Jasmine Mary Ghosn

The appellant appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee finding her guilty of professional misconduct and imposing a four-month suspension.

The misconduct involved the appellant's role as a designated manager in overseeing the ordering of veterinary drugs from a wholesaler through a veterinarian's account using a false name, contrary to regulations.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the Committee's evidentiary rulings, its interpretation of the relevant regulations, or its assessment of the penalty.

In a professional discipline matter, the registrant moved to recuse two public members of the panel because they had participated in an earlier contested discipline hearing involving him that was under appeal, including on an alleged bias ground.

The panel applied the reasonable apprehension of bias test and held that prior participation in an earlier adverse decision, without compelling evidence of actual or apparent bias, was insufficient to displace the strong presumption of impartiality.

The panel rejected the submission that the registrant was entitled to “fresh eyes” and found that the pending appeal and unproven bias allegations in the earlier matter were immaterial to the present hearing.

The recusal motion was dismissed and the hearing was directed to be rescheduled before the same panel.

No costs were awarded on the motion.

At a penalty and costs hearing following findings that the registrant sexually abused two patients and committed multiple additional acts of professional misconduct, the discipline panel held that revocation was mandatory under the Health Professions Procedural Code because the sexual abuse included sexual intercourse.

The panel rejected arguments alleging bias in the earlier merits reasons, held it was functus officio and could not revisit its findings, and found no merit in the contention that the patient relationships were merely incidental to employment or sexual relationships.

The panel also held that a victim impact statement was not a precondition to imposing penalty under s. 51(6).

It ordered a reprimand, immediate revocation, security for therapy and counselling funding for two patients, and substantial costs reflecting roughly two-thirds of the College's actual investigation and hearing expenses.

In a multi-notice professional discipline proceeding, the panel found that the registrant engaged in false and misleading insurance billing by causing claims for his own dental services to be submitted under other dentists’ names and provider numbers, and in one instance on a false service date.

The panel also found extensive professional misconduct in opioid prescribing and recordkeeping, including prescribing without documented justification, exceeding College guideline quantities and frequencies without rationale, failing to document informed consent, diagnoses, treatment plans, and root canal safeguards.

The panel further found that the registrant engaged in sexual relationships with two employees who were also his patients, amounting to sexual abuse and disgraceful, dishonourable, unprofessional and unethical conduct.

A separate allegation of inappropriate touching involving another employee-patient was not proven.

Most allegations were upheld, with limited exceptions under one notice.

The appellant, a dental hygienist, appealed a discipline committee decision finding she engaged in a concurrent sexual relationship with a client, which resulted in the mandatory revocation of her certificate of registration.

The appellant argued the hearing was procedurally unfair due to an inadequate investigation, uneven scrutiny of evidence, and failure to enforce a witness exclusion order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no procedural unfairness, noting the committee's credibility assessments were entitled to deference, and concluding the appellant failed to establish any palpable and overriding error.

The appellant veterinarian appealed decisions of the Discipline Committee finding he engaged in professional misconduct by dispensing and reselling veterinary drugs to pharmacies in large quantities, contrary to s. 33(2)(d) of the General Regulation under the Veterinarians Act.

The appellant challenged the validity of the regulation, arguing it was ultra vires, vague, overbroad, and improperly enacted without procedural fairness.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the regulation was validly enacted within the College's statutory authority and that the terms 'reasonably limited quantities' and 'temporary shortage' were not unconstitutionally vague.

The court upheld the finding of professional misconduct and the penalty of a one-month suspension, public reprimand, and costs, finding no palpable and overriding error.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The appellants argued that their appeal raised novel issues in the public interest, warranting no costs award.

The court rejected this, finding the appeal involved the application of well-established legal principles.

The respondent, GlaxoSmithKline Inc., successfully resisted the appeal and was awarded partial indemnity costs, fixed at $25,000, inclusive of disbursements and taxes, limiting the award to costs associated with time spent by two senior lawyers.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment that dismissed their action against GlaxoSmithKline (GSK), alleging that an H1N1 vaccine manufactured by GSK caused their five-year-old daughter's death.

The appeal raised issues concerning GSK's duty to warn (including the learned intermediary rule), its post-marketing commitments, the inference of negligence from circumstantial evidence, and costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's findings that GSK adequately warned the learned intermediary (the physician), met its post-marketing obligations, and that the appellants failed to prove negligence or causation on a balance of probabilities.

The court also upheld the trial judge's discretionary costs award.

The plaintiffs brought an action against GlaxoSmithKline following the sudden and unexplained death of their five-year-old daughter, who died five days after receiving the H1N1 vaccine (Arepanrix).

The plaintiffs alleged that the manufacturer breached its standard of care by failing to adequately test the vaccine and failing to warn of its risks, and that the vaccine caused the child's death.

The court dismissed the action, finding no expert evidence to establish a breach of the standard of care regarding the vaccine's testing, approval, or disclosure of risks.

Furthermore, the court rejected the plaintiffs' expert evidence on causation, relying instead on the forensic pathologist and epidemiological experts who concluded there was no evidence linking the vaccine to the child's death.

The appellant massage therapist appealed a penalty decision of the Discipline Committee imposing an eight-month suspension for professional misconduct.

The appellant argued the penalty was unreasonable because the Tribunal erroneously found he admitted to touching the complainant's sensitive areas.

The Divisional Court agreed, finding the admissions were not clear and unambiguous regarding sensitive areas.

The appeal was allowed, and the penalty was reduced to the four-week suspension already served.

In a medical malpractice action, the defendant physician sought summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiffs' expert was unqualified to give opinion evidence in Ontario.

A dispute arose at case conference over the sequencing of expert evidence and the production of experts for cross-examination.

The court held the matter was not ripe for determination because the precise issues and evidentiary record for the proposed summary judgment motion remained unclear, including whether expert evidence would ultimately be relied upon.

The court emphasized that once an issue is put forward for summary judgment, each side must have a fair opportunity to adduce and test relevant evidence, subject to the court's proportionality and case-management powers.