CITATION: R v. Cadelis, 2026 ONSC 1748

COURT FILE NO.: CR-24-50

DATE: 20260324

B E T W E E N: )

Respondent

) Susan Orlando, for the Respondent

and - )

Applicant

) Norm Stanford, for the Applicant

) HEARD: February 19, 2026

1This is a section 11(b) Charter Application for a stay of proceedings. The Application turns on a) delay that accumulated because of co-accused actions during the Ontario Court of Justice (“OCJ”) case management process, and b) the lack of vigilance by the Crown and the Court to the impact this delay would have on differently situated parties, like the Applicant. This was a case that needed to be saved from delay in the OCJ case management process, but no one - except partially the Applicant - took any steps to save it.

2The Applicant was charged on June 10, 2022, with four human trafficking related charges, all involving the same complainant, alleged to have occurred between May 22 and 28, 2022. He was charged on an information with a single co-accused, Maha Tlemcani.

3The Applicant was arrested and released on bail. Almost two years passed in the OCJ before a preliminary inquiry was set. A direct indictment was subsequently filed in the Superior Court of Justice (“SCJ”) that vacated the preliminary inquiry dates and charged the Applicant, Tlemcani and two other individuals on a four-person joint indictment. These two other individuals, Aniss Rahli and Hakim Varela, had previously been on separate informations proceeding together with the Applicant and Tlemcani during the OCJ case management process.

4The joint trial for these four individuals is scheduled to end on June 19, 2026. That is 48.36 months¹ from June 10, 2022, the date of the Applicant’s charge.²

5The Applicant submits this passage of time is simply too long, and the result of a complacent approach to case management in the Ontario Court and an inability to set trial time in the Superior Court to complete this multi-accused, four- week trial.

6The Respondent Crown submits that while the overall time is lengthy, two periods totaling 19 months should be subtracted as defence delay, leaving a total net delay below 30 months. In the alternative, it is submitted that the delay is reasonable on account of this case’s complexity, which includes significant disclosure, co-accused, and a request for a trial in the French language.

7For the reasons that follow, I find the delay in this proceeding exceeds thirty months and the Crown has not rebutted the presumption of unreasonableness. The case was permitted to drift in the OCJ by the Crown and the Court. The direct indictment – filed 23 months after the charge was laid – could not save this case from exceeding the 30-month ceiling. Whatever mild complexity this case had, it was not the driver of delay in this case and cannot amount to exceptional circumstances capable of rebutting the presumption. As a result, a stay of proceedings on the Applicant’s charges is required.

8I will review the applicable jurisprudence before moving to an analysis of the key time periods in this case.

I. Section 11(b) of the Charter

9In R v Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, [2016] 1 SCR 631, the Supreme Court of Canada leveled the

s. 11(b) cityscape and rebuilt anew. The jurisprudential approach to this section of the Charter was fundamentally altered. The Jordan framework was designed to be simple in application, predictable in effect, and provide “meaningful direction to the state on its constitutional obligations”: Jordan, at para. 50. All actors in the justice system have a part to play to ensure that criminal trials are concluded in a reasonable time, and the Jordan ratio was intended to keep delay considerations front of mind.

10Ten years later, the s. 11(b) Charter framework is now well-established. For this case, the following principles are critical to the analysis:

A presumptive ceiling of 30 months applies to cases in the SCJ. In determining whether that ceiling is exceeded, defence delay must be subtracted from total delay, resulting in “net delay”: R v Coulter, 2016 ONCA 704, at paras. 34-35; R v Jurkus, 2018 ONCA 489, at para. 5.
Defence delay can be either a) waiver or b) delay caused by defence conduct, if that conduct is the act of the Applicant, not a co-accused, either directly or through acquiescence: see R v. Ny & Phan, 2016 ONSC 8031, at paras. 37-40; R v. Gopie, 2017 ONCA 728, at paras. 128-142; R v. Singh, 2025 ONCA 843, at paras. 16-19. Co-accused delay in a joint prosecution is also commonly considered under the “case complexity” branch of the exceptional circumstances analysis.
Net delay beyond 30 months is presumptively unreasonable, placing an onus on the Crown to establish reasonableness based on the presence of exceptional circumstances. Generally, exceptional circumstances fall into two categories: discrete events or particularly complex cases. Regarding the latter, complexity has been interpreted to include cases that involve multiple co-accused: Gopie, at paras. 142, 169-171, Singh, paras, 20-23.

