Jerry Brienza

D.F. was convicted by a jury of sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching involving his niece by marriage, E.Q., who was between 6 and 10 years old.

The sexual assault count was stayed under Kienapple.

The court imposed a global sentence of four years for sexual interference and one year concurrent for invitation to sexual touching, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence in child sexual abuse cases as per Friesen.

The offender was also subject to a DNA order and a 20-year Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) order.

The appellant, a real estate agent, was convicted of fraud in relation to three real estate transactions.

She appealed her convictions on the sole ground that the trial judge impermissibly intervened during her cross-examination, creating a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's interventions were primarily questions seeking clarification of confusing evidence and did not compromise the appellant's right to a fair trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and assault against his spouse.

He argued the trial judge relied on stereotypical beliefs, misapprehended evidence, and applied an unequal standard of scrutiny to the competing narratives.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge properly applied the W.(D.) test, gave thorough reasons for disbelieving the appellant, and correctly accepted the complainant's evidence, which was partially corroborated by photographs.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, P.P., appealed convictions for sexual touching and invitation to sexual touching, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility and reliability of the complainant's testimony.

The complainant, the appellant's nephew, testified about abuse occurring when he was a child.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's findings, which were amply explained and supported by the record, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction on nine offences arising from an armed robbery of a salon, including use of a firearm, robbery, wounding, and assault.

The trial judge had upheld the validity of two search warrants (residential and digital video recorder) despite Charter challenges.

The Court of Appeal found that both warrants were issued without reasonable and probable grounds due to material non-disclosure in the Information to Obtain affidavits.

The affiant officer failed to make full and frank disclosure regarding the reliability of licence plate evidence, vehicle colour discrepancies, and other material facts.

The digital video recorder evidence, which was crucial to the Crown's case, should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

Without this evidence, the Crown's case was gutted, and acquittals were ordered.

The appellant, a police officer, appealed his conviction for assault and the conditional discharge imposed after he forcibly removed a motorist from a car.

The appellant claimed the motorist assaulted him by slamming a car door on his knee, justifying the arrest.

The trial judge rejected this account, finding no lawful authority for the appellant's actions and no assault by the motorist.

The appeal court dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's factual findings and credibility assessment, and finding no legal errors or misapprehension of evidence in the conviction or sentence.

The accused, Courtney Foster, was found guilty of attempted murder and assault against his former wife, Barbara Foster.

This decision outlines the sentencing, considering aggravating factors such as the violent and sustained nature of the attack, the significant physical, emotional, and financial impact on the victim, and the accused's prior record of violence.

Mitigating factors included the accused's willingness to plead guilty to aggravated assault, his employment history, expressed remorse, the consequence of deportation post-sentence, and participation in rehabilitation programs while in custody.

The court imposed a global sentence of 10 years imprisonment, reduced to 6 years after accounting for pre-sentence custody credit, along with a 10-year weapons prohibition and a DNA order.

Courtney Foster was charged with attempted murder after stabbing Barbara Foster multiple times.

The central issue was whether the Crown proved specific intent to kill beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court reviewed evidence of prior domestic abuse, the events of the attack (car collisions, use of a kitchen knife, multiple stab wounds, and the accused's statement "I'm going to fucking kill you"), and the victim's injuries.

The defence argued lack of intent to kill, suggesting a desire to talk or merely injure.

The court found the victim's testimony credible and reliable, and concluded that the accused's actions and words demonstrated a specific intent to kill, despite the victim's successful struggle to prevent a deeper throat wound.

The accused was found guilty of attempted murder.

Michael Davani, charged with second-degree murder, brought an application to exclude evidence of his self-identification and association with the deceased, Kwado Mensah.

Davani alleged Charter violations (ss. 7, 8, 9, 10(b)), involuntariness of his statement, unreliability of dock identification, and inadmissibility of Mensah's self-identification as hearsay.

The court found no detention for ss. 7, 9, 10(b) purposes when Davani identified himself, but a s. 8 Charter breach for an unobtrusive pat-down search.

Applying s. 24(2) factors, the court declined to exclude the evidence, finding the state conduct not serious and the impact on Charter interests minimal.

Davani's self-identification was deemed voluntary, the dock identification admissible with a limiting instruction, and Mensah's self-identification admissible as circumstantial evidence or a traditional hearsay exception.

The application was dismissed.

The accused applied for judicial interim release under s. 522 of the Criminal Code after being charged with first-degree murder arising from a drive-by shooting that killed a bystander.

Because the charge was a s. 469 offence, the application proceeded on a reverse onus.

The court found no significant risk on the primary or secondary grounds, emphasizing the accused’s lack of criminal record, educational background, community ties, and voluntary surrender to police shortly after the incident.

On the tertiary ground, the court concluded that although the offence was extremely serious, the strength of the Crown’s case on the accused’s prior knowledge of the shooting was not overwhelming and multiple reasonable inferences remained available.

Given the proposed stringent surety plan and the accused’s circumstances, the court held that public confidence in the administration of justice would not be undermined by release.