Keisha Sade Elisabeth Athanas

The offender, a youthful first-time offender, was convicted by a jury of assault causing bodily harm following an unprovoked group attack at a transit station.

The Crown sought 6 to 9 months of incarceration, while the defence sought a suspended sentence.

The court emphasized the principle of restraint and the strong prospects for the offender's rehabilitation, noting his lack of a criminal record, supportive family, and full-time employment.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with two years of probation, along with DNA and weapons prohibition orders.

The accused was stopped for a traffic violation and subsequently arrested for impaired driving.

At trial, the accused argued that his Charter rights under ss. 8, 10(a), and 10(b) were violated, seeking exclusion of the breath test results under s. 24(2).

The court found no breach of ss. 8 or 10(a), but concluded that a 7-minute delay in providing rights to counsel violated s. 10(b).

Applying the Grant framework, the court declined to exclude the evidence, finding the breach minimal and the evidence reliable.

The court found the accused guilty of both impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol, entering a conviction on the impaired driving count and a judicial stay on the excess blood alcohol count.

The accused was stopped at a static RIDE checkpoint and given a lawful demand to provide a breath sample into a roadside screening device.

Over approximately seven minutes, the accused repeatedly refused the demand despite multiple warnings about criminal consequences, a demonstration of the device, and a final chance warning.

Following arrest, the accused made three requests to provide a sample.

The trial judge found the accused guilty of refusing to comply with the breath demand, holding that the accused's post-arrest requests did not raise a reasonable doubt about the finality of the refusals, as the offence was complete when the accused knocked the device from the officer's hand.

The applicant brought a motion for a stay of proceedings pursuant to Section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging a violation of her right to a speedy trial under Section 11(b).

The applicant was arrested on November 30, 2016, and charged with driving over 80.

The information was sworn on December 5, 2016.

Trial dates were scheduled for August 21 and 22, 2018, resulting in a total delay of approximately 626 days or 20 months and 26 days.

The court found that the net delay, after accounting for defence waiver of 11(b) rights during resolution discussions, exceeded the presumptive 18-month ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The Crown failed to establish exceptional circumstances to justify the delay.

The primary causes of delay were inadequate disclosure practices, particularly the failure to timely provide booking videos and the identity of a searching officer, lack of Crown resources, Crown unavailability for earlier trial dates, and institutional resource constraints.

The court granted the stay of proceedings.

The accused was charged with failing to comply with a demand to provide a breath sample under section 254(5) of the Criminal Code and resisting arrest under section 129(a) of the Criminal Code.

The accused, who had suffered catastrophic injuries in a motor vehicle accident two years prior, including collapsed lungs and incontinence, was stopped by police on suspicion of impaired driving.

She attempted multiple times to provide a breath sample into an approved screening device but was unable to produce a suitable sample.

The accused claimed she had respiratory difficulties from her injuries and offered an alternative of providing a blood sample at a hospital.

The court found the accused guilty on both counts, rejecting her evidence regarding her respiratory limitations and finding that she deliberately failed to provide a suitable sample without reasonable excuse.

The appellant appealed his conviction for mischief under $5000, following a marital dispute where he was acquitted of assault charges.

The trial judge had found the appellant guilty of mischief, sentencing him to a conditional discharge.

The appeal court found that the trial judge erred in applying the principles from R. v. W.(D.) by failing to adequately explain why the complainant's evidence was preferred over the appellant's denial regarding the mischief charge, especially after stating that neither party was lying.

The conviction was quashed, and an acquittal was entered.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on charges of impaired care or control and over 80.

The accused was found intoxicated in the driver's seat of a vehicle stuck in a ditch.

The trial judge acquitted the accused, finding no realistic risk of danger because the vehicle was immovable.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in law by misapplying the statutory presumption of care or control under s. 258(1) of the Criminal Code.

The court found that the accused's intention to set the vehicle in motion was established, meaning the presumption was not rebutted and a realistic risk of danger was embedded in the presumption.

A guilty verdict was entered for the over 80 charge.

The accused, Raymond Roy, was found guilty on count one.

The court imposed a sentence of three years' jail, with 740 days credited for pre-trial custody, leaving an additional 355 days to serve.

A three-year probation period was ordered, including statutory conditions, complete abstention from alcohol and drugs for the first year, and a condition not to be in the company of his father if either is consuming alcohol for the remaining two years.

A lifetime weapons prohibition under section 110 of the Criminal Code, with an exception for hunting for sustenance under section 113, was imposed.

Roy was also ordered to provide a DNA sample and report to a probation officer within seven days of release, taking recommended counselling.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and "over 80" following a motor vehicle collision.

The Crown withdrew the impaired driving charge during trial.

The defence raised Charter applications alleging violations of sections 7, 8, and 10(b).

The Crown conceded a section 8 breach regarding the timing of the approved screening device breath demand.

The court found that while a technical Charter breach occurred, the evidence should not be excluded under section 24(2) as the breach was minor, made in good faith, and had limited impact on the accused's rights.

The court also found the breath tests were conducted "as soon as practicable" within the statutory requirement.

The accused was convicted of the "over 80" offence.