Court File and Parties

COURT FILE NO.: CV-20-3993 DATE: 20230627

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

B E T W E E N:

AQIB RAHMAN Aqib Rahman, acting in person Plaintiff

- and -

PEEL STANDARD CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION NO. 779 Antoni Casalinuovo & Victor Yee for the Defendant Defendant

HEARD: May 31, 2023

REASONS FOR DECISION Stribopoulos J.:

Introduction

[1] This action concerns a dispute between the owner of a unit in a condominium and a condominium corporation. It originated with a disagreement about parking. Unfortunately, it has grown much larger than that, with each side making competing claims of harassment and worse against the other.

[2] Over the last two-and-a-half years, each party has pursued a litigious approach, with the dispute spawning numerous proceedings, including before the Condominium Authority Tribunal (“CAT”), the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (“HRTO”), the Superior Court of Justice, the Divisional Court, and the Court of Appeal for Ontario. This particular action is one of many legal battlegrounds between the parties.

[3] The Plaintiff, Mr. Rahman, who represents himself, owns the unit and issued a Statement of Claim on October 25, 2020 against the Defendant, the condominium corporation, Peel Standard Condominium Corporation No. 779 ("Corporation"). Essentially, Mr. Rahman pleads that the Corporation and its agents discriminated against him based on his disability by not accommodating his need to park his vehicle in an accessible parking spot. Further, he claims the Corporation and its agents, including its legal counsel, have waged a campaign of harassment by unjustifiably arranging to have his vehicle ticketed, by adding the legal fees it incurred to harass him as maintenance fees, and by taking steps to enforce those fees as unpaid condominium fees, including by placing a lien on his unit and attempting to have his mortgage lender pay those "fees" at Mr. Rahman's expense. By way of relief, Mr. Rahman seeks an order acknowledging his "multiple disabilities and the harassment he has endured" by the Corporation and an order requiring it to "revoke, cease, or reverse any actions... in relation to this matter."

[4] On October 29, 2020, the Corporation delivered a Statement of Defence and Counterclaim, followed by an Amended Statement of Defence and Counterclaim in January 2021. It denies the various allegations levelled by Mr. Rahman in the Statement of Claim, maintaining that Mr. Rahman has parked his vehicle contrary to the terms of the Corporation's Declaration and that he has failed to furnish sufficient medical evidence to support his need to park in an accessible parking spot. Additionally, the Corporation claims that Mr. Rahman has engaged in a campaign of harassment by sending repeated and caustic emails to its agents, including its counsel, and conducting himself in a menacing, intimidating manner during in-person interactions with its building management staff and other residents. The Corporation alleges that Mr. Rahman's behaviour required that it involve legal counsel and incur legal expenses for which he is liable. It claims against him for $200,000 in damages and, alternatively, that he be required to pay the legal costs it has incurred as a chargeback to the common expenses on his unit and to recover these as common expenses in default. Further, it seeks an order requiring Mr. Rahman to refrain from harassing its Board members and its agents. Finally, it seeks pre-and post-judgment interest and its costs on a full indemnity basis.

[5] The parties appeared before me for a hearing of competing motions which each of them brought in this particular action.

[6] Mr. Rahman moves for summary judgment under Rule 20.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194 under Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43. He also purports to seek an order for default judgment. However, that relief is unavailable because the Corporation delivered a Statement of Defence: see Rule 19.01.

[7] By cross-motion, the Corporation moves, under Rule 25.11, to strike out Mr. Rahman's entire Statement of Claim without leave to amend because it contends it is scandalous, frivolous, or vexatious and is also an abuse of the court's process. Alternatively, it moves under Rule 21.01(3) to stay this action pending the outcome of other outstanding proceedings that it maintains involve the same parties and subject matter.

[8] This decision addresses these competing motions brought by the parties. It begins by summarizing the evidentiary record before the court to provide some necessary context to the parties’ dispute before addressing the discrete issues the motions raise.

The Record Before the Court on the Motions

[9] In support of his motion for summary judgment, Mr. Rahman filed a four-page affidavit sworn by him. He did not attach any exhibits to his affidavit nor include the pleadings from this action as part of his motion record; however, the Corporation did. That said, Mr. Rahman filed a variety of other documents, including the statements of claim he has issued in two further actions, one that names the Condominium Authority of Ontario (“CAO”) and the CAT as Defendants and the other in which he is suing the law firm and lawyers who have represented the Corporation during its ongoing dispute with him.

