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Judicial review dismissed as the RPD reasonably vacated refugee status for misrepresentation of identity.
The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) vacating her refugee status under section 109 of the IRPA for misrepresentation.
The RPD found that the applicant had entered Canada under a different identity and was not in Guinea during the time of the alleged persecution.
The applicant challenged the RPD's reliance on a facial comparison report, its assessment of her evidence, and its refusal to apply issue estoppel based on a subsequent grant of permanent residence.
The Federal Court held the RPD's decision was reasonable, finding no error in the RPD's evidentiary assessments or in its conclusion that issue estoppel did not apply because the prior identity assessment by an IRCC officer was neither final nor deciding the same issue.
Judicial review allowed as IAD unreasonably reopened appeal without applying the section 71 test.
The Minister sought judicial review of an IAD decision reopening the respondent's appeal of a departure order.
The respondent had previously abandoned her appeal, allegedly due to mental health issues impairing her ability to attend the hearing.
The IAD granted the reopening based on a 2019 psychiatric report and perceived counsel shortcomings in 2017.
The Federal Court allowed the judicial review, finding the IAD failed to properly apply the test for reopening under section 71 of the IRPA, failed to make a finding of counsel incompetence amounting to a breach of natural justice, and ignored contemporaneous medical evidence indicating the respondent was coherent in 2017.
Secondary examination of a refugee claimant at a port of entry does not constitute Charter detention.
The appellant, a citizen of Iran, arrived in Canada and claimed Convention refugee status.
He was referred to a secondary examination by an immigration officer, during which he omitted important factual details about his claim.
He was not advised of his right to counsel until the conclusion of this examination.
The appellant argued that the secondary examination constituted a detention under s. 10(b) of the Charter and that his s. 7 rights were violated.
The Supreme Court of Canada held that a secondary examination at a port of entry is a routine part of the screening process and does not constitute a detention within the meaning of s. 10(b).
Furthermore, the principles of fundamental justice under s. 7 do not require the provision of counsel during routine information gathering at a port of entry.
The appeal was dismissed.