11I will next review the history of the case from charge until anticipated end of trial, followed by an analysis of the three areas identified above.

II. History of the Proceedings

12The Applicant was arrested October 25, 2022, on the outstanding warrant from June 10, 2022. He was charged on a two-person information with Tlemcani only. He was released on bail two days later.

13The case spent considerable time in the set date court. At certain points in the transcript, it is mentioned that the case is related to two other files, Rahli and Varela. These individuals were charged on different informations. It is clear from the transcript, however, that the Crown wanted to prosecute these four individuals collectively.

14Initial disclosure was provided to the Applicant and a Crown pre-trial occurred between October 2022 and March 27, 2023. Promisingly, a JPT was set for April 27. The JPT judge’s notes are included in Volume 4 of the Application Record. It is challenging to discern what notes occurred on April 27 and what notes on January 12, 2024, the date the JPT resumed (almost nine months later).³ What is clear, however, is that the Applicant’s case was heading to a preliminary inquiry and the Crown was intending to adduce the bulk of its case on consent via section 540(7) of the Criminal Code. The complainant, however, would be a viva voce witness: see OCJ JPT Form, page 4.

15This promising start to the JPT process quickly stalled. As the transcripts of the next nine months reveal, the case bogged down in the set date court with counsel for Rahli and Varela changing, and new counsel scheduling meetings with the Crown before moving on to complete the JPT. The discussion on the record is predominantly, if not exclusively, about setting a JPT, not continuing one. For example, on October 20, 2023 (six months after the April 27 JPT date), new counsel for Varela encapsulates what is occurring by stating:

...in a nutshell, I think we’re all waiting for everybody to be retained so that we can go to a JPT also at some point, so I’m not sure where everybody is at, but I mean, that’s where my client is at: Transcript, October 20, 2023, p.3.

16The Applicant’s representative is the only one who demurred, responding that “[Applicant’s counsel] is ready to schedule JPT dates and prelim dates”. There is no real response to this statement by anyone else in court, other than the Crown of the day (not prosecuting counsel) asking if everyone has had their Crown pre- trial meetings. This statement is made over sixteen months after the Applicant’s charges were laid, and six months after the JPT process began.

17The JPT ultimately completes on January 12, 2024. In total, 582 days or

19.13 months pass between the laying of the charge and the completion of the JPT in the Ontario Court. 8.58 of those months occurred between the start of the JPT (April 27, 2023) and its completion (January 12, 2024).

18After the JPT was completed, preliminary inquiry dates were still not set until March 26, 2024. Adjournments occurred on February 6 and March 12 due to administrative discussions between the parties and the OCJ Trial Coordinator’s Office. On March 12, counsel advises that the process is still unfolding to get all the relevant parties together on a call to determine what dates can be set. On this date, for the first time, the Crown articulates a concern about delay, as “this matter is already 18 or 19 months old”.⁴

19On March 26, preliminary inquiry dates are set for December 2 to 6, 2024. These dates are quickly scrubbed, however, as a direct indictment is filed and the parties appear in the SCJ on May 27. A JPT occurs on August 22, with the Applicant’s counsel indicating an intention to bring a series of motions (but not a s. 11(b) motion). As a result, it was agreed that a schedule of nine days of pre-trial motions would precede a four-week French trial. English speaking trial participants, including some counsel and witnesses, would have access to court interpretation.

20The SCJ Trial Coordinator’s Office offered a proposed schedule on September 9, 2024, for the motions and trial, which would have had the trial ending late August 2025. On October 4, Applicant’s counsel’s office advised that he was not available for these dates.

21On October 15, the Trial Coordinator’s Office provided a new proposed schedule for motions and trial, with the trial ending mid-December 2025. Applicant’s counsel’s office again advised that he was not available for these dates.

22Further involved attempts took place to schedule this matter for trial. On December 27, 2024, Applicant’s counsel raised, for the first time in the SCJ, the likelihood of a s. 11(b) motion. Pre-trial motion dates were eventually set for August 12, 2025, and eight days beginning September 3, 2025. These dates were subsequently vacated as no motions were filed.

23A four-week trial was ultimately set to begin on May 26, 2026, with an anticipated completion date of June 19, 2026.