[10] Additionally, the Corporation filed two lengthy affidavits from Raja Amir Khan. He was President of the Corporation and a member of its Board of Directors when he swore his initial affidavit and the Corporation's "Honorary Vice-President" at the time of the second. (Parenthetically, I note that the Corporation's by-laws, which form part of the record, create no such position.) Mr. Khan's affidavits and the attached exhibits provide far greater detail concerning the chronology and substance of the dispute between the parties compared to Mr. Rahman's affidavit, which only contains a cursory reference to some of the material facts and mainly consists of his characterizations and conclusions concerning the conduct of the Corporation and its lawyers.

[11] At this stage, an overview of the dispute and its history is necessary to contextualize the various issues which the competing motions have raised.

The genesis of the conflict: a dispute about parking

[12] The Corporation is a non-profit residential condominium corporation registered under the Condominium Act, 1998, S.O. 1998, c. 19. It consists of 210 residential units, 295 parking units, and common areas, located at 2900 Battleford Road in the City of Mississauga. The Corporation, as prescribed by its by-laws, is governed by a three-member volunteer board. A condominium management corporation manages its operations through a condominium manager and a building manager, all licensed by the Condominium Management Regulatory Authority of Ontario.

[13] On April 14, 2020, Mr. Rahman purchased a residential unit and two associated deeded parking spots in the complex. Immediately after moving in, Mr. Rahman began parking his vehicle in one of three accessible parking spots in the outdoor ground-level visitor parking lot at the complex rather than in either of the deeded parking spots which he owns.

[14] Mr. Rahman has an accessible parking permit issued by the Province of Ontario. During submissions, he held it up and maintained it was on display whenever he parked in an accessible parking spot in the visitor's lot of the complex; however, his affidavit, preoccupied with impugning the actions of the Corporation and its lawyers, made no mention of this.

[15] Under Article 4.2(b) of the Corporation's Declaration, the three accessible parking spots were to be used only "by Owners or visitors to the Condominium requiring handicap parking" (emphasis added). And the Declaration prohibited owners from parking in the visitor parking lot more generally (Article 4.2(a)).

[16] According to Mr. Khan's first affidavit, within a month after Mr. Rahman moved in, the building manager asked him to provide medical documentation to justify his use of the accessible parking spots. Apparently, he asked Mr. Rahman to provide "a very detailed letter" from his doctor. Mr. Khan's affidavit is silent on whether Mr. Rahman's vehicle displayed an accessible parking permit, but correspondence attached to it as an exhibit suggests it did. In any event, from the outset, for reasons that are unclear, the Corporation considered the accessible parking permit insufficient evidence justifying Mr. Rahman's parking his vehicle in one of the three accessible spots in the visitor's lot.

[17] Mr. Khan deposes that, despite the building manager's request, Mr. Rahman failed to provide timely evidence to justify his use of the accessible parking spots. The parking dispute soon soured the relationship between Mr. Rahman and the Corporation and its agents. Eventually, Mr. Yee, counsel for the Corporation, became involved.

[18] In June 2020, Mr. Yee wrote Mr. Rahman three letters chronicling what the Corporation claimed was his harassing behaviour toward staff at the complex, asking him to stop engaging in such behaviour in future, and indicating that from the Corporation's standpoint, he had not provided "sufficient evidence or information" to demonstrate that he required accessible parking.

[19] In a letter dated June 23, 2020, Mr. Yee referred Mr. Rahman to Simcoe Condominium Corporation No. 89 v. Dominelli, 2015 ONSC 3661. Mr. Yee took the position that Dominelli entitled the Corporation to seek further information concerning Mr. Rahman's disability-related needs. (I note that Dominelli involved the owner of a condominium unit with a dog that exceeded the weight limitations for pets specified in a condominium corporation's rules. In contrast, an accessible parking permit, given the medical documentation required to obtain one from the province, provides ready proof of an individual's entitlement to accessible parking.) In his letter, Mr. Yee explained that because of Mr. Rahman's email correspondence, the Corporation was incurring added legal costs and that Mr. Rahman would be liable for these, which the Corporation would add to his unit's common expenses. Mr. Yee enclosed a document entitled "Statement of Common Expense Arrears," with $2,522.16 noted as a "chargeback for legal costs of enforcement" and demanded that Mr. Rahman pay that amount.

