Cameron R. B. Fiske

The plaintiff commenced an action seeking damages for slander.

The defendant brought a motion to strike the statement of claim under the Protection of Public Participation Act, 2015 (anti-SLAPP legislation).

The parties could not agree on a timetable leading up to the motion, particularly because the defendant failed to attend her scheduled examination for discovery due to medical reasons.

The court fixed a timetable for the delivery of materials, completion of discoveries, cross-examinations, and factums leading up to the scheduled motion date.

The court determined costs for several motions following a previous endorsement.

Filomena Siggillino was ordered to pay costs for an abandoned motion.

Filomena, Teresa Scalamogna, and Lilianna Siggillino were ordered to pay costs for a successful Vesting Order motion brought by 2377544 Ontario Inc. and an unsuccessful Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) motion brought by Filomena.

The court awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis, rejecting the request for substantial indemnity, and adjusted the claimed amounts based on the complexity of the proceedings, the results achieved, and the clarity of the costs submissions.

This endorsement addresses two motions within related legal proceedings concerning a "family feud" over a property.

Robert Di Toro, on behalf of 2377544 Ontario Inc., sought a vesting order to facilitate the sale of a property, with $1,500,000.00 to be paid into court as previously ordered by Master Short.

Filomena Siggillino, the mother of the other parties, brought a cross-motion for leave to register her own Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) against the property, alleging fraudulent misuse of a Power of Attorney by her daughters, Teresa Scalamogna and Lilianna Siggillino.

The court dismissed Filomena's cross-motion for a CPL, finding no tenable cause of action against Robert/2377544 Ontario Inc. and that damages would be an appropriate remedy.

The court also noted the disingenuous position of Teresa and Lilianna in supporting their mother's motion, which undermined their own prior claims, constituting an abuse of process.

Consequently, the court granted the vesting order sought by 2377544 Ontario Inc., allowing the property sale to proceed with the specified funds paid into court.

The appellant, Jungmin Lee, appealed his convictions and sentence for careless driving and failing to comply with a recognizance, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel.

He alleged his counsel failed to inform him of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea and did not seek a conditional discharge.

The court found that while counsel's omissions regarding immigration consequences constituted ineffective assistance, no miscarriage of justice occurred.

The original conviction and suspended sentence were deemed warranted, and a conditional discharge would have been contrary to public interest given the serious nature of the breach of recognizance.

The appeal was dismissed.

Following a trial where the plaintiff obtained judgment on a promissory note and successfully defended a counterclaim alleging fraud, the court determined costs.

The plaintiff and its principal were awarded substantial indemnity costs of $115,530.26 because the plaintiff beat its Rule 49 offer to settle and the defendants made unfounded, seriously prejudicial allegations of fraud.

The third-party real estate broker and his brokerage, who also successfully defended the counterclaim, were awarded partial indemnity costs of $60,047.28, as there was no clear finding of reprehensible conduct against them to justify elevated costs.

The appellant pleaded guilty to defrauding her employer of over $300,000 over 14 months.

She appealed her 10-month carceral sentence, seeking a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle.

The court noted the breach of trust, the duration of the scheme, and concluded the sentence was already very lenient despite mitigating factors such as self-reporting and a guilty plea.

Following the dismissal of the appellant's appeal from a Small Claims Court order, the court determined the issue of costs.

The successful respondents sought costs despite their counsel acting on a pro bono basis.

The court rejected the appellant's arguments against awarding costs in pro bono cases, applying Court of Appeal precedent that costs awards are appropriate and necessary for successful pro bono litigants to ensure access to justice.

The court awarded the respondents partial indemnity costs of $2,557.

Following a six‑day civil fraud trial in which the plaintiff recovered damages exceeding $150,000, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs, relying on findings that the defendants engaged in deceitful and exploitative conduct and pointing to litigation conduct during trial.

Applying Rules 1.04 and 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and relevant appellate guidance, the court held that substantial indemnity costs are reserved for rare and exceptional cases involving reprehensible conduct.

The court found that the conduct of one individual defendant and the corporate defendant warranted substantial indemnity costs, while another defendant’s lesser culpability justified only partial indemnity costs.

Costs were fixed at $50,000 on a substantial indemnity scale and $32,500 on a partial indemnity scale, with joint and several responsibility apportioned among the defendants.

A vulnerable elderly homeowner brought an action alleging fraud, deceit, breach of contract, and negligence after contractors performing renovation work obtained over $138,000 through numerous consumer purchase contracts within approximately forty days.

The court found that a salesperson for the construction company exploited the plaintiff’s trust and vulnerability, repeatedly persuading her to approve unnecessary work and sign cheques.

The court concluded that the salesperson’s conduct constituted fraudulent misrepresentation and the tort of deceit, rendering most contracts void.

The construction company was held vicariously liable for its agent’s misconduct, and the company’s principal bore partial personal liability for failing to intervene despite warning signs.

Compensatory and aggravated damages were awarded.

The appellant's action was dismissed by a Deputy Judge at a Small Claims Court settlement conference.

The appellant brought a motion before a second Deputy Judge to set aside the dismissal, which was denied for lack of jurisdiction.

The appellant appealed to the Divisional Court.

The court held that the original dismissal was a final order, meaning the second Deputy Judge correctly concluded he had no jurisdiction to hear what was effectively an appeal.

The court also declined to grant an extension of time to appeal the original dismissal order due to the lengthy delay and lack of intention to appeal within the statutory period.

The appellant property owner appealed a Small Claims Court judgment finding it liable for injuries sustained by the respondent pedestrian who tripped over a double asphalt curb in a poorly lit parking lot.

The appellant argued the respondent was a trespasser who willingly assumed the risks of crossing the lot.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge made no palpable and overriding error in concluding that a single sign restricting unauthorized vehicles did not effectively bar pedestrians, and that the respondent had not willingly assumed the risks under the Occupiers' Liability Act.

The respondents requested a reconsideration of a Tribunal decision that found they had breached the Human Rights Code.

The respondents had failed to participate in the original proceedings, claiming they feared the impact on pending criminal charges against the personal respondent.

The Tribunal dismissed the request, finding no new facts were presented and the respondents failed to provide an adequate explanation for their failure to participate or request a deferral.

The Tribunal held that the respondents' inaction did not outweigh the public interest in the finality of decisions.