Craig Bottomley

The accused applied for leave to cross-examine the affiant of an Information To Obtain (ITO) a search warrant at a preliminary inquiry.

The accused sought to examine areas relating to the corroboration of confidential informant (CI) information, the steps taken to corroborate such information, and whether police contaminated the information by reaching out to a CI.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the proposed cross-examination did not meet the threshold test established in R. v. Garofoli and R. v. Dawson.

The court held that a preliminary inquiry is not the appropriate venue for such cross-examination, particularly given the risk of identifying confidential informers and the fact that the trial judge would be better positioned to address these issues through the Garofoli procedure.

The offender, Lauralee Walker, was found guilty by a jury of conspiracy to traffic cocaine and possession of the proceeds of crime.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the nature of crack cocaine, and significant mitigating factors, such as the offender's lack of prior record, young age, strong family ties, employment history, limited role in the offences, and the context of domestic abuse by her co-accused.

The court also noted the offender's remorse and voluntary disassociation from the co-accused.

Despite the general requirement for custodial sentences in crack cocaine trafficking cases, the court found that the unique circumstances, including over 600 days under restrictive bail conditions, warranted a suspended sentence with 18 months of probation, along with ancillary orders including a 10-year weapons prohibition, DNA sample order, and victim surcharges.

The appellants appealed their convictions for assault causing bodily harm and, for one appellant, threatening death.

The court upheld the convictions for assault causing bodily harm, finding the trial judge's assessment of credibility and reliability, and rejection of self-defence, to be reasonable and supported by evidence.

However, the conviction for threatening death was set aside as unsupported by evidence.

At a preliminary inquiry into the deaths of Tyler McLean and Zemarai Khan Mohammed, who were shot outside the Rebel nightclub on October 1, 2017, the Crown sought committal of both accused on murder charges.

Tanade Mohamed conceded committal on two counts of second-degree murder as the alleged shooter.

Abdirisaq Ali, who drove the vehicle from which the shots were fired, contested committal and sought to be committed only as an accessory after the fact.

The court found that while the accessory provisions captured Ali's involvement, there was a reasonable inference that Ali knew Mohamed had a gun and intended to assist in the murders, based on Ali's conduct in positioning the vehicle, waiting in the parking lot, and fleeing the scene.

The court committed both accused to stand trial on two counts of second-degree murder.

The accused, while in custody, counselled a fellow inmate and an undercover police officer to murder his ex-girlfriend to prevent her from testifying against him in an upcoming trial.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the testimony of the fellow inmate, a 'Vetrovec' witness with a lengthy criminal record.

The court found the inmate's testimony credible and substantially corroborated by objective evidence, including a recorded phone call between the accused and the undercover officer.

The accused was found guilty of counselling murder and attempting to obstruct justice.

The accused, charged with counselling murder and obstructing justice, brought a Garofoli application challenging a wiretap authorization.

He argued that the Information to Obtain (ITO) failed to disclose that the police informer had requested and received sentencing consideration.

The accused also alleged breaches of his s. 7 Charter rights due to deliberate police deception and a failure to video or audio record all interactions with the informer.

The court dismissed the applications, finding that the omission in the ITO was inadvertent and that the warrant could still have issued if the omitted information had been included.

The court also held there was no constitutional duty to create video or audio records of all police interactions with the informer.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay, alleging a violation of their s. 11(b) Charter right.

The total delay was approximately 54.5 months, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling under R. v. Jordan.

The court found certain periods of defence delay and identified three discrete exceptional circumstances related to the preliminary inquiry: a last-minute election for a preliminary inquiry, the illness of the assigned justice, and underestimation of the preliminary inquiry's length.

The court also determined the case was particularly complex due to voluminous disclosure, numerous witnesses, and multiple co-accused, and that the Crown had a concrete plan to manage this complexity.

Additionally, the transitional exceptional circumstance was applied, finding that the institutional delay was acceptable under the previous Morin framework and that the Crown reasonably relied on the prior state of the law.

No actual prejudice to the accused was found.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The applicant, Michael Majeed, challenged the validity of a search warrant under s. 8 of the Charter, arguing that evidence obtained from his home should be excluded due to an unreasonable search and seizure.

The court conducted a *Garofoli* review, assessing whether the affiant subverted the pre-authorization process through deliberate non-disclosure, bad faith, or fraudulent misrepresentation.

The court found that while the affiant's disclosures were not full or fair and showed a lack of care, they did not meet the high threshold of deliberate deception or subversion required to invalidate the warrant.

The s. 8 application was dismissed.

The applicant, Michael Majeed, facing fraud charges, sought leave to cross-examine the affiant of a search warrant Information to Obtain (ITO).

The defence challenged the search warrant's validity under s. 8 of the Charter, alleging the affiant misled the issuing justice.

The Crown opposed the application.

The court applied the Garofoli test for leave to cross-examine and considered the residual discretion to set aside a warrant for subversion of the pre-authorization process.

The court found a realistic likelihood that cross-examination in three specific areas (source of physical description, source of fraudulent funds, and frequency of sightings) would assist in determining whether the affiant deliberately misled or acted with significant carelessness.

Leave to cross-examine was granted.

The accused was convicted by a jury of multiple firearm possession offences and pleaded guilty to simple possession of cocaine.

He was also convicted of possessing a firearm while prohibited following the jury’s findings.