[20] The situation seems to have worsened after that. On October 2, 2020, Mr. Yee sent a further letter to Mr. Rahman, which noted that the Corporation had not received payment of the "outstanding chargeback." The letter also complained about Mr. Rahman engaging in harassment by visiting the on-site Management Office despite a prior direction that he refrain from doing so and by sending two emails to the building manager in short succession. Additionally, Mr. Yee noted that the Corporation had yet to receive the medical documentation it requested from Mr. Rahman.

[21] Further, in his letter, Mr. Yee cited Taite v. Carleton Condominium Corporation No. 91, 2014 HRTO 165, as supporting the Corporation's position that a "unit owner needs to satisfy the condominium corporation – separate and apart from the provincial parking permit – that he has a disability, for which he requires a special exception to be granted to him which allows him to park in the Visitors Parking despite being otherwise prohibited from doing so under the Declaration." (Parenthetically, I note that Taite says no such thing. It accepted that such a permit entitles a resident to park in an accessible parking spot; the issue in Taite concerned whether the accessible parking spot assigned was adequate given that it could not accommodate Mr. Taite's vehicle and whether his Ford F-150 pick-up truck was necessary to accommodate his disability or a matter of choice on his part: see at paras. 61-62.) Finally, Mr. Yee again cautioned Mr. Rahman that he would be liable to pay the Corporation's added legal costs.

[22] Eventually, on October 8, 2020, Mr. Rahman emailed Mr. Yee and attached a letter from Dr. Andrew Moran of that same date. In that letter, Dr. Moran wrote, in part:

Mr. Rahman has wrist pain, low back pain, bilateral shin and ankle pain as well as post-concussion syndrome. He has multiple ongoing musculoskeletal complaints which occurred after work related injury on January 6, 2016.

Mr. Rahman was working as a roofer when he fell and sustained four vertebral fractures, bilateral wrist fractures as well as bilateral ankle fractures. Mr. Rahman underwent extensive right wrist surgery followed by hardware removal. He does however still have several screws in both ankles and right wrist since the accident. Mr. Rahman has tried physiotherapy, chiropractic care, massage, acupuncture and has been seen by a psychiatrist. Despite this treatment he has chronic pain and reduced function.

His current status post concussive syndrome, Mr. Rahman reports 7-9 migraine days per month which are exacerbated by bright lights, stress and poor sleep.

Mr. Rahman has a disability parking permit and has spoken to me on a number of occasions regarding harassment by his condo management which he has told me is causing stress and anxiety in his life. Any action to reduce this stress would obviously benefit Mr. Rahman's overall health.

[23] Unfortunately, despite Dr. Moran's letter, the Corporation remained unconvinced that Mr. Rahman had a disability entitling him to park in the accessible spots in the visitor parking lot. Mr. Yee wrote to Dr. Moran on October 26, 2020, seeking further information from the doctor. It appears that the Corporation doubted Mr. Rahman's claim that he needed to park in an accessible spot because surveillance cameras in the building recorded him on a couple of occasions carrying some heavy items into the building in late April 2020, shortly after he moved in, and a large case of water in July 2020.

[24] Since then, the relationship between the parties has gone from bad to worse. Two unfortunate and likely related developments have marked the period since then. First, numerous legal proceedings have ensued. And second, Mr. Rahman's conduct as the dispute has festered has often been excessive and inappropriate.

Multiplicity of proceedings

[25] There has been a litany of different legal proceedings, including this action, each at various stages, mainly initiated by Mr. Rahman but some of which were escalated by the Corporation's somewhat aggressive litigation strategy. A summary of these various proceedings, which party began them, and where they currently stand is relevant to the Corporation's cross-motions.

[26] On October 25, 2020, Mr. Rahman issued his Statement of Claim in this action. On October 29, 2020, the Corporation delivered a Statement of Defence and Counterclaim, followed by an Amended Statement of Defence and Counterclaim in January 2021.

