse.

[23] The PSR author was unable to contact the victim and did not make any effort to reach out to the investigator to obtain S.L.'s most recent contact information. S.L. has also not filed a victim impact statement in this case.

[24] Finally, Mr. Al-Hajj apologized in court to the complainant, society, and the court for his conduct. I found his expression of remorse to be genuine.

E. Purpose of and Sentencing Range for Sexual Commodification Offences

[25] Following the Supreme Court of Canada's invalidation of earlier trafficking legislation in Canada (A.G.) v. Bedford, 2013 SCC 72, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 1101, Parliament enacted the Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act, S.C. 2014, c. 25 ("PCEPA"). PCEPA represents a paradigm shift in the regulation of sex work by recognizing that the sale of sexual services is inherently exploitative and by developing a regulatory scheme which seeks to reduce and ultimately eliminate the demand for such services: Kloubakov, at paras. 21-22. Under the PCEPA, prostitution is no longer a public nuisance, but an inherently exploitative activity which disproportionately and negatively impacts women and girls: Kloubakov, at paras. 21, 71.

[26] As the Supreme Court explained in Kloubakov, at para. 68, the purpose of the PCEPA is (1) to reduce the demand for sex work; and (2) to protect sex workers from the risks of violence, abuse, and exploitation associated with the sex work industry. There are two aspects to the second purpose: (a) to protect sex workers from third parties who commercialize the sale of sexual services; and (b) to allow sex workers to protect themselves from the dangers posed by purchasers of sexual services.

[27] For the first time in Canadian law, it is a crime to purchase sexual services: Kloubakov, at para. 25. In addition, the PCEPA created four new offences, including the material benefit offence under s. 286.2, with a view to penalize those who induce, facilitate, and materially benefit from the sale of sexual services while providing exceptions that allow sex workers to legitimately hire persons such as drivers, managers, and bodyguards to protect themselves: paras. 23, 78, 83, and 103. The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the constitutionality of ss. 286.2 (material benefit) and 286.3 (procurement) in Kloubakov.

[28] Section 286.2(1) is a hybrid offence with a maximum punishment of ten years imprisonment when prosecuted by indictment, and no mandatory minimum sentence.

[29] Both parties have filed caselaw supporting their respective positions which I have considered. Below, I have cited some comparable cases keeping in mind that no single case is alike, and that sentencing is ultimately an individualized process that involves consideration and weighing of multiple factors.

[30] In Joseph, the Court of Appeal for Ontario declined to set a range of sentence but noted that the starting point for sexual commodification offences was 12 months jail with the possibility of lower sentences being imposed in exceptional circumstances: see also R. v. Robitaille, 2017 ONCJ 768.

[31] In Joseph, the accused was found guilty after trial of making and possessing child pornography, advertising, procuring and receiving a material benefit from sexual services. Unlike in this case, the material benefit offence was pursuant to s. 286.2(3) because all three victims were under 18, an aggravating factor. The accused was a youthful offender with no criminal record. His pimping occurred over just a few weeks. The Court of Appeal substituted the trial judge's sentence of a suspended sentence with one year probation, with a 15-month global sentence for all five offences. The Court of Appeal did not address whether the sentence could be served within the community.

[32] In R. v. Williams, 2023 ONSC 4648, Trimble J. noted the range of sentence for a first-time offender with convictions for both harbouring and receiving material benefit is between one and three years: at para. 73. In Williams, the accused was a first offender convicted following a jury trial of harbouring and receiving a material benefit from the sexual services of S.B. The accused encouraged and was involved in facilitating the sexual services over a period of four to five years. He booked hotel rooms, arranged trips to other cities, and collected money from the clients. There was no estimate for cash he made or shared, but he only paid the complainant from time to time and for what she needed. He did not engage in any threats or violence against the complainant. At the time of the offences, he was in a romantic relationship with the complainant.

