Meredith E. Jones

The applicant, facing drug trafficking charges, brought a Garofoli application alleging a violation of section 8 of the Charter and seeking to quash a wiretap authorization.

The applicant argued that the Information to Obtain (ITO) lacked reasonable and probable grounds, and that police were grossly negligent or deliberately misleading in their presentation of a police agent's reliability and information.

The court reviewed the ITO, excising inappropriate material and amplifying it with evidence from the hearing.

The court found that the police agent was not a confidential informant at the time the ITO was considered, and his information, corroborated by other sources, provided sufficient grounds for the authorization.

The court concluded there was no police misconduct or gross negligence, and the ITO was facially valid.

The application was dismissed.

The defendant municipality brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s negligence action arising from a motor vehicle accident, arguing the claim was commenced outside the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiff argued the claim against the municipality was not discoverable until receipt of a police accident report revealing potential roadway maintenance issues and identifying the proper municipal authority.

The court held the plaintiff failed to rebut the statutory presumption of discoverability and did not exercise reasonable diligence in identifying potential defendants, noting a 17‑month delay in obtaining the accident report.

The action was therefore statute‑barred.

The court also found that commencing a second action rather than seeking to amend the existing action to substitute the proper municipality constituted an abuse of process.

The accused applied for leave to cross‑examine the affiant of an Information to Obtain supporting a Part VI authorization, intending to challenge the authorization through a Garofoli application.

The accused argued that the police agent’s reliability problems and alleged investigative failures undermined the grounds relied upon in the ITO.

The court reviewed the governing principles from Garofoli and subsequent authorities requiring a reasonable likelihood that cross‑examination would elicit evidence capable of undermining a precondition to the authorization.

After reviewing numerous proposed areas of questioning relating to the agent’s credibility, background, and post‑authorization conduct, the court concluded they concerned minor matters, speculative issues, or information arising after the authorization was granted.

The court held that cross‑examination would not assist in discrediting the grounds for the authorization.

In a medical malpractice action, the defendant physician sought summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiffs' expert was unqualified to give opinion evidence in Ontario.

A dispute arose at case conference over the sequencing of expert evidence and the production of experts for cross-examination.

The court held the matter was not ripe for determination because the precise issues and evidentiary record for the proposed summary judgment motion remained unclear, including whether expert evidence would ultimately be relied upon.

The court emphasized that once an issue is put forward for summary judgment, each side must have a fair opportunity to adduce and test relevant evidence, subject to the court's proportionality and case-management powers.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' medical malpractice action on the basis that it was statute-barred.

The plaintiffs had previously commenced two identical actions, one of which was dismissed as abandoned.

The court found that the plaintiffs' claim that they discovered the cause of action in September 2011 was inconsistent with their pleadings in the prior action and unsupported by evidence.

Applying the statutory presumption of discoverability, the court concluded the action was commenced beyond the two-year limitation period.

The motion was granted and the action dismissed.

The plaintiff underwent foot surgery by the defendant orthopedic surgeon, who had diagnosed a ganglion cyst.

During surgery, the defendant discovered a nerve tumour (schwannoma) and proceeded to excise it, causing permanent nerve damage to the plaintiff's foot.

The plaintiff sued for negligence, lack of informed consent, and battery.

The court dismissed the negligence claims regarding assessment and diagnosis but found the defendant liable for lack of informed consent and battery, as the material risks of nerve damage were not disclosed and the plaintiff did not consent to the peripheral nerve surgery.

The court awarded $75,112 in damages to the plaintiff and $5,000 to his wife under the Family Law Act.

The applicant alleged discrimination on the basis of disability and sexual orientation, as well as reprisal, after his doctor terminated their physician-patient relationship.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing to determine if the application had a reasonable prospect of success.

The Tribunal found that the applicant provided only speculation that the termination was based on discriminatory grounds or reprisal, while the respondent provided non-discriminatory reasons for the termination, including a breakdown of trust and the applicant's complex needs exceeding the doctor's skills.

The application was dismissed for having no reasonable prospect of success.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their medical malpractice action against a doctor and hospital.

The action arose from a delayed diagnosis of testicular torsion, resulting in the removal of the affected testicle.

The motion judge found that even if the doctor had properly diagnosed the condition when he first saw the patient, there was at most a 10 per cent chance of saving the testicle.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's conclusion that the 'but for' test for causation was not met and dismissed the appeal.

The appellants, minority shareholders of Asbestos Corporation Limited, commenced an action in Ontario in 1987 for an oppression remedy and other relief following the takeover of the corporation by the Province of Quebec.

The appellants did not pursue the Ontario action until 2003, after exhausting five other proceedings in different forums.

The motion judge dismissed the action for delay and, in the alternative, stayed it on the basis of forum non conveniens and abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in her conclusions that the delay was inexcusable, Quebec was the more appropriate forum, and the attempt to relitigate issues already decided elsewhere constituted an abuse of process.