[27] The competing motions before this court were originally returnable on July 29, 2022, a day reserved for motions requiring less than an hour for a hearing. Given the amount of material filed by the parties, this was not a "short motion," so it was adjourned to May 31, 2023, when it came before me for a hearing.

[28] On the same day he initiated this action, October 25, 2020, Mr. Rahman filed an application against the Corporation with the HRTO, alleging discrimination in housing based on, amongst other things, a disability. Eventually, because the basis for Mr. Rahman's application was essentially the same allegations made in this action, the HRTO applied section 34(11) of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19 to dismiss it: see Rahman v. Peel Standard Condominium Corporation No. 779, 2022 HRTO 1300.

[29] Additionally, on November 17, 2020, Mr. Rahman brought an application before the CAT. Like this action, that application concerned Mr. Rahman's use of the accessible parking spots and the chargeback claimed by the Corporation for the legal fees it had incurred in dealing with the parking dispute.

[30] The Corporation brought a motion before the CAT to dismiss Mr. Rahman's application, challenging that tribunal's jurisdiction to deal with the application and, alternatively, seeking its dismissal based on a claim that it was vexatious and an abuse of the tribunal's process. The CAT dismissed that motion for written reasons: see Rahman v. Peel Standard Condominium Corporation No. 779, 2021 ONCAT 1.

[31] The CAT hearing proceeded online from December 2020 to January 2021. The CAT received evidence and submissions from the parties. It considered the terms in the condominium's Declaration that the Corporation claimed supported its position and the various legal arguments it advanced, including a further challenge to the CAT's jurisdiction to decide the dispute. Ultimately, the CAT issued comprehensive written reasons for concluding that Mr. Rahman was indeed entitled to park in one of the accessible spots and that the Corporation could not claim the costs it incurred in the dispute as a chargeback against his unit: see Rahman v. Peel Standard Condominium Corporation No. 779, 2021 ONCAT 13.

[32] The Corporation then brought an application for judicial review of the CAT's decision. The Divisional Court dismissed that application because the Corporation failed first to exhaust its statutory right of appeal, and there were no exceptional circumstances in the case warranting the court's interference by way of judicial review at that time: see Peel Standard Condominium Corporation No. 779 v. Rahman, 2021 ONSC 7113.

[33] Having failed to file an appeal within the prescribed time, the law firm representing the Corporation notified the Lawyers’ Professional Indemnity Company (“LAWPRO”), who appointed different counsel to act for the Corporation and bring a motion for an extension of time to appeal the CAT's decision to the Divisional Court and a motion for leave to appeal the refusal of judicial review by the Divisional Court to the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

[34] On February 16, 2022, Harvison Young J.A., in an unreported endorsement, granted the Corporation an extension for filing an appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario against the Divisional Court's dismissal of the judicial review application. However, she also stayed the appeal pending the resolution of the appeal proceedings before the Divisional Court.

[35] On April 25, 2022, the parties appeared before Fitzpatrick J., one of the Divisional Court judges who sat on the panel that dismissed the Corporation's judicial review application. That appearance became necessary because Mr. Rahman refused to approve the draft order prepared by the Corporation concerning the dismissal of its judicial review application. In an unreported endorsement, Fitzpatrick J. rejected Mr. Rahman's suggested revisions and signed the order as the Corporation's counsel drafted it.

[36] On September 29, 2022, Emery J., for the Divisional Court, granted the Corporation's motion for an extension of time to appeal the CAT's decision: see PSCC No. 779 v. Rahman, 2022 ONSC 5166. I understand that the Divisional Court heard the Corporation's appeal on June 12, 2023 and has reserved its decision.

[37] Additionally, Mr. Rahman issued a Statement of Claim against the CAO and the CAT on February 3, 2023. In essence, he seeks various orders clarifying the authority of the CAO and CAT as well as general and punitive damages for them allegedly violating his rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

[38] On February 8, 2023, the Corporation issued a Notice of Arbitration against Mr. Rahman after he refused the Corporation's overtures, made for the first time in the fall of 2022, to mediate their dispute. Mr. Rahman is not agreeable to mediation or to appointing an arbitrator. On April 25, 2023, the Corporation issued a Notice of Application seeking an order to appoint an arbitrator to adjudicate various issues concerning Mr. Rahman's allegedly harassing behaviour toward the Board of Directors, the property management team, and their agents, which the Corporation says has created a "dangerous condition" for them, and to seek indemnification for the costs of addressing Mr. Rahman's behaviours. That application will be heard on June 30, 2023.

