Gary Grill

Two accused were jointly tried for the homicide of a young teenager.

The principal accused admitted causing the death but contested whether the killing constituted first degree murder, second degree murder, or manslaughter.

The co‑accused was alleged to have participated in a plan to lure the victim to the residence and assist in the killing.

The trial involved numerous evidentiary rulings, including admissibility of a fictional story written by the co‑accused as potential motive evidence, disclosure and partial admission of the victim’s diary, admission of edited autopsy photographs, and applications concerning prior consistent statements under the Edgar doctrine.

The jury ultimately convicted the principal accused of first degree murder and acquitted the co‑accused.

The decision records extensive reasons on pre‑trial and mid‑trial evidentiary and procedural rulings made throughout the proceeding.

The accused applied for severance from a multi-accused drug trafficking indictment and sought a judge-alone trial rather than a jury trial proceeding jointly with co-accused.

He argued prejudice arising from the loss of his chosen mode of trial, trial delay, financial hardship due to the anticipated length of a joint trial, and potential “guilt by association.” The court reviewed the governing principles under s. 591(3)(b) of the Criminal Code and leading authorities addressing the presumption in favour of joint trials where accused are alleged to have acted in concert.

The court found an evidentiary nexus between the accused and co-accused through the alleged drug trafficking network and concluded that the asserted prejudice could be managed through jury instructions and procedural accommodations.

The applicant failed to establish that a joint trial would work an injustice.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings based on delay in completing his bail hearing, alleging violations of ss. 7, 9, and 11(e) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The accused argued that the justice of the peace and Crown prosecutor caused an unlawful adjournment exceeding the three‑day limit under s. 516 of the Criminal Code and demonstrated disregard for the accused’s liberty interests.

The court held that defence counsel consented to the adjournment and therefore no illegal adjournment occurred.

The court further found that neither the Crown prosecutor nor the justice of the peace acted improperly or breached the accused’s Charter rights.

Although the 32‑day duration of the bail hearing was unacceptable, it did not justify the extraordinary remedy of a stay of proceedings.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that the police lacked justifiable grounds to search his house and that an officer exceeded his authority.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusion was amply supported by evidence including a 911 call and plain view observations that justified a telewarrant.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the forfeiture order was deemed reasonable and the sentence length was not challenged.

The accused, a young person, was involved in a gun battle on a crowded street during which an innocent bystander was killed by a bullet fired by a rival shooter.

The preliminary inquiry judge committed the accused for trial on second degree murder.

The motion judge quashed the committal for murder but remitted the matter for manslaughter.

Both the Crown and the accused appealed.

The Court of Appeal held that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find that the accused's participation in a mutual shootout caused the victim's death.

The Court also held that the accused could be committed for second degree murder under s. 229(c) of the Criminal Code, as he engaged in a dangerous act for an unlawful object that he knew was likely to cause death.

The Crown's appeal was allowed and the committal for second degree murder was restored.

The appellant was pulled over for driving without illuminated tail lights and subsequently arrested for attempting to mislead police about his identity.

Upon arrest, police discovered he was wearing two bulletproof vests and searched his vehicle, finding a semi-automatic pistol and a revolver.

The trial judge found the search violated section 8 of the Charter but admitted the firearms under section 24(2).

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in finding a section 8 breach, concluding the search was a valid search incident to arrest.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed.