Adrienne Samberg

The applicant sought a stay of charges due to a breach of his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The court applied the Jordan framework, calculating total delay, subtracting defence delay (including prolonged non-attendance, inefficient re-tracing of procedural steps, time pursuing resolution, and defence counsel unavailability), and accounting for the COVID-19 pandemic as an exceptional circumstance.

Despite significant Crown efforts, the net delay still exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court cases by 22 days.

The court found the s. 11(b) right was breached and stayed the charges.

The accused was charged with four counts of assault against his spouse arising from incidents occurring between December 2018 and February 2019 during the breakdown of their relationship.

The Crown's case rested entirely on the testimony of the complainant.

The court found the complainant's evidence unreliable and fraught with significant gaps in memory, credibility issues including evidence of extortion attempts, and demonstrated animus toward the accused.

The court acquitted on counts one through three due to reasonable doubt regarding consent and self-defence.

However, the court convicted on count four based on security footage corroborating the complainant's account of a forceful push in a parking garage, finding the accused's response disproportionate to the complainant's attempt to take custody of their child.

The defendant was charged with assault causing bodily harm against his estranged wife.

The defendant admitted striking his wife three to four times in the face, causing significant injuries including two black eyes and broken nasal bones.

The defendant raised a self-defence claim under Criminal Code section 34, arguing he acted to protect his three-year-old son from imminent harm.

The Crown conceded there was an air of reality to the defence.

The court found that the defendant subjectively believed his son's safety was at risk and that this belief was objectively reasonable given the circumstances, including the complainant's prior threat of self-harm, her volatile behavior that evening, and her deliberate destruction of his clothing.

The court concluded the force used was reasonable in the circumstances and acquitted the defendant.

The accused was charged with attempted fraud, robbery, assault, and multiple counts of failing to comply with probation after entering a stopped vehicle at a Toronto intersection, taking the driver’s phone, and assaulting him.

Identification was established through CCTV footage from a nearby restaurant, dashcam video from a passing vehicle, circumstantial evidence linking clothing found at the scene, and an incriminating in-court utterance.

The court held that the accused’s removal of the complainant’s phone from his hand constituted an indirect application of force amounting to assault, satisfying the elements of robbery under s. 343(c) of the Criminal Code.

The attempted fraud charge failed because the court was left with reasonable doubt as to whether the accused’s claim that the vehicle had struck him was false.

The accused was convicted of robbery and two counts of failing to comply with probation, while the assault conviction was stayed under the Kienapple principle.

P.B. was found guilty by a jury of sexual interference, two counts of sexual assault, and incest against his daughter.

The court considered the statutory purpose and principles of sentencing, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for child sexual abuse.

Aggravating factors included a gross breach of parental trust, prolonged and escalating abuse, grooming, and the devastating impact on the victim, including an alleged pregnancy and abortion.

Mitigating factors included no prior criminal record and credit for stringent bail conditions.

The court applied case law regarding sentencing ranges for such offences and the totality principle for consecutive sentences.

A total sentence of 8 years was imposed, reduced by 6 months for pre-sentence bail conditions, resulting in a net sentence of 7.5 years.

Ancillary orders included a lifetime firearms prohibition, DNA order, Sex Offender Information Registration for life, and a communication ban with the victim.

The accused admitted historical sexual abuse of a younger cousin, but the dispositive issue was whether any charged incidents occurred after the accused turned 18.

Applying the balance of probabilities standard to this jurisdictional fact under the Young Offenders Act, the court found the complainant's evidence on timing confused and unreliable, and accepted independent evidence casting doubt on the alleged timeline.

Because it was at least equally likely that the last incident occurred while the accused was still a young person, the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction.

The charges were dismissed.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol level exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The defendant did not dispute the breath test readings of 110 and 90 mgs. percent but argued that bolus alcohol consumption—the rapid ingestion of a large quantity of alcohol shortly before driving—created a reasonable doubt as to his blood-alcohol level at the time of driving.

The Crown proved the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defendant's evidence regarding the timing and quantity of alcohol consumed was found to be manifestly unreliable and inconsistent.

The court rejected the bolus drinking defence and convicted the defendant.

The Crown applied under section 117.05 of the Criminal Code for an order forfeiting firearms and ammunition seized from the respondent and prohibiting him from possessing firearms.

The respondent, who had been apprehended under a Form 1 psychiatric assessment in September 2008 following concerning behaviour at a functional restoration program, opposed the application.

The court found that while the respondent's conduct on September 11, 2008 raised clinical concerns, the assessment must be made at the time of the hearing.

Considering the respondent's lack of criminal record, absence of violence, proper storage of weapons, and his family physician's opinion that he poses no danger to himself or others, the court declined the Crown's application for forfeiture and prohibition orders.

The accused pleaded guilty to dangerous operation of a motor vehicle, assault with a weapon, criminal negligence causing bodily harm, and flight from police arising from a road rage incident.

The Crown sought 18 months custody (12 months concurrent for the primary offences and 6 months consecutive for flight from police).

The defence sought 6 to 9 months.

The court conducted a Gardiner hearing to determine whether the accused intentionally struck the victim with his vehicle.

The court found the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused intended to strike the victim, though he recklessly drove toward the van and used it as a weapon to threaten.

The court imposed 9 months total custody (7 months concurrent for the primary offences and 2 months consecutive for flight from police), followed by 18 months probation, a 3-year driving prohibition, DNA order, and a section 109 weapons prohibition order.

The accused challenged impaired driving and over-80 charges arising from a R.I.D.E. stop, arguing the arresting officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds and seeking exclusion of breath samples under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The court held that the combination of driving through the spot check, admission of recent drinking, odour of alcohol, bloodshot eyes, nervousness, and staggering gait provided an objective basis for the officer's subjective belief that the accused was impaired.

The accused also sought a stay under s. 24(1), alleging late disclosure of the breath room video deprived him of the opportunity to seek entry into a reduced suspension ignition interlock program.

The court held that any trial fairness prejudice from late disclosure was cured by adjournment and that the inability to apply for the program did not engage a s. 7-protected right because driving is a privilege, not a protected liberty interest.

Convictions were entered.