[39] On May 1, 2023, Mr. Rahman issued a Statement of Claim against Mr. Yee and his law firm, along with two other lawyers at the firm, in which he claims that the Defendants have engaged in fraud in their representation of the Corporation in its dispute with Mr. Rahman. He seeks damages of $750,000, inclusive of a claim for punitive damages.

[40] Furthermore, Mr. Rahman has initiated several additional applications against the Corporation before the CAT concerning matters separate from the parking dispute. These include:

(1) Seeking production of further information concerning the condominium's Declaration and Rules, the Periodic information Certificates issued and the minutes of meetings held in the 12 months before the request: see Rahman v. Peel Standard Condominium Corporation No. 779, 2021 ONCAT 32 (dismissing the application).

(2) Contesting the appointment of Mr. Khan as "Honourary Vice-President" and "Honourary Deputy Secretary" of the Corporation: see Rahman v. Peel Standard Condominium Corporation No. 779, 2022 ONCAT 5 (dismissing the application for lack of jurisdiction).

(3) Complaining about a nuisance caused by water leaking from a window-based air conditioner: see Rahman v. Peel Standard Condominium Corporation No. 779, 2022 ONCAT 107 (dismissing the application for lack of jurisdiction).

(4) Complaining about misleading parking signage: see Rahman v. Peel Condominium Corporation No. 779, 2023 ONCAT 10 (dismissing Mr. Rahman's application to remove counsel for the Corporation because of an alleged conflict of interest); see also Rahman v. Peel Condominium Corporation No. 779, 2023 ONCAT 36 (dismissing the application for lack of jurisdiction).

(5) Complaining about odours entering his unit: see Rahman v. Peel Standard Condominium Corporation No. 779, 2023 ONCAT 9 (dismissing Mr. Rahman's application to remove counsel for the Corporation because of an alleged conflict of interest); see also Rahman v. Peel Standard Condominium Corporation No. 779, 2023 ONCAT 37 (dismissing the application for lack of jurisdiction); Rahman v. Peel Standard Condominium Corporation No. 779, 2023 ONCAT 48 (dismissing Mr. Rahman's motion for reconsideration).

(6) Seeking records from the Corporation concerning "all incident reports kept about Aqib Rahman": see Rahman v. Peel Standard Condominium Corporation No. 779, 2023 ONCAT 46 (dismissing the application because the records sought were related to actual or contemplated litigation).

Mr. Rahman's Conduct

[41] As the legal saga between the parties has continued and escalated, Mr. Rahman has written hundreds of emails to virtually anyone with the remotest connection to the various proceedings, including lawyers, judges, adjudicators, court and tribunal staff, and others. For example, he has sent communications to Justice Minister Lametti and the offices of the Prime Minister, the Premier, and the Mayor of Mississauga. There would be little utility in reviewing the voluminous record created by this correspondence in detail.

[42] To be sure, many, if not most, of Mr. Rahman's communications are extremely intemperate. In reviewing these, Mr. Rahman's frustration with how the Corporation decided to address the various legal proceedings between them is palpable.

[43] Additionally, no doubt perceiving Mr. Yee and his firm as his principal antagonizers in this ongoing ordeal, Mr. Rahman has levelled serious allegations of misconduct against them, claiming they have engaged in deceptive, fraudulent, perjurious, and extortionist conduct. As noted, these allegations are now the subject of a separate action. Beyond filing a claim against Mr. Yee and his law firm, Mr. Rahman has complained about them to various agencies, including the Law Society of Ontario, LAWPRO, and the Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre. He has also threatened to make these same allegations to law enforcement. It is unclear whether Mr. Rahman has followed through on any of those threats. However, even if he has, I cannot imagine the police would share his characterization of the conduct of Mr. Yee and his law firm in this dispute.