[33] Trimble J. considered the accused's positive pre-sentence support, his racial challenges as a black person, and that he was on bail for seven years without incident. Defence requested a conditional sentence of 18 months while the Crown requested a sentence of three years jail. Upon weighing the conflicting considerations in favour of and against a conditional sentence, His Honour found that "Mr. Williams' case is one of those circumstances where the need for denunciation and deterrence is so pressing that incarceration is the only suitable way with which to express society's condemnation of Mr. Williams' conduct and to deter such conduct by others": at para. 45. Trimble J. found a sentence of 28 months for harbouring and 20 months for receiving a material benefit served concurrently was a fit and appropriate sentence: at para. 75.

[34] In R. v. Jacquet and Zamor-Louis (December 15, 2023), Ottawa, 0411-998-22-30006-02/0411-998-22-30006-04 (Ont. C.J.), a decision of the Ontario Court of Justice, Legault J. recognized the range of sentence for procuring pursuant to s. 286.3 in a case involving no physical violence, threats or coercion, to be between 15 months to three years jail. Legault J. reviewed the relevant factors for sentencing such as the age of the victims; the degree of control imposed on the victims; moneys received, and profits made; the sophistication and size of the operation; the duration of the offences; the degree of violence; the use of inducements; and the impact of the offences on the victims. Legault J. sentenced Mr. Jacquet, a first-time offender, on convictions for receiving a material benefit, procuring, and advertising to two years jail with respect to one victim and to two years jail consecutive for a second victim over which the duration of the offence was longer and therefore the financial benefit greater: pp. 15-16.

[35] In R. v. Bedard-Morin, 2022 ONCA 844, the offender pled guilty to one count of receiving a material benefit from the sale of sexual services from three victims over several months. The court recognized that sex work is at its core exploitative, but noted there was no violence or coercion. The accused was at the time of the offence subject to a no contact order with one of the victims and had a significant criminal record. The Ontario Court of Appeal endorsed a sentence of 22 months jail, less pre-sentence custody.

[36] In Morgan, the accused was convicted of a single count of receiving a material benefit from the sale of sexual services after trial. The complainant was 18 and had been working as a prostitute. She met the accused at a strip club, and they entered into an intimate relationship. During the relationship, the accused controlled the victim's earnings which amounted to $5,000/week. There was evidence that the accused was controlling and aggressive. The accused had no criminal record. The trial judge sentenced him to 18 months incarceration followed by two years of probation. The trial judge rejected the request for a conditional sentence stating that meaningful jail sentences are necessary to deter others from what can be a very lucrative crime but also noted that there was little evidence that the accused, unlike in the case before me, had engaged in any rehabilitation. At para. 21, Baltman J. stated:

A message needs to be sent that this kind of abuse will result in a meaningful jail sentence, otherwise potential offenders will see jail time as a small price to pay for a very lucrative crime. In this case, it is particularly troubling that the offender, a healthy, able bodied man with a high school education, has done virtually nothing in the last decade to establish continual and legitimate employment or contribute meaningfully to society. Any "employment" he has had has been minimal and sporadic. He appears content to let his parents (or a prostitute) support him.

[37] In R. v. Green (May 24, 2022), Brampton, CR-20-378 (Ont. S.C.), Durno J. rejected the Defence request for a two-year-less-a-day conditional sentence for offences contrary to ss. 286.3 and 286.2. The victim was 16 or 17 when she met the accused who was 35 at the time. They entered into an intimate relationship. She became an exotic dancer and later the accused facilitated and profited from her sex work. The offences had a significant emotional and physical impact on the victim, and when she finally chose to leave him, she was effectively homeless. He was a first-time offender who pled guilty, was remorseful, conducted prosocial and charitable work, and filed 60 character and supporting references. Notwithstanding these mitigating factors, Durno J. concluded that a conditional sentence would not reflect the gravity of the offence and the offender's degree of responsibility. His Honour cited the Supreme Court of Canada decision in R. v. Proulx, 2000 SCC 5, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61, wherein the Supreme Court stated that in some cases the need for denunciation and deterrence was so pressing that incarceration was the only way to express society's condemnation: Green, at p. 32.

