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Municipal power to fix a permit fee authorizes only a flat fee, not a variable volume-based charge.
The appellant challenged a municipal by-law that set a permit fee for soil removal based on the volume of soil removed.
The Supreme Court of Canada held that the enabling statute, which authorized the municipality to 'fix a fee for the permit', only permitted a flat fee and did not authorize a variable fee based on the measure of activities conducted.
The appeal was allowed and the by-law was quashed.
French-only Quebec court summons did not violate s. 133.
The appellant challenged a conviction arising from a municipal traffic prosecution on the basis that the initiating summons was issued only in French, contrary to s. 133 of the Constitution Act, 1867.
The Court held, by majority, that it had jurisdiction to entertain an appeal notwithstanding the provincial appellate court's refusal of leave, given the constitutional significance of the issue.
On the merits, the majority concluded that s. 133 protects the language choice of speakers, writers, and issuers in judicial proceedings, but does not entitle a litigant to receive court process in the litigant's own language.
A unilingual French summons issued by a Quebec court was therefore valid, and the appeal was dismissed with costs, Wilson J. dissenting.
Company's obligation to supply town with power at fixed price limited to 4,000 horsepower reserve.
The Province of Ontario and the predecessor in title of Boise Cascade Canada entered into an agreement in 1905 to develop hydro-electric power on the Rainy River.
The agreement required the company to supply the Town of Fort Frances with electrical power at a rate not exceeding $14 per horsepower per annum.
The agreement created a reserve of 4,000 horsepower for use on the Canadian side.
The Town's energy consumption eventually exceeded the 4,000 horsepower reserve.
The Supreme Court of Canada held that the company's obligation to supply power to the Town at the fixed price of $14 per horsepower per annum was limited to the 4,000 horsepower reserved under the agreement.
Prior dismissal barred identical later indictment proceedings.
The appellant challenged a conviction entered after the Crown commenced indictment proceedings on charges identical to informations previously dismissed by a provincial court judge who had erroneously concluded he lacked jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court held that the earlier court had competent jurisdiction, the accused had been put in jeopardy once pleas were entered, and the dismissals remained effective unless rescinded, quashed, or reversed.
Applying the autrefois acquit principles discussed in R. v. Riddle, the Court concluded that the Crown could not ignore the prior dismissals and simply commence new proceedings.
The plea should have succeeded and the appeal was allowed.
The Canada Evidence Act permits orders for the production of documents without ancillary oral testimony.
The United States District Court sought judicial assistance via letters rogatory under s. 43 of the Canada Evidence Act to obtain documents and tape recordings for a criminal tax evasion trial in Florida.
The Alberta Court of Appeal held that s. 43 did not permit an order for the production of documents unless it was ancillary to oral testimony.
The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that s. 43 should be given a broad, liberal construction in the interests of comity and permits an order for the production of documents alone.
The Court also held that illegally intercepted telephone conversations could be disclosed at the s. 43 hearing, provided they were only used against accused persons who were not parties to the communications.