[44] Furthermore, some of Mr. Rahman's communications have been offensive, such as obliquely referencing Mr. Yee's race in one email and making sexist comments concerning a female Board member in another.

[45] Finally, on occasion, when Mr. Rahman has been displeased with the outcome of various proceedings, he has not hesitated to question the competence and objectivity of the decision-makers who have decided against him. For example, he has reportedly filed complaints with the Canadian Judicial Council against Harvison-Young J.A. and Fitzpatrick J. and threatened to file complaints with the HRTO against members of the CAT who have not decided in his favour.

[46] With all that by way of background, I turn next to address the competing motions which the parties have brought.

Law and Analysis

[47] It is sensible to begin by considering the Corporation's cross-motions because if it succeeds on any of them, Mr. Rahman's motion for summary judgment would be moot irrespective of whether it has any merit.

Should Mr. Rahman's Statement of Claim be struck without leave to amend because it is frivolous, vexatious, or scandalous?

[48] Rule 25.11(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure confers authority on this court to strike or expunge or all part of a pleading, with or without leave to amend, on the ground that it is "scandalous, frivolous or vexatious." The Court of Appeal recently provided guidance on the sort of pleading that will qualify. As explained in Abbasbayli v. Fiera Foods Company, 2021 ONCA 95, 456 D.L.R. (4th) 668, at para. 49:

A scandalous pleading includes those parts of a pleading that are irrelevant, argumentative or inserted for colour, and unfounded and inflammatory attacks on the integrity of a party: see George v. Harris, at para. 20. The focus in considering a challenge to a pleading under this rule is on the relevance of the pleading to a cause of action or defence. As this court recently noted in Huachangda Canada Holdings Inc. v. Solcz Group Inc., 2019 ONCA 649, 147 O.R. (3d) 644 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 15, "[a] fact that is relevant to a cause of action cannot be scandalous, frivolous or vexatious. On the other hand, a pleading that raises irrelevant or superfluous allegations that cannot affect the outcome of an action is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious, and should be struck out".

[49] Mindful of what will qualify, the Corporation has not demonstrated that the court should strike Mr. Rahman's entire Statement of Claim in this action under Rule 25.11(b). I have come to that conclusion for a few reasons.

[50] First, although Mr. Rahman's Statement of Claim bears little resemblance to what a lawyer might have drafted, it does plead sufficient material facts that, if proven at trial, would make out a claim of discrimination against the Corporation and justify an order that it "revoke, cease or reverse" the actions it has taken in the parking dispute.

[51] Second, while the Statement of Claim, in various places, alleges that the Corporation and its agents "harassed" Mr. Rahman instead of accommodating his disability, that claim is arguably relevant to Mr. Rahman's claim of discrimination.

[52] Third, although there are aspects of the Statement of Claim that are indeed argumentative – for example, questioning, rhetorically, whether Mr. Rahman's treatment might have been different had he been in a wheelchair or elderly – the Corporation has not sought an order to strike out those discrete aspects of the pleading.

[53] Instead, the Corporation moved for an order striking the entirety of Mr. Rahman's Statement of Claim for being scandalous, frivolous, or vexatious. As noted, much of what Mr. Rahman has pleaded is undoubtedly relevant to the legal claims he advances, and, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the court to strike the Statement of Claim in its entirety as the Corporation urged.

[54] Importantly, the Corporation did not target any discrete aspect of the Statement of Claim as objectionable. Beyond pleading Rule 25.11(b) in its Notice of Motion, its counsel did not press this argument during the hearing.

[55] In all these circumstances, I decline to strike what are arguably objectionable aspects of the Statement of Claim, as neither party made submissions concerning whether the court should do so.

Should Mr. Rahman's Statement of Claim be struck without leave to amend because it is an abuse of process?

[56] Rule 25.11(c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure confers authority on this court to strike or expunge all or part of a pleading, with or without leave to amend, on the ground that it is "an abuse of the process of the court."