[38] In R. v. N.S., 2023 ONSC 5481, Sutherland J. also rejected a conditional sentence in a case involving an 18-year-old victim addicted to cocaine and a 36-year-old offender convicted of three sexual commodification offences. The sentencing judge found that taking into consideration the age difference of the parties, the manipulations, and the use of cocaine, a period of straight incarceration was warranted and imposed a sentence of 22 months: at paras. 55-56.

[39] In R. v. Houmphavong (September 15, 2022), Peterborough, 3311-998-21-33101574-02/3311-998-22-33101454-02 (Ont. C.J.), Breen J. rejected a conditional sentence for a 43-year-old female offender who pled guilty and had no criminal record, instead imposing a two-year jail sentence. Ms. Houmphavong ran a commercial escort business from her home where she employed six Chinese immigrants or visitors to Canada. Some victims had no status in Canada. While all claimed they worked voluntarily, without threat or coercion, the sentencing judge recognized the inherently exploitative nature of sex work. The sentencing judge described Ms. Houmphavong's enterprise as a large-scale prostitution operation that generated significant profit of which she was the principal beneficiary. The police recovered $100,000 upon her arrest and seized 55 telephones with thousands of sex work related messages. The operation took place in multiple cities. In imposing the sentence, Breen J. stated "it is common ground that denunciation and general deterrence are at the forefront of the sentencing exercise presented by this case. These objectives generally demand a degree of punishment that can only be achieved through imprisonment": at p. 6.

[40] There are, however, cases where the courts have imposed conditional sentences for sexual commodification offences.

[41] In R. v. Beeransingh, 2022 ONSC 5905, the accused was a youthful first offender who became involved in pimping as a quick way to make money. He made a large financial profit from the sex work of three women over a period of 10 months. He was actively involved in facilitating the complainants' sex work and encouraging the complainants to do more work so they would earn more money. Relying on the Court of Appeal's decision in Joseph as a benchmark, Dawe J., as he then was, found that a fit and appropriate sentence was a sentence in the range of 12 to 15 months: at para. 87. Dawe J. then went on to find that a conditional sentence would neither endanger the safety of the community nor be inconsistent with the principles of sentencing in ss. 718 to 718.2, including the need to emphasize deterrence and denunciation in sentencing for sexual commodification offences. His Honour imposed a conditional sentence of two years less one day: at paras. 83-99.

[42] In arriving at his decision, Dawe J. noted that in reforming the regulatory regime governing sex work under the PCEPA, Parliament did not preclude the availability of conditional sentences for sexual commodification offences, and consequently, conditional sentences remain available for these offences: Beeransingh, at paras. 24, 80-82, and 93-94. Dawe J. also found that Parliament's objective in denouncing and discouraging prostitution does not conflict with the existence of conditional sentences because, as per the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Proulx, a conditional sentence is a punitive sanction capable of achieving the objectives of denunciation and deterrence: Proulx, at paras. 22, 102, and 107; see also Musara, at para. 29.

[43] In Musara, a 28-year-old accused was found guilty after trial of receiving a material benefit from the sex work of an 18-year-old complainant over a period of two to four months. The accused was not the complainant's pimp. Rather, the accused sold drugs to the complainant and knew that she was both addicted and paid for the drugs from sexual service earnings. The accused did not engage in any control, direction, or influence over her movements or threaten or commit violence against her and was not aware of her exploitation by another pimp. On the contrary, he offered the complainant a safe place to stay in one instance.

