Rob Fried

The defendant brought a pre-trial motion to exclude evidence obtained from a dash camera and its memory card, arguing a violation of section 8 of the Charter due to a warrantless search.

The court found that while the dash camera was lawfully seized under s.489(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, the subsequent search of its memory card was warrantless and violated the defendant's section 8 Charter rights, as the search warrant did not explicitly cover such a device.

However, applying the Grant test under section 24(2) of the Charter, the court determined that the police acted in good faith based on an understandable mistake, the evidence was inevitably discoverable, and its admission was crucial for the truth-seeking function of the trial, particularly regarding the defendant's statements about the altercation.

Consequently, the motion to exclude the evidence was dismissed, and the audio and video recordings were deemed admissible.

The offender pleaded guilty to robbery with a firearm, break and enter, and firearms offences following a home invasion.

The court considered the serious aggravating factors of the offence and the offender's prior record for armed robbery, balanced against mitigating factors including a guilty plea, remorse, and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions exacerbated by inadequate medical care for a urological issue.

The court accepted the joint submission of a 6.5-year global sentence and, after applying enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody and harsh conditions, sentenced the offender to a further 18 months in custody.

The accused applied to sever counts on an indictment charging him and a co-accused with a home invasion and firearms offences.

The accused sought separate trials so he could testify regarding the firearms charges without implicating himself in the home invasion.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the counts were closely connected factually and legally, and that the desire to testify on some counts but not others did not outweigh the policy against a multiplicity of proceedings.

J.S. brought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code after being detained on reverse onus charges of possession for the purpose of trafficking and firearm offences.

The court found material changes in circumstances, including new sureties (father and godfather) addressing previous concerns about the mother's health, and the elevated risk posed by the COVID-19 pandemic in detention facilities.

Considering the proposed strict house arrest plan, the applicant's lack of criminal record, and the overall circumstances, the court determined that release would not undermine public confidence in the administration of justice on the tertiary ground.

The bail review was granted, and J.S. was released on a $15,000 surety recognizance with strict conditions.

The Crown brought a dangerous offender application against the offender, who was convicted of two counts of counselling murder and one count of obstruction of justice.

The offender brought a Charter challenge arguing the dangerous offender regime violated his rights under ss. 7 and 12, which the court dismissed.

The court found the offender met the criteria for a dangerous offender designation due to an intractable pattern of severe domestic violence and a high risk of violent recidivism.

Concluding that neither a conventional sentence nor a long-term supervision order would adequately protect the public, the court imposed an indeterminate sentence.

The offender was sentenced after a jury conviction for sexual assault arising from a non-consensual sexual encounter with an acquaintance in his apartment.

The court held that a victim impact letter not in Form 34.2 could still be considered under s. 722(9) of the Criminal Code, but only to the extent it described permissible physical, emotional, and economic impacts.

Applying the principles of proportionality, denunciation, deterrence, and individualized sentencing, the court found significant aggravating factors including repeated refusals, multiple sexual acts, unprotected intercourse, and profound victim impact, while giving limited mitigation for recent self-improvement and five months' credit for stringent bail conditions.

A sentence of 26 months' incarceration followed by three years' probation was imposed, together with DNA, sex offender registration, weapons prohibition, and no-contact orders.

The accused, while in custody, counselled a fellow inmate and an undercover police officer to murder his ex-girlfriend to prevent her from testifying against him in an upcoming trial.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the testimony of the fellow inmate, a 'Vetrovec' witness with a lengthy criminal record.

The court found the inmate's testimony credible and substantially corroborated by objective evidence, including a recorded phone call between the accused and the undercover officer.

The accused was found guilty of counselling murder and attempting to obstruct justice.

The accused, charged with counselling murder and obstructing justice, brought a Garofoli application challenging a wiretap authorization.

He argued that the Information to Obtain (ITO) failed to disclose that the police informer had requested and received sentencing consideration.

The accused also alleged breaches of his s. 7 Charter rights due to deliberate police deception and a failure to video or audio record all interactions with the informer.

The court dismissed the applications, finding that the omission in the ITO was inadvertent and that the warrant could still have issued if the omitted information had been included.

The court also held there was no constitutional duty to create video or audio records of all police interactions with the informer.

Michael Davani, charged with second-degree murder, brought an application to exclude evidence of his self-identification and association with the deceased, Kwado Mensah.

Davani alleged Charter violations (ss. 7, 8, 9, 10(b)), involuntariness of his statement, unreliability of dock identification, and inadmissibility of Mensah's self-identification as hearsay.

The court found no detention for ss. 7, 9, 10(b) purposes when Davani identified himself, but a s. 8 Charter breach for an unobtrusive pat-down search.

Applying s. 24(2) factors, the court declined to exclude the evidence, finding the state conduct not serious and the impact on Charter interests minimal.

Davani's self-identification was deemed voluntary, the dock identification admissible with a limiting instruction, and Mensah's self-identification admissible as circumstantial evidence or a traditional hearsay exception.

The application was dismissed.

The offenders, two brothers with extensive criminal records, pleaded guilty to five counts of break and enter and theft involving commercial stores.

They used stolen vehicles to ram through store entrances and steal merchandise.

The court weighed their lengthy records, drug addictions, and the aggravating factor of the younger brother being on probation.

The older brother was sentenced to 5 years imprisonment and the younger to 50 months, both receiving 1.5:1 credit for pre-sentence custody.