III. Analysis

24I will apply the Jordan framework to this case by addressing the following questions:

What is the total delay?
Is there any defence delay?
What is the net delay?
Has the Crown rebutted the presumption of unreasonableness?

(1) What is the total delay?

25This answer is straightforward. The charge date is June 10, 2022. The anticipated end of trial is June 19, 2026. That is 1471 days or, dividing by 30.417,

48.36 months.

(2) Is there any defence delay?

26The Applicant has not expressly waived any time periods in this case.

My focus is on whether there is any delay caused by the Applicant’s conduct.

27The modern approach to defence delay is contextual. The Supreme Court of Canada instructs that “all relevant circumstances should be considered to determine how delay should be apportioned among the participants”: R v. Hanan, 2023 SCC 12, [2023] 1 SCR 467, at para. 9; see also R. v. Anderson, 2025 ONCA 172, at para.

(a) The relevant OCJ time period: April 27, 2023, to February 6, 2024

28The Crown focuses on two time periods that they submit constitute defence delay. The first period is between April 27, 2023, and February 6, 2024. This is the time between the start of the OCJ JPT and the next court date after its completion. It is submitted that the parties were proceeding collectively through

the case management process, and that the Applicant was content to wait for his co-accused’s retainer issues to resolve before resuming the JPT process.

29In my view, a contextual assessment of this time period takes into consideration a) this early stage of proceedings, b) the actions or inaction of the Applicant, c) the actions of co-accused, d) the actions or inaction of the Court, and

e) the actions or inaction of the Crown. Having considered all these factors, I cannot conclude that the Applicant acquiesced or agreed to proceed collectively through the case management process. That was simply what occurred. I come to this conclusion for several reasons.

30First, I note that the Applicant was only charged with Tlemcani, not Rahli or Varela, who appear to have been on single informations. While the Crown had decided to prosecute these four individuals together, they took no active steps in the OCJ to join them on an information. Having the police lay a joint information is a common, almost automatic, step in a joint prosecution. The failure to do so in this case is consistent with the overall theme established by the evidentiary record

– the Crown did not pay a great deal of early attention to these files. The procedural roadblocks that arose in the OCJ relating to Rahli and Varela’s counsel did not legally preclude a preliminary inquiry being set on the Applicant’s information, which did not include either of these individuals. What kept these four accused together in the OCJ was the Crown’s wish to have them follow the same case management path. I view this as meaningfully different from the situations in Albinowski⁵, Chung⁶, and Brissett⁷, which arose from trial scheduling or adjournment-related concerns later in the trial process in cases where the parties acquiesced to being tried together. What occurred in the Applicant’s case was not “[d]elay caused by scheduling challenges arising directly and inevitably from the joint situation of the appellants”: R v. Chung, 2021 ONCA 188, at paras. 194-195. What occurred in the Applicant’s case is over eight months passing in case management court because two separately charged individuals changed lawyers. The resulting delay of the Applicant’s case was not “inevitabl[e]” by any means.

31I want to be precise about the conclusion I am drawing from the decision not to join these informations in the provincial court. The failure to do so is not determinative of the issue of whether co-accused delay is attributable to the Applicant. But it is relevant, particularly when it is part of an overall pattern of conduct exhibited by the Crown where they were content to simply wait until all four accused parties had counsel before completing the OCJ JPT process. But

they did not have to wait. On this record, I find they chose to wait. And that decision (or non-decision) created delay.

32Having reviewed the transcripts during this time period, I see no effort on the Crown’s part to meaningfully move this prosecution forward, even as the weeks passed into months and Spring turned into Winter. Remedial options were available to address this delay, such as:

Having the Applicant’s joint information with Tlemcani proceed to preliminary inquiry first. I note much of the Crown’s case at the preliminary inquiry was to be admitted under s. 540(7) of the Code. While having the complainant testify multiple times would not have been ideal, it would have ensured the Applicant’s case (and Tlemcani’s) kept moving forward in the system. See, for example, the approach taken by the Crown in R. v. Ste- Marie, 2022 SCC 3, [2022] 1 SCR 14, at para. 10, involving an accused party delayed by co-accused action.
Have the matter transferred to a judge’s court to address the ongoing delay. The Supreme Court in Jordan directed all justice system participants to take active steps to curtail criminal court delay. Taking a stalled case out of case management court and bringing it to a judge’s court is a common, well-known approach to addressing delay and delay-related concerns: R v Vassell, 2016 SCC 26, [2016] 1 SCR 625, at para. 6; see also, relatedly, R v Girimonte (1997), 37 OR (3d) 617 (C.A.), at para. 41.⁸
Have the matter addressed in court by a Crown with ongoing knowledge of the file. This was a matter being prosecuted by a specialized unit of Crowns, yet each appearance in set date court involved a local prosecutor with, seemingly, little specific knowledge of the file. There was, on the face of the transcript, a lack of ownership over this file as it drifted through the case management process.⁹ This lack of ownership explains the absence of

any active decision-making on the Crown’s part to address the ongoing delay.

