David Sydney Steinberg

The appellant hospital appealed a motion judge's order refusing to approve a 1998 infant settlement and granting the plaintiff's motion to amend the claim for damages.

The plaintiff sought the amendment based on new expert evidence indicating her life expectancy had increased by 30 to 35 years since the settlement was reached.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge correctly focused on the best interests of the child under Rule 7.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and reasonably relied on the uncontradicted expert evidence regarding life expectancy.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them personally liable for an unpaid restaurant account for food services provided to them, their family, and business associates.

At trial, the appellants argued that a corporation (SLM) was solely responsible, which the trial judge rejected.

On appeal, they attempted to argue they were only liable for meals when they were present.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge made no error and that the appellants could not shift their legal position on appeal, especially since it would require a reference to develop new evidence.

Costs of $8,803.43 were awarded to the respondent.

The appellants appealed an order striking their third party claim and counterclaim under Rule 21, except for a claim alleging tortious conduct to usurp corporate control.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the claims, including a claim for breach of an implied term of a Side Agreement, noting that on a Rule 21 motion, pleadings must be taken as true and the motion judge erred by relying on an absence of evidence.

The cross-appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the judgment of Justice John H. Brockenshire dated June 12, 2000.

On consent, the Court of Appeal ordered that the order go as asked.

The appellants appealed an order clarifying a previous judgment regarding interest payable to a dissenting shareholder under s. 185 of the Business Corporations Act.

The motion judge initially ordered interest 'in accordance with section 185' and later clarified that only postjudgment interest would be awarded from the date of judgment.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge retained jurisdiction to specify both the rate and the time period for interest, and properly exercised his discretion.