Robert M. DiPietro

The Applicants sought a stay of proceedings under sections 11(b) and 24(1) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay.

The total delay from the swearing of the information to the anticipated end of trial was 30 months and 30 days, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court matters.

The court found that significant disclosure delays and the Crown's failure to manage the co-accused's matter contributed to the delay.

While a period of 41 days was attributed to the COVID-19 pandemic's impact on initial court appearances, the Crown failed to demonstrate that the pandemic caused the overall protracted delay or that they took reasonable steps to mitigate it.

The court also deducted 52 days for defence-caused delay related to date setting.

Ultimately, the remaining delay of 27 months and 19 days was found to be presumptively unreasonable, and the Applicants' s. 11(b) rights were breached, leading to a stay of all charges.

The applicants sought a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging a breach of their s. 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The court found the total delay exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court matters.

The Crown failed to rebut the presumption of unreasonableness by establishing exceptional circumstances, as the delay was primarily due to the Crown's failure to properly assess and streamline the co-accused prosecution, rather than case complexity or the COVID-19 pandemic.

Consequently, all charges against the applicants were stayed.

Two offenders pleaded guilty to armed bank robberies committed in Windsor and four additional robberies in Toronto involving firearms, disguises, and violence against bank employees.

The parties jointly proposed a global sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment.

The court held that although a higher sentence in the range of 12 to 15 years would otherwise be fit given the seriousness and multiplicity of the offences, the joint submission did not meet the high threshold required to reject it.

The court also considered the application of the Truth in Sentencing Act and the proper credit for pre‑sentence custody under s. 719 of the Criminal Code.

Credit was granted at 1:1 for the period before the guilty pleas and 1.5:1 for the period after the pleas due to sentencing delay beyond the offenders’ control.