33I am not suggesting these steps had to occur. But they were options. What the transcripts reflect, however, is nothing of substance occurring on the part of the Crown or the presiding Justices of the Peace, beyond simply adjourning the Applicant’s case month-to-month to await resolution of the co-accused issues, despite the Applicant’s repeated representations that they were ready to complete the JPT process and schedule preliminary inquiry dates. To be clear, the Applicant could also have done more, such as requesting his information be set down for preliminary inquiry without his separately charged co-accused or requesting that he be traversed for case management before a judge. Explicitly making either request might have triggered action on the Crown’s part or at least brought this issue more to the fore. However, on a contextual view, I am satisfied the Applicant did not create any meaningful delay by his conduct during this time period; indeed, he was the only party taking any action to move his case forward more expediently.

34As a factual matter, I am not convinced that the Applicant acquiesced or agreed to be dealt with as a collective with the other accused parties. While he did not actively resist the collective adjournments, his legal representative did repeatedly express that he was ready to move to a preliminary inquiry. His representations, however, fell on deaf ears.

35I appreciate the Crown wanting to deal with these four accused parties together, and I accept that there were initially good reasons to do so. But, as the Court of Appeal for Ontario instructed in R. v. Manasseri, 2016 ONCA 703, at para. 373, the decision to keep these cases together created the obligation on the Crown to “remain vigilant that its decision did not compromise [a co-accused’s] s. 11(b) rights. A joint trial is not some magic wand the Crown can wave to make a co- accused’s s. 11(b) rights disappear”. The passage of over eight months between the start and finish of the OCJ JPT should have set off delay alarm bells in this proceeding; that it did not do so can only be further evidence of a lack of vigilance and a complacent approach towards delay. The majority of this time period will not be characterized as defence delay and subtracted from net delay.

36As I have noted, however, the Applicant’s efforts could have been greater. For that reason, I am prepared to characterize six weeks of this period as defence delay, consistent with the obligation on all parties to take active, meaningful steps to address ongoing delay in criminal proceedings. The remaining time will count against the ceiling.

(b) The relevant SCJ time period: August 26, 2025, to June 19, 2026

37The second time period alleged by the Crown to be defence delay is August 26, 2025¹⁰ to June 19, 2026. This is the time period between the end of the first proposed motion and trial schedule and the end of the actual motion and trial schedule. It is submitted that the Applicant’s counsel was the sole reason why this initial trial time was not set, and as a result all subsequent time should be characterized as defence delay.

38By this point in the proceedings, the direct indictment had been filed and the case was before the SCJ. A judicial pre-trial took place on August 22, 2024, during which the Applicant identified a lengthy list of motions he intended to bring, requiring nine days of motion time to be set aside. Notably, a s. 11(b) motion was not identified at this time.

39The process of setting nine days of motions, followed by a four-week jury trial, with four accused parties, is not straightforward. On the record before me, the SCJ Trial Coordinator made considerable efforts to offer motion/trial schedules that would work. On September 9, 2024, a schedule was proposed that involved the trial finishing on approximately August 26, 2025. Applicant’s counsel advised the court on October 4, 2024, that he was unavailable.

40On October 15, 2024, the SCJ Trial Coordinator offered a different motion and trial schedule, this one ending December 21, 2025. The Applicant’s counsel was unavailable for these dates as well.

41A lengthy back and forth followed regarding dates in 2025 and 2026, and eventually the motions were set for August and September 2025. These motions were eventually abandoned by the Applicant and the dates unused.

42The four-week trial was eventually set to begin on May 26, 2026. The anticipated end date is June 19, 2026.

