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The accused was acquitted of firearm offences because communal use of his vehicle raised reasonable doubt regarding his knowledge of the hidden weapon.
This case concerns the accused, Jore Henry, charged with possession of a prohibited firearm, careless storage of a firearm, and possessing a firearm with a defaced serial number.
The firearm was found hidden in a vehicle registered to Mr. Henry.
The central issue was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Henry had knowledge and control of the firearm.
The court reviewed evidence including vehicle registration, video surveillance, witness testimony, and the hidden nature of the firearm.
The court found that while an inference of knowledge was available due to ownership and use of the vehicle, the presence of other users with access, including the prior owner with a firearm-related criminal record, raised reasonable doubt.
The accused was acquitted on all charges.
The defendant was convicted of breaching bail conditions but acquitted of sexual assault and uttering threats due to the complainant's unreliable testimony.
The defendant, N.R., faced five counts arising from allegations of intimate partner violence, including a death threat, sexual assault, and three counts of breaching a bail order.
The court found the complainant's testimony unreliable due to inconsistencies, poor memory, and a history of breaching court orders.
The defendant's video-taped statement to police admitted to maintaining contact and cohabiting with the complainant, contrary to his bail conditions.
Applying principles from R. v. W.(D.) and R. v. Kruk regarding credibility and reliability, the court found N.R. guilty of the three bail breach counts but acquitted him of the death threat and sexual assault charges due to reasonable doubt arising from the complainant's unreliable testimony and the absence of corroborating evidence.
The court allowed limited cross-examination regarding the complainant's other sexual activity to address consent.
The Applicant, F.W., facing a sexual assault charge, brought a s. 276 application to introduce "other sexual activity" (OSA) evidence of the complainant, M.M., related to DNA evidence, capacity to consent, and inconsistencies in her statement.
The court, applying the s. 276 regime, balanced the probative value against the prejudice.
The court allowed limited cross-examination of the complainant regarding sexual activity at the nightclub/vicinity on the night of the incident and permitted examination of Crown witness S.R. and the Applicant regarding their sexual activity with the complainant, finding significant probative value for the defence's issues of consent and DNA explanation, which outweighed the prejudice.
The accused was acquitted of sexual offences due to reasonable doubt regarding intentional touching.
The defendant, G.C., was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference involving his then-girlfriend's 15-year-old daughter.
The trial in the Ontario Court of Justice involved conflicting testimony from the complainant and her mother (the defendant's common-law partner).
The court found the complainant credible but had lingering reliability concerns due to inconsistencies and a possible motive for fabrication.
The mother's testimony was largely unbelievable but confirmed an apology from the defendant and an admission of possibly touching the complainant's "bum or something." Despite a strong suspicion of guilt, the court found that the evidence, when considered holistically, left a reasonable doubt, leading to an acquittal.
Warrantless cell phone data extraction breached s. 8, but evidence admitted under s. 24(2).
The accused, charged with home invasion robberies, brought a pre-trial motion under s. 8 and s. 24(2) of the Charter to exclude evidence obtained from his cellular telephone.
The police had seized the phone upon arrest and extracted its raw data without a warrant, later obtaining a search warrant to review the data.
The court found that the warrantless extraction of raw data violated the accused's s. 8 Charter rights, rejecting the Crown's argument that it was authorized under s. 489(2)(c) of the Criminal Code.
However, applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court concluded that the evidence should not be excluded, as the impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests was minimal and society's interest in adjudicating the serious charges on their merits favoured admission.
The application was dismissed.