John L. Finlay

The appellants sought an extension of time and a re-hearing on the issue of costs following an appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada granted the applications and awarded costs of the appeal, the application to extend time, and the re-hearing to the respondent.

The appellant Indian band surrendered a portion of its reserve to the Federal Crown in 1966 for full market value to be used as a municipal airport, with a stipulation that the land would revert to the band if it ceased to be used for public purposes.

Following 1988 amendments to the Indian Act that brought lands surrendered 'otherwise than absolutely' into the definition of 'reserve' for taxation purposes, the band levied property taxes on the respondent municipality.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that despite the sui generis nature of native land rights, the true intention of the parties was an absolute surrender for sale.

The Court concluded that the lands were not 'designated lands' under the Indian Act and thus not subject to the band's property tax jurisdiction.

The appellant Indian bands enacted property tax assessment by-laws under the Indian Act, which included appeal procedures to band-appointed tribunals.

The respondents, who owned a railway right-of-way through the reserves, sought judicial review to challenge the assessments, arguing their lands were not 'in the reserve'.

The motions judge struck the judicial review application, finding the band appeal procedures provided an adequate alternative remedy.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the bands' appeal, holding that the band tribunals lacked sufficient institutional independence (due to lack of financial security and security of tenure), and therefore did not constitute an adequate alternative remedy, allowing the judicial review to proceed.

The respondents were senior managers of Prime and Calpine, two reporting issuers involved in mineral exploration.

The British Columbia Securities Commission found that the respondents breached the timely disclosure provisions of the Securities Act by failing to disclose material changes, including drilling results, a private placement, and a contractual dispute, before engaging in securities transactions.

The Court of Appeal set aside the Commission's orders, finding errors of law in the interpretation of "material change".

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that considerable deference is owed to specialized tribunals like the Securities Commission, even where there is a statutory right of appeal and no privative clause.

The Court restored the Commission's findings and orders, confirming that drilling results can constitute a material change and that senior management has a duty to inquire about material changes before causing an issuer to engage in securities transactions.

The appellant sued Quebec asbestos companies in British Columbia for damages related to asbestos exposure.

He sought discovery of documents.

The respondents refused, citing the Quebec Business Concerns Records Act, which prohibits removing business documents from Quebec pursuant to foreign judicial orders.

The BC courts declined to rule on the constitutionality of the Quebec statute and dismissed the application to compel production.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the BC courts and the SCC had jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of the Quebec statute.

Applying the principles from Morguard, the Court held that the Quebec blocking statute was constitutionally inapplicable to proceedings in other provinces because it offended the principles of order and fairness inherent in the Canadian federation.