43I am satisfied that this time period, beginning on August 26, 2025, and ending on June 19, 2026, should be characterized as defence delay. I say so for three reasons:

The cumbersome motion schedule exclusively proposed by the Applicant proved unnecessary
The Applicant did not provide timely notice of his s. 11(b) motion
The Applicant’s counsel was meaningfully unavailable for proposed dates in 2025

44First, the unnecessary pre-trial motion schedule. The Applicant advised of an intention to bring seven different pre-trial motions. These motions would require nine days to be set in advance of the trial time. This motion time was ultimately vacated because none of the motions were ever brought. This is defence conduct that delayed the setting of the trial. While I do not find these motions were frivolously suggested, the reality is that, by proposing them to be argued, the defence delayed the ultimate end of his trial. I agree with the comments of Justice Stribopoulos in R. v. Brown, 2019 ONSC 6899, at para. 71 where he stated:

Nevertheless, a defence lawyer's failure to engage in a timely assessment of the merits of a potential pre-trial application is not without consequences. The scheduling of precautionary placeholder motions on the off chance that they may later prove to have merit is not a practice this court can countenance in the post- Jordan era. A defence lawyer is obligated to get his or her "head in the file" before squandering scarce judicial resources by scheduling motions that in time are abandoned. Such conduct "exhibits marked inefficiency" and is “illegitimate”: see Cody, at paras. 31-33.

It follows that all of the delay that resulted from the scheduling of the Garofoli application and its later abandonment must be attributed to the defence: see Jordan, at para. 65; Cody, at para. 34.

45Second, the Applicant did not advise at the initial SCJ JPT, when the motion and trial schedule was first being organized, he intended to bring a delay application. Frankly, given the significant passage of time in the OCJ, this must have been a live consideration in the mind of the Applicant or his counsel. Section 11(b) was, however, only raised months later, after the motions had been set and while the parties were still in the process of setting the four-week trial.

46Delayed notification violates the proactive duty of the accused discussed by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. J.F., 2022 SCC 17, [2022] 1 SCR 330, at para. 36. The Applicant’s failure to proactively notify limited the availability of remedial steps to try and alleviate the delay. It is conduct that occasioned delay.

47Finally, there is defence counsel’s unavailability for the proposed motion and trial dates. I am satisfied it was counsel’s unavailability that prevented this trial from being heard and completed in 2025. Two separate four-week periods were made available. Counsel declined both on account of unavailability. The details of that unavailability do not form part of this record. In the circumstances, I agree with Justice Campbell’s statement in R. v. Bent, 2025 ONSC 1962, that “an accused cannot properly delay a criminal trial in order to accommodate the professional calendar of his or her defence counsel, and then later turn around and realistically complain that their own actions in this regard resulted (or contributed) to an unreasonable delay in the criminal proceedings against them”. I would further note that, at the time the Applicant was turning down these proposed 2025 trial dates, he had not yet advised of his intention to bring a s. 11(b) application. The Court and the other parties were available to complete the Applicant’s trial by the end of August 2025. The Applicant was not.

48Again, the characterization of defence delay is a contextual assessment. The Applicant did not proactively advise the court of his intention to bring a s. 11(b) application. He complicated date setting by a) requiring unnecessary motions to be scheduled, and b) his counsel indicated unavailability for earlier trial dates. In the collective circumstances, I am satisfied that all time after August 26, 2025 (298 days or 9.79 months) should be characterized as defence delay and subtracted from net delay.

(3) What is net delay?

49Total Delay = 48.36 months Minus Defence delay of 11.29 months¹¹

Net Delay = 37.07 months

(4) Has the Crown rebutted the presumption of unreasonableness?

50The net delay in this case significantly exceeds thirty months. That is presumptively unreasonable under s. 11(b) of the Charter. The Crown now bears

a burden to demonstrate the presence of exceptional circumstances, otherwise a stay of proceedings is required: Jordan, para. 47.

51Exceptional circumstances are defined in Jordan as lying outside the Crown’s control, “in the sense that (1) they are reasonably unforeseen or reasonably unavoidable, and (2) Crown counsel cannot reasonably remedy the delays emanating from those circumstances once they arise.”¹²

52The Jordan majority opinion further refines this point in paragraph 70:

It is not enough for the Crown, once the ceiling is breached, to point to a past difficulty. It must also show that it took reasonable available steps to avoid and address the problem before the delay exceeded the ceiling. This might include prompt resort to case management processes to seek the assistance of the court, or seeking assistance from the defence to streamline evidence or issues for trial or to coordinate pre-trial applications, or resorting to any other appropriate procedural means. The Crown, we emphasize, is not required to show that the steps it took were ultimately successful — rather, just that it took reasonable steps in an attempt to avoid the delay.