[44] Nakatsuru J. found that while the accused had a prior conviction for simple possession resulting in the payment of a fine, he was essentially a first offender. In addition, the accused had a positive PSR. Since the offence, the accused obtained a culinary degree, secured employment in his field and had started a new relationship and family. The accused was well supported by his family and community and had good prospects of rehabilitation. In exercising the principle of restraint, Nakatsuru J. found a penitentiary sentence was not necessary to meet the objectives of sentencing including denunciation and deterrence. His Honour found that a 17-month conditional sentence was fit and appropriate. In ordering a conditional sentence, Nakatsura J. considered the unique facts of the case, the accused's rehabilitation and change in lifestyle, and the over-incarceration of black offenders in the criminal justice system.

[45] In R. v. Hawke, 2024 ONSC 7124, the sentencing judge also imposed a conditional sentence for a female offender who pled guilty to one count of obtaining a material benefit from the sale of sexual services. Ms. Hawke was the mother of a pimp. She was involved in her son's human trafficking activities from September 2018 to March 2020. During that 18-month period, she facilitated the transfer of tens of thousands of dollars into her banking account knowing the funds were from the sale of sexual services. She also booked hotel rooms and transported multiple victims all with a view to shielding her son's involvement in sex trafficking from notice. While Ms. Hawke knew the victims were engaging in the sale of sexual services, she claimed she believed they were voluntarily choosing to do so and did not view her or her son's role in facilitating sex work as illegal. The sentencing judge found her explanation to be patently absurd and rejected it. Carnegie J. concluded that Ms. Hawke's conduct was on the higher end of the seriousness scale for this form of offending but on the moderate end of the moral culpability scale. Upon weighing the factors for and against a conditional sentence, he found that a conditional sentence of two years less one day did not pose a risk to public safety, met the sentencing objectives of deterrence and denunciation, and also meaningfully addressed the sentencing principle of restraint.

[46] Finally, in R. v. D.A.L., 2025 ONSC 134, Vermette J. imposed a conditional sentence on a first offender, Mr. L, who was found guilty by a jury after trial of procuring but acquitted of 11 human trafficking related charges. The victim and accused were 21 and 22 when they met and engaged in casual non-exclusive dating. During this period, the victim met a pimp named Mr. H who trafficked her and sold her cocaine. Mr. H. later pled guilty to human trafficking. The jury accepted Mr. L had some role in the arrangement and found him guilty of procuring the victim to offer sexual services for consideration. The sentencing judge recognized S's vulnerability by virtue of her age and addiction but noted that the impact of the offences on the victim were more likely the direct result of Mr. H's pimping rather than Mr. L's conduct. Vermette J. found the accused was a young black man and first-time offender who had strong rehabilitative prospects and support from his partner, employer, family and friends. In these circumstances, Her Honour found that a conditional sentence of 18 months with house arrest provided a sufficient and proportionate amount of denunciation and deterrence and was consistent with the principles of restraint and rehabilitation: at paras. 149-150.

[47] The above-noted jurisprudence suggests the following non-exhaustive list of factors are relevant for determination of sentence for sexual commodification offences:

i. the number of victims;

ii. the age of the victims, recognizing the vulnerability of young or underage women;

iii. the nature of the accused's relationship with the victim, including whether it was an intimate partner relationship or a relationship of trust;

iv. the degree of control exercised by the accused over the victim and/or the use of inducements (drugs or alcohol);

v. the degree of violence, threats, or coercion, if any, keeping in mind that even in the absence of overt violence, sex work is inherently exploitative;

vi. in addition to receiving a material benefit, the accused's conduct in facilitating the sex work such as recruiting, advertising, making bookings, transporting, etc. even where there may be a plea to only a single sexual commodification offence;

vii. the impact of the offence(s) and harm to the victim(s);

viii. the accused's role in the enterprise and level of moral responsibility, particularly in circumstances where there may be several people facilitating and profiting from the victim(s) sex work;

ix. the scope, sophistication, and duration of the financial enterprise and the amounts of moneys received;

x. the age and maturity of the offender;

xi. whether the offender is first offender or a person with a prior criminal record;

xii. whether the conviction(s) arise following a guilty plea or after trial; and

xiii. the rehabilitative efforts of the accused since the offence and charges.

