E. C. Chiasson

The appellant gravel pit operators challenged municipal by-laws that imposed a volumetric fee for soil and gravel removal permits.

They argued the fees constituted indirect taxation ultra vires the province and that the by-laws were discriminatory.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the volumetric fees, while indirect in their general tendency, were supportable under the provincial licensing power as they were ancillary to a valid regulatory scheme intended to cover the costs of road repair and regulation.

The Court also found that any discrimination between commercial and non-commercial extractors was implicitly authorized by the enabling provincial legislation.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiffs applied for a rehearing of an appeal regarding amendments to pleadings in an aboriginal claim.

The Supreme Court of Canada had previously dismissed the appeal, allowing the amended pleadings to stand because they were not clearly invalid.

The plaintiffs sought a pronouncement on further issues considered by the Court of Appeal, such as the nature of the action and the necessity to establish the continued existence of the Indian nations.

The Supreme Court dismissed the application, finding it premature to pronounce on these questions without evidence at this early stage of the action.

Appeal from an order permitting amendment of pleadings in litigation arising from alleged impacts of railway construction on river habitat and asserted Aboriginal and Indian Act rights.

The appellants argued the proposed amended pleadings were defective because the claims were communal in nature and could not be advanced as personal actions by members of Nations.

The Court held that authority to bring the claims and the personal entitlement of members were questions of fact or mixed fact and law best determined by the trial judge.

The appeal was dismissed and the amendments were allowed to stand.

The appellant challenged a municipal by-law that set a permit fee for soil removal based on the volume of soil removed.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the enabling statute, which authorized the municipality to 'fix a fee for the permit', only permitted a flat fee and did not authorize a variable fee based on the measure of activities conducted.

The appeal was allowed and the by-law was quashed.

The respondents were charged with unlawful conspiracy to lessen competition under s. 32(1)(c) of the Combines Investigation Act.

The proceedings were conducted by counsel authorized by the Attorney General of Canada.

The respondents sought prohibition to prevent the Provincial Court from proceeding, arguing that under s. 92(14) of the Constitution Act, 1867, only the provincial Attorney General could prosecute criminal offences.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the federal Attorney General has the constitutional authority to conduct the prosecution.

A majority found that s. 32(1)(c) is validly enacted under Parliament's trade and commerce power (s. 91(2)) as well as its criminal law power, and therefore federal prosecutorial authority is valid.

Other justices held that even if the Act rested solely on the criminal law power, Parliament is competent to authorize the federal Attorney General to prosecute federal offences.