53The Crown’s principal argument is that this was a complex case, and the interests of justice strongly prefer joint trials. Prosecuting four individuals in this case injected complexity and reasonable delay, even if in excess of the 30-month ceiling.

54I would refer to the following aspects of this case in reliance on my conclusion that the Crown cannot meet their onus on this issue:

Exclusive of defence delay, this case spent 22 months in OCJ (June 10, 2022, to May 24, 2024, minus six weeks) and 15 months in SCJ (May 24,

2024, to August 26, 2025). This totaled 37 months of net delay.

I accept the Crown’s complexity argument, but only to a point. Four accused means four counsel and greater complexity in trial scheduling. A French trial requires a French jurist, which further complicates scheduling. This was also a jury trial, so the trial required four consecutive weeks, on top

of the nine motion days that ultimately proved unnecessary. Scheduling such a matter takes meaningfully longer than a more straightforward case.

Despite these complexities, however, the record reveals the SCJ Trial Coordinator put significant effort into organizing this matter and setting it for completion by August 25, 2025. That is fifteen months from the first SCJ appearance, and a reasonable period of time considering the necessity of

a) conducting a SCJ JPT, b) engaging in the date setting process, and c) finding time for the complicated motion and trial schedule proposed at the JPT. Given the length of trial time involved (six weeks inclusive of motions), it was in the interests of justice to proceed jointly at this stage: see R v. Singh, 2025 ONCA 843, at paras. 15-16. Were this case only three months above the Jordan ceiling, I would have nevertheless found the delay reasonable in these circumstances.

However, it is not within three months. It is over seven months above the Jordan ceiling. It is also clear in this case that the operative delay did not occur in the SCJ but in the OCJ, for all the reasons earlier discussed. This case meaningfully exceeded 30 months not because it was particularly complex to schedule, but because it was left to drift through the OCJ case management process. The Crown was not reasonably diligent in managing this case during that time period. As I have earlier reviewed, there were options left unexplored that could have addressed this excessive delay: Jordan, para. 70; see also R v Hillier, 2026 ONCA 202, at para. 81-82. The preliminary inquiry that was delayed being set was not complex, it was a one-witness case with the remainder admitted under s. 540(7) of the Code. The “strong policy preference” for joinder discussed in Singh is lessened when the inquiry being held up by co-accused conduct is one week, not six.
I take into consideration the lack of vigilance and diligence by the Crown during the OCJ portion of these proceedings. I also take into consideration the Applicant’s casual approach to his s. 11(b) rights in the SCJ, i.e. not advising of his s. 11(b) concern immediately, and prioritizing his counsel’s schedule over those concerns. The Applicant also increased scheduling complexity in the SCJ by raising the spectre of motions ultimately never brought: R v. Faulkner, 2018 ONCA 174, at para. 178.
I do not consider the disclosure in this case as meaningfully greater than other cases of the same nature. The disclosure referred to in paragraph 19 of the Respondent’s factum is consistent with the disclosure commonly associated to a human trafficking prosecution and would not have required

“an inordinate amount” of preparation time: Jordan, paras. 77-78. Indeed, I do not understand the provision of disclosure to have been a source of delay in this case.

55Case complexity is, at bottom, a qualitative assessment: R v. Cody, 2017 SCC 31, [2017] 1 SCR 659, at para. 64. I conclude that while there were complexities related to the scheduling of this matter for trial once it reached the SCJ, those complexities did not account for the bulk of delay in the OCJ during case management. Options to relieve this delay on the Applicant went unexplored and, as a result, delay accrued that cannot be accounted for as “exceptional circumstances”: Jordan, para. 79.

56In conclusion, the Respondent Crown has not rebutted the presumption of unreasonableness in this case.

IV. Disposition

57The Application is granted and the Applicant’s charges on the indictment

are stayed.

LATIMER J.

Released: March 24, 2026

CITATION: R v. Cadelis, 2026 ONSC 1748

COURT FILE NO.: CR-24-50

DATE: 20260324

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

B E T W E E N:

His Majesty the King

Respondent

- and -

Wolff Cadelis

Applicant

REASONS FOR DECISION

(Section 11b Application)

LATIMER J