The court considered the sentencing principles in s. 718 of the Criminal Code and emphasized denunciation and deterrence in relation to illegal handgun possession while also weighing the offender’s background, remorse, and prospects for rehabilitation.

The court rejected the Crown’s request for an eight‑year sentence and determined that the appropriate range for a second firearm possession offence without additional aggravating factors was lower than that proposed.

A global sentence of five years and nine months’ imprisonment was imposed, including a consecutive term for breaching a firearms prohibition order, with credit for pre‑sentence custody.

The appellant appealed a conviction for assault causing bodily harm arising from a nightclub altercation where a single punch knocked out three of the complainant’s teeth.

The primary issue at trial was whether the accused acted in self‑defence after being pushed.

The appellant argued the trial judge improperly assessed proportionality by focusing on the injuries rather than the force used, that new self‑defence provisions enacted by the Citizen’s Arrest and Self‑Defence Act should apply retroactively, and that the trial reasons were inadequate.

The court held the trial judge properly assessed proportionality by considering the nature of the force and surrounding circumstances, not merely the resulting injuries.

It further held the new statutory self‑defence provisions do not apply retroactively to completed trials on appeal and found the reasons for judgment adequate.

The accused were charged with sexual assault following an incident involving alleged non-consensual sexual activity after a night of drinking.

During the jury trial, the defence brought a mid‑trial application under s. 276 of the Criminal Code seeking to cross‑examine the complainant about a prior incident involving discussion of “threesomes” and a kiss with one accused months earlier.

The court held the prior incident constituted “sexual activity” within the meaning of s. 276.

Although the evidence was a specific instance of sexual activity and had some relevance to credibility after questioning in the Crown’s examination‑in‑chief, the court concluded its probative value was minimal and substantially outweighed by prejudice to the proper administration of justice.

The proposed evidence risked inviting stereotypical reasoning about sexual history and did not meaningfully assist in determining the central issue of consent.

This is a ruling on committal for trial following a three-month preliminary inquiry into Project Marvel, a police investigation into drug and firearm trafficking by members of a criminal organization known as the Young Buck Killers (YBK).

Nine defendants faced sixty-four counts including trafficking and possession of cocaine and other drugs, trafficking and possession of firearms, and conspiracy charges.

The Crown alleged that most defendants committed these offences for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with the YBK criminal organization.

The court applied the test for committal established in R. v. Arcuri, requiring that there be admissible evidence which could, if believed, result in a conviction.

The court found sufficient evidence to commit most defendants to trial on the charges, though some counts were discharged where the evidence was insufficient or speculative.

The court's analysis focused on whether the predicate offences were sufficiently connected to the criminal organization and whether the accused possessed the requisite mens rea.

The offender was sentenced after conviction for importing cocaine into Canada and possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, contrary to the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

Police surveillance and intercepted communications established that the offender coordinated with another individual to import approximately 600 grams of cocaine from Panama for distribution.

The court considered the sentencing ranges established in appellate authorities for cocaine importation and trafficking, emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence.

Although the offender expressed remorse and had some rehabilitative prospects, aggravating factors included a prior drug conviction, commission of the offence while on probation, and participation for financial gain.

The court imposed concurrent penitentiary sentences of five years for each offence, reduced to 4 years and 6 months after credit for pre‑trial custody and restrictive bail conditions, together with ancillary orders.

The accused was charged with importation of cocaine into Canada and possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown relied primarily on intercepted telephone communications, surveillance evidence, and seizure of drug packaging and cocaine to establish participation in a common criminal design to import cocaine from Panama.

The defence argued that the Crown failed to prove the identity of the accused’s voice in the intercepted calls and failed to prove knowledge of the package contents.

The court accepted voice identification evidence, found the co‑conspirators’ exception to the hearsay rule applied, and concluded that the intercepted calls, surveillance observations, and surrounding circumstantial evidence established the accused’s knowledge and participation.

The court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knowingly participated in the importation and trafficking scheme.

The Crown sought forfeiture of real property under s. 16(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act following convictions of several members of a motorcycle club for drug trafficking and conspiracy offences.

Evidence showed that the property functioned as the clubhouse and operational hub for members involved in trafficking cocaine, oxycodone, and GHB, and was used for meetings, negotiations, and transactions connected to those offences.

The court held that trial evidence from the related criminal proceedings could be relied upon in the forfeiture hearing and concluded that the property was “offence‑related property” because it facilitated networking and discussions integral to the drug trafficking activities.

The respondent corporation failed to establish that it was an innocent owner or that it was sufficiently separate from the convicted offenders, many of whom were de facto shareholders or controlling members of the organization.

The court further held that forfeiture was not disproportionate given the seriousness, scale, and commercial nature of the offences and the fortified nature of the property.

The Crown applied under s.16(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act for forfeiture of a motorcycle club clubhouse alleged to be offence-related property following convictions of several members for drug trafficking offences.

The court held that the clubhouse facilitated drug trafficking activities, including meetings, negotiations, and at least one drug transaction, and therefore qualified as offence-related property committed in relation to the offences.

The respondent corporation failed to establish that it was an innocent owner under s.19(3), as the property was effectively controlled by members of the organization involved in the offences.

The court also rejected relief under s.19.1(3), finding forfeiture was not disproportionate given the seriousness of the offences, the role of the property, and its fortified nature.