[57] That rule codifies the court's long-established inherent and residual discretion to control its process to prevent its misuse for some improper purpose that would either be manifestly unfair to a party or would in some other way bring the administration of justice into disrepute: see Behn v. Moulton Contracting Ltd., 2013 SCC 26, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 227, at paras. 39-41; Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79, 2003 SCC 63, 2003 S.C.C. 63, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 77, at para. 37; Canam Enterprises Inc. v. Coles (2000), 51 O.R. (3d) 481 (C.A.), at para. 55, per Goudge J.A. dissenting, approved 2002 SCC 63, [2022] 3 S.C.R. 307.

[58] In Behn, the Supreme Court referred to R. v. Power, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 601, which described the abuse of process doctrine as concerned with proceedings that are "unfair to the point that they are contrary to the interest of justice" and R. v. Conway, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1659, which referenced concerns about "oppressive treatment": at para. 39.

[59] With that summary of the abuse of process doctrine, these reasons turn to address the Corporation's submission that the court should strike the Statement of Claim on that basis.

[60] In making that argument, the Corporation contends that the cumulative effect of Mr. Rahman's conduct since the dispute between them arose justifies such an order. In that regard, the Corporation emphasizes the numerous proceedings that Mr. Rahman has initiated, the hundreds of emails that he has sent, their intemperate and often offensive contents, his repeated and unjustified allegations of unprofessional and criminal conduct against the Corporation's lawyers, and the complaints he has made and threatened against judges and tribunal members who have not decided in his favour.

[61] To be sure, the court finds a great deal about Mr. Rahman's conduct extremely troubling. The inescapable impression that emerges from the entire record before the court on these motions is that Mr. Rahman is a man on a crusade. Mr. Rahman must understand that the courts are not a tool for him to torment and harass those he believes have aggrieved him during his ongoing dispute with the Corporation. At a certain point, should he continue to initiate proceedings against other persons or agencies that have played some role in what he perceives as the injustice of his ongoing conflict with the Corporation, Mr. Rahman runs a significant risk that on a motion by an opposing party for such a declaration, the court will declare him a vexatious litigant under section 140(1) of the Courts of Justice Act. Should an order of that nature be made, he would be unable to initiate any further action without leave of the court: see s. 140(3).

[62] In that regard, I must caution Mr. Rahman that his preoccupation with Mr. Yee and his firm, as well as his claims that they have engaged in criminal wrongdoing, find no support in the extensive record before this court on these motions. Unfortunately, Mr. Rahman's comments during the hearing and much of his correspondence filed as part of the record betray a fundamental misunderstanding concerning the role of counsel.

[63] Lawyers take their instructions from their clients. If a client maintains the facts are "X" when, in truth, they are "Y," unless the lawyer knows that their client's account is untrue, they neither engage in professional misconduct nor commit a criminal offence by advocating for their client and urging a court or tribunal to accept their client's version of events. Similarly, there is nothing improper or fraudulent in a lawyer advancing a legal argument in good faith that a court or tribunal does not ultimately accept.

[64] Having said all that, I am hard-pressed to accept the Corporation's submission that this action constitutes an abuse of process. Based on the record, of all the claims he has made, those advanced by Mr. Rahman in this action appear to be the most meritorious he has. In all the circumstances, I find it impossible not to fault the Corporation for its role in escalating this dispute from its inception.

[65] I am at a loss to understand why Mr. Rahman's accessible parking permit was insufficient from the standpoint of the Corporation to accommodate his request to use one of the three accessible parking spots in the visitor's parking lot. Even if the Corporation initially had doubts concerning Mr. Rahman's entitlement to use the accessible parking spots, Dr. Moran's October 8, 2020 letter should have unquestionably put these to rest. Instead, the Corporation continued to deny Mr. Rahman's right to park in an accessible spot, precipitating much of what has unfolded since.

[66] The Corporation has taken an overly aggressive approach to this dispute, especially in its early days. By doing so, its actions have only served to antagonize a self-represented litigant who, according to his doctor, suffers from post-concussion syndrome and is, as a result, as Dr. Moran reports in a letter dated February 14, 2023, "not mentally stable."

[67] Of course, none of that excuses Mr. Rahman's intemperate emails or personal attacks on counsel for the Corporation. Nevertheless, it does help to explain why the relationship between Mr. Rahman and the Corporation has deteriorated to the extent that it has and what precipitated much of the behaviour that the Corporation now says justifies striking Mr. Rahman’s Statement of Claim as an abuse of process.