[48] In addition, the jurisprudence is clear that the paramount objectives of denunciation and deterrence can be met through a conditional sentence, and conditional sentences remain available for sexual commodification offences.

[49] Below, I consider the application of these factors in the present case.

Conclusion

[50] Mr. Al-Hajj has pled guilty to a single count of s. 286.2. The offence involved one adult victim, ten years his senior and with whom he was in an intimate relationship. While the duration of his involvement was limited to four months, S.L. was engaged in providing sexual services almost daily for that period. Mr. Al-Hajj did not merely financially benefit but played an active role in facilitating the sale of S.L.'s sexual services through advertising, driving, and collecting revenues. There is no evidence of any direct violence, threats, or coercion. While Mr. Al-Hajj suggests in the PSR that the complainant had alcohol-abuse issues, there is no evidence that he exploited her addiction.

[51] Mr. Al-Hajj was essentially a first offender at the time of the offence and has taken responsibility by way of a guilty plea. Notwithstanding that I do not have a victim impact statement from S.L., I have considered that sex work is inherently exploitative, and sexual commodification offences committed by persons who seek to profit from the sex work of others warrants, as per Joseph, a jail sentence starting at 12 months. In these circumstances, and upon consideration of the above-noted jurisprudence, I find that an appropriate sentence which accords with sentencing objectives in this case is a sentence in the range of 18 to 24 months jail.

[52] I must next consider whether that jail sentence can be served in the community. In this regard, I must consider the factors in s. 742.1(a) and that is (1) whether service of the sentence in the community would endanger the safety of the community; and (2) whether making a conditional sentence order would be consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing set out in ss. 718 to 718.2: Beeransingh, at para. 83; Hawke, at para. 48.

[53] In R. v. Pike, 2024 ONCA 608, 173 O.R. (3d) 241, the Ontario Court of Appeal reiterated this two-part approach in determining the appropriateness of a conditional sentence: at para. 179. Reconciling the various cases on when a conditional sentence might be available, the Court of Appeal noted that the imposition of a conditional sentence is not limited to exceptional circumstances, but rather that the personal circumstances and mitigating factors are to be sufficiently compelling to make a conditional sentence proportionate. The Court of Appeal went on to state that there is no closed list of such circumstances and factors, but multiple seemingly non-exceptional factors taken together, such as being a young first offender with family support who poses little risk and takes responsibility for one's actions can collectively render a conditional sentence proportionate: at para. 182.

[54] I find that it would not endanger the community for Mr. Al-Hajj to serve his sentence in the community. As noted by the PSR author, Mr. Al-Hajj has turned his life around. He has disassociated with negative peer influences, has become gainfully employed and motivated to succeed in his two businesses, and is well supported by his family and new partner. Collateral sources contacted by the PSR author indicate that substance abuse is not a risk factor. Furthermore, he has abided by court-ordered conditions for over two years without incident. In these circumstances, I find he is at low risk to re-offend and consequently, a conditional sentence would not endanger the community.

[55] I also find that a conditional sentence would not be inconsistent with sentencing objectives, including deterrence and denunciation that are the paramount principles in sentencing for trafficking related offences. In this regard, I have considered the duration and circumstances of the offence, the scope of Mr. Al-Hajj's involvement, that it was limited to one victim, and that it did not involve any violence, threats, or coercion. Having considered the jurisprudence on conditional sentences for sexual commodification offences, I do not find that the circumstances of this case and this offender are such that the need for denunciation and deterrence is so pressing that incarceration is the only way to express society's condemnation.

[56] Furthermore, as stated in Proulx, a conditional sentence is generally better suited to achieving the objectives of rehabilitation, reparation, and the promotion of a sense of responsibility for a youthful first offender: Proulx, at para. 109; Beeransingh, at para. 90. While Mr. Al-Hajj is not "youthful" per se, he was in his 20s at the time of this offence and is effectively a first offender. I also find that a conditional sentence accords with the principle of restraint in circumstances such as these where a first offender such as Mr. Al-Hajj has taken significant steps towards his own rehabilitation.

