3 total
Confinement proved, death threat not proved, aggravating domestic violence facts established.
The accused pleaded guilty to assault by choking, aggravated assault, and breach of probation arising from a prolonged episode of intimate partner violence, but contested unlawful confinement and uttering a death threat.
After assessing the complainant’s credibility and reliability, the court found her core account of repeated cyclical assaults, restraint inside the apartment, and two episodes of choking to be credible and materially corroborated by the physical scene and injuries.
The court held that the Crown proved unlawful confinement beyond a reasonable doubt because the complainant was prevented from leaving by force, intimidation, and surveillance.
The court acquitted on the uttering-threat count, finding the accused’s statements expressed indifference to the complainant’s suffering rather than an objectively ascertainable threat to kill.
On the Gardiner hearing, the court also found the disputed aggravating facts proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
The court sentenced the offender to three years' incarceration for breaching his Long-Term Supervision Order.
The offender, Christopher Watts, pleaded guilty to breaching a Long-Term Supervision Order (LTSO) by being in the presence of female children under 18 without supervision.
This was his fourth breach of the LTSO.
The court considered sentencing principles, including denunciation, deterrence, and separation, giving primary consideration to the protection of children.
The offender's lack of insight and resistance to rehabilitation were aggravating factors.
The court imposed a sentence of three years' incarceration, less pre-sentence custody on a 1:1 basis, rejecting enhanced credit due to the need for public protection and the offender's high risk of recidivism.
The young person was acquitted of robbery and related charges because circumstantial identification evidence failed to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
E.T., a young person, faced charges of robbery, possession of a weapon, disguise with intent, and possession of a stolen vehicle.
The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, relying on a general resemblance of E.T. to one of the robbers, E.T.'s possession of a similar jacket seven days after the robbery, and his presence in the victim's stolen vehicle.
The court applied the principles of circumstantial evidence from R. v. Villaroman, emphasizing that an inference of guilt must be the only reasonable inference, not merely a probable one.
The court found that while E.T.'s guilt was more likely than not, the identification evidence was insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for the robbery-related charges.
Similarly, for the possession of stolen vehicle charge, there was no evidence that E.T. had control over the vehicle or knowledge that it was stolen.
All charges were dismissed.