[68] In all the circumstances, it would be ironic if Mr. Rahman's ill-informed and excessive response to the parking dispute, fuelled, as it has been, by the Corporation's aggressive approach to litigating their conflict, resulted in the court striking his pleadings for a claim that appears meritorious. Acceding to the Corporation's motion to strike Mr. Rahman's Statement of Claim as an abuse of process would be contrary to the interests of justice.

[69] On the record before this court, the Corporation has failed to meet the high standard justifying striking a Statement of Claim as an abuse of process.

Should this action be stayed pending the outcome of the Corporation's appeal of the CAT decision?

[70] Rule 21.01(3)(c) permits a Defendant to move to have an action stayed or dismissed where "another proceeding is pending in Ontario or another jurisdiction between the same parties in respect of the same subject matter." That rule vindicates the res judicata doctrine, preserving scarce adjudicative resources, ensuring finality, and avoiding the risk of inconsistent decisions.

[71] As noted, as it concerns the parking dispute, the CAT decided in Mr. Rahman's favour. It concluded that Mr. Rahman was entitled to park in one of the accessible spots and that the Corporation could not claim the costs it incurred in the dispute as a chargeback against his unit.

[72] That decision by the CAT was the subject of an unsuccessful application for judicial review. The Corporation has appealed the Divisional Court's decision to dismiss the application for judicial review to the Court of Appeal; that appeal has been stayed pending the outcome of the Corporation's appeal of the CAT decision to the Divisional Court. The Divisional Court heard the Corporation's appeal on June 12, 2023 and reserved its decision.

[73] The appeals before the Court of Appeal and the Divisional Court each concern the CAT's decision regarding Mr. Rahman's entitlement to park in an accessible spot and the chargeback claimed by the Corporation for legal costs incurred in that dispute. As such, they involve the same parties and subject matter as this action.

[74] During submissions, Mr. Rahman attempted to distinguish this action from what the CAT decision presently under appeal concerned. He argued that this action is different because it involves claims that the Corporation breached its fiduciary duty to him and has engaged in fraud. Putting to one side the merits of those allegations, the difficulty for Mr. Rahman is that he has failed to plead any such causes of action in the Statement of Claim issued in this action.

[75] The pleadings, the Statement of Claim and the Amended Statement of Defence and Counterclaim, frame the dispute that is the subject matter of this action. Based on these, I am satisfied that this action involves the same parties and subject matter dealt with by the CAT in its decision concerning the parking dispute.

[76] As a result, this action must be stayed. Should either of the outstanding appeals challenging the CAT’s decision in Rahman v. Peel Standard Condominium Corporation No. 779, 2021 ONCAT 13 be decided in the Corporation's favour, at that point, Mr. Rahman may move to reinstate this action.

Conclusion

[77] Given the decision to stay this action, Mr. Rahman's motion for summary judgment is moot. That in no way prejudices his right to renew that motion should the Corporation succeed in either of the outstanding appeals, and he successfully moves to reinstate this action.

[78] Should that come to pass, I would strongly encourage Mr. Rahman to download and read the Canadian Judicial Council's Civil Law Handbook for Self-Represented Litigants, which he can find here: https://cjc-ccm.ca/sites/default/files/documents/2021/Civil%20Handbook%20-%20EN%20MASTER%202021-10-19.pdf

[79] The Corporation's application to appoint an arbitrator is not before me. A different judge will hear it on June 30, 2023. That said, I am at a loss to understand why, if the Corporation believed mediation and arbitration were the appropriate means to resolve this dispute because it includes competing allegations of harassment, it did not make that suggestion from the outset. Had it done so, it may have avoided much of what has transpired over the last three years.

[80] Given that the Corporation was successful in its motion to stay this action, ordinarily, it would be entitled to claim the costs of that motion. However, cost awards are within the court's discretion, subject to the factors enumerated in Rule 57: see Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 57.01(1); Courts of Justice Act, s. 131(1).

[81] Considering all the circumstances, especially mindful of the conduct of the Corporation from the inception of this dispute, I decline to make an award of costs in its favour.

Signed: “J. Stribopoulos J.” Released: June 27, 2023