Daniel W. Scott

The Applicants sought a stay of proceedings under sections 11(b) and 24(1) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay.

The total delay from the swearing of the information to the anticipated end of trial was 30 months and 30 days, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court matters.

The court found that significant disclosure delays and the Crown's failure to manage the co-accused's matter contributed to the delay.

While a period of 41 days was attributed to the COVID-19 pandemic's impact on initial court appearances, the Crown failed to demonstrate that the pandemic caused the overall protracted delay or that they took reasonable steps to mitigate it.

The court also deducted 52 days for defence-caused delay related to date setting.

Ultimately, the remaining delay of 27 months and 19 days was found to be presumptively unreasonable, and the Applicants' s. 11(b) rights were breached, leading to a stay of all charges.

The applicants sought a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging a breach of their s. 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The court found the total delay exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court matters.

The Crown failed to rebut the presumption of unreasonableness by establishing exceptional circumstances, as the delay was primarily due to the Crown's failure to properly assess and streamline the co-accused prosecution, rather than case complexity or the COVID-19 pandemic.

Consequently, all charges against the applicants were stayed.

The Crown applied for an order granting prohibition with certiorari in aid to quash a decision of the Ontario Court of Justice.

The lower court had ruled that amendments to the Criminal Code (Bill C-75) limiting the availability of preliminary inquiries did not apply retrospectively to cases already scheduled.

The Superior Court held that the amendments are procedural, do not affect a vested or substantive right, and therefore apply retrospectively.

The lower court's decision was quashed, and an order was issued prohibiting the Ontario Court of Justice from conducting preliminary inquiries for the respondents.

The appellant, Christopher Joseph Battisti, appealed his conviction for uttering threats to cause death or bodily harm and his subsequent sentence.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's assessment of credibility, alleged misapprehension of evidence, sufficiency of reasons, and the fitness of the imposed sentence, particularly a three-year probation term with a travel notification condition.

The Superior Court of Justice, sitting as a summary conviction appeal court, found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's findings of fact or credibility, nor in the application of the criminal burden of proof.

The court also determined that the trial judge's reasons were sufficient for meaningful appellate review and that the probation condition, being protective rather than punitive, was not demonstrably unfit.

Consequently, the appeal was dismissed on all grounds.

The offender, an on-duty police officer, was convicted of dangerous driving causing bodily harm after colliding with another vehicle while responding to an emergency call at 178 km/h in a 50 km/h zone.

The defence sought an absolute discharge, arguing the officer's motive mitigated his moral culpability.

The court found that while a discharge was in the offender's best interests, it was contrary to the public interest due to the need for general deterrence and denunciation.

A conviction was registered, and the offender was sentenced to a $2,500 fine and a 12-month driving prohibition.

The accused, a police officer, was responding to an emergency call and drove his police cruiser at 178 km/h in a 50 km/h residential zone.

He collided with a civilian vehicle making a left turn, causing bodily harm to the civilian driver.

The court found that while the civilian driver failed to pull over, the accused's excessive speed in a residential area with multiple hazards was a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable police officer in the circumstances.

The accused was found guilty of dangerous driving causing bodily harm.