[57] Where a conditional sentence is imposed, the court may increase the length of sentence to what might have been a straight jail term. Mr. Al-Hajj will therefore be ordered to serve his sentence in the community as a conditional sentence for a period of two years less one day. I find that this sentence properly denounces his conduct while allowing him the advantage of remaining within the community and continuing in his rehabilitative efforts. The conditional sentence will be followed by a probation order of 18 months which will allow for continued monitoring of the accused, but with less stringent conditions.

[58] Mr. Al-Hajj's conditional sentence of two years less one day will include the following conditions:

1. Report as directed to Probation Services.

2. Attend for any assessment treatment or counselling as directed by his conditional sentence supervisor.

3. Reside at a residence approved by the conditional sentence supervisor and not change this residence without the prior approval of his supervisor.

4. House arrest: For the first 12 months, Mr. Al-Hajj shall always remain in his residence except:

   a. for medical emergencies for himself or his partner or immediate family member;

   b. for going directly to and from or being at employment, court attendances, meetings with his CS supervisor or probation officer, religious services, legal or medical or dental appointments, and performing community service hours. Mr. Al-Hajj will confirm his schedule in advance with his supervisor setting out the times for these activities;

   c. with the prior written approval of his supervisor, which he must carry with him during these times;

   d. for three hours on one occasion per week, on a date approved of by his supervisor, for acquiring the necessities of life; and

   e. for carrying out any legal obligations regarding compliance with this Order.

5. During his home confinement, Mr. Al-Hajj must present himself at his doorway upon the request of his conditional sentence supervisor or a peace officer, for the purpose of verifying his compliance with his home confinement condition.

6. Mr. Al-Hajj is not to buy, possess or consume any alcohol or drug or substance prohibited by the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19, unless with a valid medical prescription.

7. Mr. Al-Hajj shall attend and actively participate in all assessment, counselling or rehabilitative programs as directed by the supervisor and complete them to the satisfaction of the supervisor. He will sign any release of information forms as will enable his supervisor to monitor his attendance and completion of any such programs.

8. Mr. Al-Hajj shall perform 100 hours of community service work on a rate and schedule to be directed by the supervisor, but which must be completed within 18 months of the start date of this Order.

9. Mr. Al-Hajj is not to contact or communicate, directly or indirectly, by physical, electronic, or other means with S.L.

10. Mr. Al-Hajj is not to possess any weapons as defined by the Criminal Code.

11. After completing 12 months of his conditional sentence as house confinement, Mr. Al-Hajj will be on a curfew from 8 pm to 7 am for the remaining period of his conditional sentence.

12. After completing his sentence, Mr. Al-Hajj will be placed on probation for 18 months, subject to the conditions outlined in the PSR as follows:

    a. Report as directed to Probation Services.

    b. Attend for any further assessment, treatment or counselling as directed.

    c. Sign any release of information form as will enable his probation officer to monitor his attendance and completion of any assessments, counselling or rehabilitative programs as directed.

    d. Reside at a residence approved by the probation officer and not change this residence without the prior approval of his supervisor.

    e. Do not contact, either directly or indirectly by any physical, electronic or other means, the complainant S.L.

    f. Do not be within 250 meters of anywhere Mr. Al-Hajj knows S.L. to live, work, go to school, or be.

Ancillary Orders

[59] The Crown seeks the following additional ancillary orders which are not disputed by Defence and which will be accordingly granted:

1. DNA Secondary Designation Order pursuant to s. 487.04(a);

2. Section 110 firearms' prohibition of ten years;

3. On consent of the accused, a forfeiture order pursuant to ss. 490 and 491 of telephones, air gun, unrelated bullets, and various other items.

4. On consent of the accused, an order for the return to the police of two journals and various other items belonging to the complainant within 45 days.

Somji J.

Released: September 18, 2025